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ABSTRACT
Our current understanding of tribunal resource allocation decision-making is via judicial
review of tribunal decisions and/or the capacity, independence and appointment process
of tribunal members. This analysis of tribunals provides incomplete information.

This qualitative five year case study asked the three following questions:

Research Question #1:
Do procedures statistically affect the resource allocation decisions of the Board? If so,
what elements of the procedures create this statistical effect?

The author analyzed the quantitative research results relative to the A4R theory‘s four
procedural conditions of transparency and concluded that the A4R theory it bwas not
‗fine grain‘ enough to identify the complexity of the tribunal resource allocation decision
making. Quantitative analysis revealed that Board decisions were influenced by elements
of the Board‘s procedure. In particular, the author‘s statistical analysis found that the
Board‘s procedures statistically did affect resource allocation decisions by disadvantaging
self- represented parties and, for a certain year, parties not participating in the tribunal‘s
hearing orally/in person.

Research Question #2:
What substantive arguments affect the resource allocation decisions of the Board?

ii

This study confirmed that submissions by the parties – the patient and OHIP - affected
resource allocation decisions. However, within these substantive arguments the research
found that patients and administrative requirements played a key role in determining out
of country coverage of nonemergency inpatient health services (OCCNEIHS). The
research also identified that more patients requesting OCCNEIHS argued for treatment to
be considered acceptable than argued that treatment domestically would be delayed. The
research also identified that there was an absence of arguments regarding the economic
implications of OCCNEIHS.

Research Question #3
What Should Be the Revised Resource Allocation Decision Making Mechanism?
It is recommended that any non-neutral procedures be further examined and potentially
eliminated. It was also recognized that significant expert consensus on multiple factors
was required in order to make resource allocation decisions. As a result of this research, it
is recommended that resource allocation decisions should be based on a multi factorial
algorithm comprised of ongoing expert consensus, available publicly and utilized by
OHIP for the determination of resource allocation. The Board‘s jurisdiction should be
revised.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION

Why allocate resources? Scarcity. Scarcity assumes more people want a given resource
than is available. When more people want a resource than is available, difficult choices
have to be made. So how do we – as a society – decide how to allocate a limited
resource? What is the decision making process? Do certain factors influence the decision
making process? What is the theoretical, actual and revised resource allocation decision
making process? This thesis attempts to answer these questions

Adjudicative administrative tribunals1 are one mechanism for making decisions regarding
the allocation of resources. Tribunals in Ontario are a quasi-judicial decision making
mechanism which provide parties - who have been denied a government resource by a
government agency – a forum to appeal the resource allocation decision. Tribunals are
important because the vast majority of Ontario residents will not access the judicial
system for resource allocation decision making but may access the quasi-judicial system
of tribunals. As such, tribunals have a larger impact on the residents of Ontario than the
courts. However, very little is known about Canadian tribunals – and Ontario tribunals in
particular - and the factors which influence tribunal resource allocation decision making.
Our current understanding of tribunal resource allocation decision making has taken
place – in the author‘s opinion – in the following two waves.

1

Hereinafter ―tribunals‖.

1

The first wave of attempting to understand tribunal decision making was the result of the
legal analysis of judicial review. While courts typically defer substantive decision making
to the tribunal, they review the tribunal‘s decision in accordance with procedural
requirements according to the law. The courts have also provided tribunals with direction
concerning what the courts consider appropriate procedural elements. As such, the
court‘s oversight and direction to a tribunal through judicial review has been an important
factor in understanding tribunals.

The second wave of attempting to understand tribunals and the factors which may
influence their resource allocation decision making came from the examination of
tribunal members themselves – typically in terms of the members‘ expertise,
independence, potential bias and appointment processes.

Both the first wave and the second wave - in the author‘s opinion – provide important but
preliminary information on tribunal procedures. However, judicial review and tribunal
member attributes do not provide a holistic view of resource allocation decision making
by tribunals. This limited view of tribunal decision making about resource allocation is
not only providing an incomplete picture of tribunal decision making but is also a missed
opportunity to proactively address problems before they come before the tribunal. A
more comprehensive empirical analysis of actual tribunal decision making is required.

In this thesis, the author seeks to develop a novel third wave in understanding tribunal
resource allocation decision making. The premise of the third wave is that a tribunal‘s

2

decision cannot be understood in isolation from the tribunal‘s procedures, the
submissions by the parties, an understanding of who is appearing before the tribunal and
why they are submitting a request.2 These elements cannot be separated from the
decision arrived at by the tribunal and must be viewed together in order to understand
tribunal decision making. In this respect, unlike the first wave of judicial review for
tribunal compliance with court sanctioned procedures or the second wave of tribunal
membership attributes, this thesis looks at the interplay between patient profiles,
procedures, substantive arguments and the ultimate tribunal decisions.

An example of the interplay between profiles, process and substantive argument could be
seen in a basketball game. In a basketball game, the focus is not just on the referee‘s
capacity to referee, his/her appointment as a referee or the independence he/she has to
call certain plays. The focus is not on a sports networks‘ review of the referee‘s
decisions. The interest in basketball is on the game played between the teams. It is
important to know who is on the home team and who is on the visitor team. Assuming the
home team is a constant professional basketball team, observers may wish to know who
is on the visitor team. The seven foot tall home team of professional basketball players
may be playing a competitive game against another seven foot tall professional basketball
team from a rival city. The home team may also be playing against a first grade school
team that is three feet tall and never played a competitive game. In this respect, knowing
2

In this study, one party is constant while the other party is constantly changing. The party that is
constantly changing – in this study it is the patient - activates the hearing before the tribunal. It is also the
patient who is affected by the tribunal‘s decision. However, it is not known who the patients are, where
they reside, why they come before the tribunal and what remedy the patient of the tribunal. In order to
provide a more fulsome context, the author analyzed each of the decisions in this case study in order to
create a ‗patient profile‘ for the study period. The patient profile data are outline in Chapter 7.
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who the parties are gives the observer a sense of the game which is about to be played –
or in the case of parties before the tribunal, a sense of the hearing that is about to take
place.

In terms of process, the basketball teams are required by the rules to play within a
basketball court. They do not play outside the court line and into the stands. The players
also do not bring a ping pong table onto the court and try to play ping pong while the
basketball game is underway. The rules of the game are assumed to be understood. If the
rules of the game are not abided by, it may be because a player does not understand the
rules or they may understand the rules but wish to make a point contrary to the rules.
Applied to a tribunal hearing, the tribunal has a jurisdiction within which a hearing takes
place. The parties cannot expand the jurisdiction of the tribunal (e.g. play in the stands) or
bring into the tribunal those elements which are not within the jurisdiction (e.g. a ping
pong table). A party before the tribunal may truly not understand the jurisdiction of the
tribunal, may want to make a point or may not have another suitable forum in which to
bring forth concerns.

Also in terms of process, the basketball league does not purposely disadvantage the teams
– such as putting rocks on one side of the basketball court thus disadvantaging one of the
teams. Instead, the basketball league tries to ensure that the basketball court is a level
playing field for both teams so the teams can concentrate on playing the game rather than
navigating the rocks. The venue may inadvertently disadvantage a team if the game is
continually played on one team‘s home court or if the venue lights are too bright for one
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team to play to their potential. Applied to a tribunal hearing, the tribunal‘s procedures are
intended to create a level playing field with no intentional barriers (e.g. the rocks on one
half of the court) upon which the game can be actually played. While not intended, the
tribunal‘s procedures may inadvertently disadvantage one of the parties if self
represented or unable to attend the hearing in person.

In terms of substantive issues, it is helpful to know whether a particular team plays well
in the first part of the game but not in the second part of the game or if the team has a
particular technical skill in one area of play but not in another. Applied to the tribunal, it
is helpful to know if a party excels in one part of the substantive argument before the
tribunal but not in another substantive argument.

Overall, it is important for the observer not just to know who won the basketball
game/granted a resource but rather to know who the teams/parties were, if they played
within the court/jurisdiction, where they were inadvertently disadvantaged by the
venue/procedures to the point of losing the game/not attaining the resource requested and
where in the process a party won the game/what substantive argument(s) attained the
resource requested.

Continuing with the basketball example, most players and teams are assessed over an
extended time period. In this respect, trends can be observed both within one player and
between teams. This assessment over time is important in order to determine if a
particular game reflects a trend or if it reflects an outcome that occurred by chance and is

5

not a trend. Applied to the tribunal, it is important to understand if the elements of patient
profile, procedures, substantive arguments and the Board decision occurred by chance or
if the elements reflect a trend. To date, most legal research is based on case analysis. The
academic discussion, outlined in Chapter 3, identifies that case analysis is insufficient and
empirical research is required. However, there is little legal research on multiple cases
over an extended period of time which is analyzed statistically to distinguish between
chance occurrences and trends. This thesis seeks to analyse multiple cases over an
extended period of time and to statistically analyse the data in order to determine if the
results were due to chance occurrences or if the results reflected a trend or trends.

Empirical Research
In order to understand the effect of procedural elements and the substantive arguments on
tribunal resource allocation decisions and how this compared to theoretical models, a
case study of a tribunal was undertaken. In this respect, one section of a regulation –
section 28.4(2) of Regulation 5523 of the Health Insurance Act,4 which deals with the
funding of health care outside of Canada, was critically analyzed over a five year period.
When the government denies publicly funded health insurance for health care requested
outside of Canada, the government‘s decision can be appealed to the Health Services
Appeal and Review Board (HSARB). It should be noted that the statutes and regulation
related to HSARB do not require HSARB to act primarily as a health service resource
allocation decision making body. However, that is the effect of what it does, and in the
course of fulfilling its legislative mandate, HSARB does operate though a resource

3
4

R.R.O. 1990, [hereinafter ―Regulation 552‖].
R.S.O. 1990, c.H.6, [hereinafter ―the HIA‖].
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allocation lens. This resource allocation lens can be seen throughout the approximately
400 decisions regarding s.28.4(2). The decisions were empirically analysed with respect
to the following: the characteristics of the parties before the tribunal, the procedural
elements of the tribunal hearing, the substantive arguments of the parties before the
tribunal and the effect these latter two elements had on the tribunal‘s ultimate decision to
grant or deny resource allocation. The resource being allocated was public financing of
health care outside of Canada.

The five year period was selected for a number of reasons. First, the study time period
represented a period of relative stability. One provincial government party was in power
during this period suggesting little philosophical or political change to out of country
health care policy and/or legislation during this period. Second, the leadership of the
HSARB as a tribunal and the office secretariat remained constant during the period.
Third, the position of the appellate courts in Ontario was not finalized during this period,
resulting in an absence of changes to social policy or the legislation.5 This relative
stability on multiple fronts allowed for a focus on actual tribunal resource allocation
decision making rather than a focus on changes to the legislation and regulatory
framework or structural changes to the decision making mechanism. It was also assumed,
at the beginning of this thesis research, that HSARB decisions during the study period
would be easily accessible electronically. This latter point turned out not to be the case.

5

One major case decision from the Ontario Divisional Court was released in 2007 - Flora v. Ontario Health
Insurance Plan, 2007 CanLII 339 (ON S.C.D.C.). However, this decision was on appeal to the Ontario
Court of Appeal. The Ontario Court of Appeal‘s decision was released in July of 2008 - Flora v. Ontario
Health Insurance Plan, 2008 ONCA 538 (CanLII) after the thesis study period ending March 2008. While
on appeal, major changes to the HSARB resource allocation process or the provincial legislation did not
take place.
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It should be noted that this study deliberately did not empirically research Board
members‘ capacity, independence, potential bias or appointment process. This decision
was made because of methodological challenges. This study attempted to objectively
quantify variables for analysis. However, details regarding the Board members‘
appointment process, duration of appointment, availability, preference or expertise to
hear certain cases and the capacity, independence or potential bias of the scheduler were
not available from the data source. For example – in terms of the appointment process -nominations for Board member appointments are submitted to a legislative committee
comprised of all political parties. Each political party is required to approve an
appointment. Appointed Board members serve for a non-tenured, part time period of two
to three years. The two to three year part time appointment was not the same for all
appointees in the study, such that some appointees may be nearing the end of their
appointment while other appointees are just beginning their appointment. Once
appointed, the Board members submit their availability to a scheduler who formulates
panels of three appointees to collectively hear and deliberate on a case. None of the above
information – along with Board members‘ capacity, independence and potential bias -was available through this study‘s data source of Board decisions.

Resource allocation decision making, as previously discussed, has typically focused on
the neutrality of the decision maker. There is a long standing debate within the
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) academic literature regarding the neutrality of
mediators and the affect on the process and outcome of disputes between parties. More
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recently, this debate has shifted to include the role of the decision making system.
Lawrence Susskind6 argues that mediators should not be neutral during the process or
outcome of mediation. Mediators need to play an active role in the process of mediation
by guaranteeing full participation and a balanced exchange between capable parties as
well as being accountable for the negotiated outcomes.

Josh Stulberg7 argues that mediators need to exhibit neutrality regarding the outcome but
not in the process to arrive at the outcome. If a mediator assumes responsibility for the
fairness of the agreement between the parties then the mediator is abandoning a neutral
stance and creates an unwarranted role expansion. He states that the mediator is not
equipped or entitled to assume the role of social conscience or social critic.

Bernie Mayer8 states that the focus on the neutrality of the mediator is misleading as the
fairness of an outcome is largely reliant on the system structure rather than the mediator‘s
behavior. In fact, he states that it is the role of the system not the role or obligation of the
mediator to provide a socially responsible process. In this respect, the design, safeguards
and management of the system, the training of people who work within the system and
the ability to address system problems needs to be considered. Mayer states that a
mediator can still be neutral and yet intervene when the system has not allowed for
6

Lawrence Susskind, ―Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem‖ (1981) 6 VT. L. REV.
1.
7

Joseph B. Stulberg, ―The Theory and Practice of Mediation: A Reply to Professor Susskind‖ (1981) 6
VT. L. REV. 85.
8

Bernie Mayer, ―Core Values of Dispute Resolution: Is Neutrality Necessary?‖ 95 Marq. L. Rev. 805
2011-2012.
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participants to have an effective voice,including having the right parties at the table
and/or have ignored important issues.

This thesis aligns with the scholarship of Mayer by focusing on the system as opposed to
focusing on the decision maker. Of particular interest is Mayer‘s comment regarding the
need to consider system problems. The consideration of system problems can only be
undertaken if the system problems are identified. An empirical review undertaken in this
thesis of Board processes, substantive legal arguments and outcome decisions over
multiple years is designed to help identify system problems which may subsequently be
addressed.

It must be stressed that the empirical quantitative research that was undertaken in this
study examined preliminary correlations not causation relationships. In other words, the
study cannot report that one factor caused another factor. The study can only say that
there was a correlation between the factors. As a correlation, the factors must be more
closely examined in order to determine the meaning behind this result. It is highly
recommended that further qualitative research be undertaken to further explore the
correlations.

In terms of research questions, this study focused on analyzing the association of the
Board‘s procedures and the parties‘ substantive arguments on Board decisions. In terms
of procedures, the prevailing assumption is that procedures do not influence the resource
allocation decision but rather create a ‗level playing field‘ upon which the parties can
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make their substantive arguments. This assumption was questioned in this thesis. In this
respect, the thesis asks the following question:Research Question #1:
Do procedures create a statistically significant effect on resource allocation
decisions of the Board? If so, what elements of the procedures create this
statistical effect? 9

The quantitative results of the Board‘s procedures were analyzed relative to the leading
process theory – Accountability for Reasonableness (A4R) - in order to determine if the
theory of resource allocation decision making reflected the actual practice of resource
allocation decision making. If the actual practice did not reflect the A4R theory,
expecting the A4R theory to explain tribunal decision making is questionable.

This thesis also critically examined why some Applicant/Patients are granted resources
while others are not. As such, this thesis asks:

Research Question #2:
What substantive arguments affect resource allocation decisions of the Board? 10

Based on the research results of actual tribunal decision outlining procedures, the
substantive arguments taking place before the Board and an analysis of the literature, this
author proposes a revised resource allocation decision making mechanism in order to
answer the following question:

9

Chapter 8 – What It Is Now: Procedures: Quantitative Research Results
Chapter 9 – What It Is Now: Substantive Arguments: Quantitative Research Results

10

11

Research Question #3
What Should Be the Revised Resource Allocation Decision Making
Mechanism?11

The revised resource allocation decision making mechanism should increase the
likelihood of decision acceptance by ensuring a fair, transparent neutral process for
determining resource allocation and taking into consideration a multiple of factors that
affect substantive arguments.

Outline of this Thesis
This thesis is laid out in the following manner: Chapter 2 outlines the legislative context
within which the Board operates. Chapter 2 is important because the analysis of this
study relative to the A4E theory became largely dependent on the legislative framework
rather than on the study‘s data. In this respect, at least two of the four A4R theory criteria
are established in legislation as opposed to quantitative data. For example, the A4R
requirement for the ‗appeals‘ condition and the ‗enforcement‘ condition were found in
the statutes rather than within the Board‘s decision.

Chapters 3, 4 and 5 review the literature regarding resource allocation mechanisms.
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 review the literature in terms of the lack of empirical research, the
judicial and quasi-judicial systems of decision making and the existing procedures and
substantive theories regarding decision making. More specifically, Chapter 3 reviews the
11

Chapter 11 – What It Should Be: Revised Resource Allocation Decision Making Mechanism
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literature regarding the academic discussion of the overall lack of empirical research in
legal studies. This chapter specifically examines the dearth of tribunal empirical research
and lack of academic discussion and debate on the topic. Chapter 3 also critically
analyses the existing qualitative and quantitative tribunal research. The existing
qualitative and quantitative research on tribunals was analyzed in an effort to inform the
author of existing research methodologies and potential variables for analysis. This
methodological review formed the basis of this thesis‘ research design. Chapter 4 reviews
the academic debate regarding the use of judicial and quasi-judicial as decision making
mechanisms. In particular, Chapter 4 reviews the debate regarding the role of the courts
in health care decision making, their overview of tribunals via judicial review and their
deferral of difficult resource allocation decisions to tribunals. Chapter 5 reviews the
academic literature on substantive and procedural decision making theories with specific
reference to the A4R theory.

Chapters 6, 7, 8, and 9 outline the study‘s methodology and the results. For example,
Chapter 7 examines who is coming before the Board, why they are coming before the
Board and what treatment and facilities they are requesting. Chapter 8 analyses the first
research question -- whether the Board‘s procedures statistically affect resource
allocation decisions. If procedures are associated statistically with resource allocation
decisions, the study analyzes what elements of the procedures create this statistical effect.
Chapter 9 analyses the second question - what submissions by the parties affect resource
allocation decisions.

13

Chapter 10 analyses the study results relative to the academic discussion regarding the
lack of empirical research and relative to the A4R theory. Chapter 11 answers the third
research question by outlining a revised resource allocation decision making mechanism
– based on the results of Chapter 7-10. Chapter 12 summarizes the study‘s conclusions.
Chapter 13 presents a final thought regarding the potential to use the OCCNEIHS
situation to pilot test and study alternative health care delivery models. Chapter 14 is an
Epilogue which outlines some legislative development since the end of the study period.
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Chapter 2
Legislative Framework

Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the existing Canadian health care
legislative system within which HSARB is situated. It is within this system and legal
constraints that Board decisions regarding the out of country coverage of health care
services are made. Chapter 2 is important because the analysis of this study‘s results
relative a leading theory, Accountability of Reasonableness,12 was largely dependent on
the legislative framework rather than on the study‘s quantitative data. For example, at
least two of the four A4R theory criteria – the appeals condition and the enforcement
condition -- are established in legislation as opposed to the quantitative data. Chapter 2 is
also important because it provides the legislated definitions and criteria for the Board‘s
procedures (Research Question #1) and the substantive legal arguments of the parties
before the Board (Research Question #2).
Summary of Ontario‘s Out of Country Coverage
In order to provide a context for this research, it is important to understand how health
care services are provided to Ontario residents. Health care services are provided to
Ontario residents in three major situations in three main geographic areas.

The three major situations include – an emergency, a non-emergency outpatient situation
and a non-emergency inpatient situation. Emergency situations involve a serious or life

12

Hereinafter ―A4R‖.
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threatening event for the patient where immediate action must be taken - such as a heart
attack or a severe car accident. Non-emergency outpatient situations involve a health care
situation that is not considered serious enough to require admission into the hospital or
health facility. Non-emergency inpatient situations involve events where the patient is
admitted into the hospital or health facility for a serious health care issue. However,
while the health care issue is considered serious enough for admission to the hospital, it is
not considered serious enough to qualify as an emergency situation.

In addition to the three major situations in which health care services are provided,
Ontario residents are able to receive health care in three main geographic locations: (1)
within Ontario, (2) outside Ontario but within Canada and (3) outside Canada. It should
be noted that any form of health care services outside Canada is – theoretically -available to Ontario residents. The question is who pays for health care service outside
Canada. If the patient pays for the health care services outside Canada through a private
health insurance plan or out-of-pocket – often referred to as ‗medical tourism‘ -- the
Ontario government and the publicly insured health plan are not involved and have no
say in what services are or are not to be funded. However, if the Ontario government is
asked to use public funds to pay for out of country health care, then Ontario legislation –
specifically the HIA- is invoked.

The Ontario government‘s public insurance program that administers the HIA is called
the Ontario Health Insurance Plan – or as commonly referred to – OHIP. The criteria by
which OHIP determines which health care services provided outside Canada are publicly
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insured are set out in the HIA and Regulation 552. Under Regulation 552, section 28
determines whether health care provided outside of Canada will be paid for by OHIP.
Specifically, section 28.4(2) contains the regulatory criteria – or the ‗test‘ - to determine
whether non-emergency inpatient health services provided on an inpatient basis outside
of Canada are or are not publicly insured by OHIP. Out of country coverage for nonemergency inpatient health services will be referred to as OCCNEIHS for the purpose of
this thesis. In terms of the process to receive OCCNEIHS, the patient – based on
approval from their physician - appeals to OHIP to approve and thus fund an
OCCNEIHS. OHIP may grant, deny or partially grant the requested OCCNEIHS based
on the test in section 28.4(2). Where OHIP has denied or partially denied the requested
OCCNEIHS, the patient may appeal the request to HSARB.13 Based on the submissions
of the parties at a hearing, HSARB issues a written decision stating whether or not the
health care service is financially covered by the provincial publicly insured health plan.
The patient and/or OHIP may appeal the HSARB decision to the Ontario Divisional
Court,14 then the Ontario Court of Appeal and ultimately with leave to the Supreme Court
of Canada (SCC).

2. Legal Framework
The Board‘s decision regarding an OCCNEIHS takes place within a larger legislative
framework. The legislated framework reviewed included the Canadian Constitution, the
Ontario Human Rights Code, the Canada Health Act, the Ontario Health Insurance Act,

13
14

HIA Supra Note 4 at s.20.
Ibid at s.24.
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the Ministry of Health Appeal and Review Boards Act. Thus, the Board must determine
resource allocation based on the parties‘ submissions within these legal constraints.
a. Canadian Constitution: Division of Powers
It is important to understand the overall constitutional context within which HSARB
operates. The overriding statute that affects all laws within Canada is the Canadian
Constitution15 of 1867. The Constitution has played an important role in the federal
government and the provincial government with respect to the Ontario health care
system. The Constitution divided the governance powers of the federal and provincial
governments under section 91 and section 92. According to section 91 of the
Constitution, the federal government has jurisdiction to deal with national issues that
affect all Canada such as taxation (s.3), census and statistics (s.6) and marine hospitals
(s.11). The federal government also has jurisdiction over Canadian issues outside
Canadian borders such as trade and commerce (s.2). Thus, the federal government has
Constitutional powers for some matters across Canada as well as issues outside or
coming into or out of Canada. Provincial jurisdiction is outlined in s.92 of the
Constitution. In addition to provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights (s.13) in
the province and matters of a local nature (s.16), section 92(7) has been interpreted to
assign the bulk of the jurisdiction over health to the provinces.16 As such, the delivery of
health care is interpreted to be largely a provincial responsibility.

15

Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30&31 Vict., c. 3.

16

Section 92(7) states that province s have jurisdiction over health care delivery:
The Establishment, Maintenance, and Management of Hospitals, Asylums, Charities, and
Eleemosynary Institutions in and for the Province, other than Marine Hospitals.
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In 1982, the Canadian Charter17 was enacted. While the Constitution applies to the
provincial and federal governments, the Charter applies to the government relative to its
residents in that it protects individual rights and freedoms from unjustified governmental
actions.18 The Charter does not explicitly protect a right to health care but the Supreme
Court of Canada (SCC) has stated that when the government puts in place a system to
provide health care, that scheme must comply with the Charter.19

In 2002, the Ontario legislature clarified that the Board did not have constitutional
jurisdiction to inquire into or make a decision concerning the constitutional validity of a
provision of an Act or regulation. Thus, the Board‘s enabling legislation, the Ministry of
Health Appeal and Review Boards Act,20 expressly prohibits the Board from having
authority to inquire into or decide questions concerning the constitutional validity.
Section 6(3) of that MOHARBA states:

Limit on jurisdiction
6(3) Despite subsection (2), the Board shall not inquire into or make a decision
concerning the constitutional validity of a provision of an Act or a regulation.21

17

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),1982, c.11 [hereinafter ―the Charter‖]
18
Nola M. Ries, ―Charter Challenges‖ in Jocelyn Downie et al. eds, Canadian Health Law and Policy 3 rd ed
(LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2007) 541.
19
Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, 1 S.C.R. 791 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
―Chaoulli‖] at para 104 per McLachlin C.J.C. and Major J..
20
S.O. 1998, Chapter 18, Schedule H [hereinafter ―MOHARBA‖].
21
Ibid.
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Prior to this amendment, the Board did interpret the legislation to include jurisdiction to
determine constitutionality.22 However, given the 2002 legislative prohibition and the
subsequent five year study period of 2003/04 to 2007/08, the Board would have operated
under a jurisdiction which excluded Constitutional jurisdiction. The Board itself has
recently recognized the argument that it should have Charter review powers but clearly
stated that this scope is beyond its jurisdiction.23
b. Ontario Human Rights Code
While the Board does not have jurisdiction over constitutional questions, it does have
jurisdiction to apply the Ontario Human Rights Code24. The application of the Code to a
tribunal‘s statutory mandate was clarified on April 21, 2006 in the decision of
Tranchemontagne.25 In that decision, the majority of the SCC held that administrative
tribunals must apply the Code and consider whether any aspects of the tribunal‘s
legislation are inconsistent with the Code when rendering their decisions. The majority of
22

L.H. v. General Manager of OHIP, September 19, 2001 – unreported decision
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In EH v. Ontario (Health Insurance Plan), 2011 CanLII 67509 (ON HSARB), <http://canlii.ca/t/fnlpj>
retrieved on 2012-02-13 the Appellant had made a number of submissions as to why the Board ought to
proceed with a hearing on the Charter issues. The Board stated at para 10-11:
―One such submission, to which there may be considerable merit, is that a Charter challenge made
to legislation before the Board is considerably more expeditious, less time consuming and less
expensive to the parties than proceeding before a Court. The Appellant also submits that
disadvantaged individuals would have a greater opportunity to participate in Charter challenges
whether before this Board or other administrative tribunals than they would in a court proceeding.
11.
As sympathetic as this Board may be to the Appellant‘s submissions, the fact remains that
Section 6(3) of MHARBA presents an insurmountable hurdle for the Appellant to overcome. This
section does not allow the Board to even ―inquire‖ into the constitutional validity of an Act or
Regulation, which is the very inquiry the Appellant asks the Board to make. The Appellant has
given no authority that deals with any other Board‘s jurisdiction regarding constitutional inquires
in the face of such a prohibition. On any principle of statutory construction or interpretation, the
Board is foreclosed from granting the relief requested by the Appellant in paragraph 20.D of her
submissions. The question whether the legislature‘s erection of the hurdle faced by the Appellant
was constitutional will have to be answered in another forum.‖
24
R.S.O.. 1990, c. H.19 [hereinafter ‗the Code‘].
25
Tranchemontagne v. Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program), [2006] 1 SCR 513 [hereinafter
―Tranchemontagne‖].
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the SCC also stated that tribunals that are properly seized with human rights complaints
cannot decline to exercise their jurisdiction, in favour of referring the complainant to a
human rights commission, unless the legislature has granted the tribunal the power to do
so. The SCC stated:

The importance of the Code is not merely an assertion of this Court. The Ontario
legislature has seen fit to bind itself and all its agents through the Code: s. 47(1).
Further, it has given the Code primacy over all other legislative enactments: s.
47(2). As a result of this primacy clause, where provisions of the Code conflict
with provisions in another provincial law, it is the provisions of the Code that are
to apply.26

As such, the Code is a statute with quasi-constitutional status, which the Ontario
Legislature has given primacy over all other provincial legislation – including the HIA
and Regulation 552.27

The Board itself recognized its right to apply the Code in D.G. v. Ontario (Health
Insurance Plan):28

26

Ibid at para 34.
The importance of Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 and Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration) v. Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 (2009) should be noted – i.e. where a reasonableness standard of
review applies, reviewing courts cannot substitute their own view of a preferable decision, but must
determine whether the tribunal‘s outcome falls within the range of possible, acceptable outcomes supported
by the evidence.
28
2009 CanLII 85052 (ON HSARB), <http://canlii.ca/t/2c035> retrieved on 2013-02-24 [hereinafter D.G.
v. Ontario].
27
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In the Appellant‘s Appeal, the Appellant states that the policy which does not
provide for insured PSA screening tests is wrong and flagrantly discriminatory to
males. Accordingly, the Appellant‘s application raises a matter of alleged
discrimination which may be contrary to the Human Rights Code of Ontario.
Although this Appeal Board does not have jurisdiction to determine the
constitutional validity of the statute (Ministry of Health Appeal and Review
Board Act, Section 6(3)), this Appeal Board does have jurisdiction to consider
whether a matter before this Appeal Board may be a violation of the Ontario
Human Rights Code, since the recent Decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Tranchemontagne v. Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program), 2006 SCC
14 (CanLII), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 513. More specifically, the Appeal Board may have
jurisdiction to consider whether or not the exclusion of screening tests for prostate
cancer in asymptomatic men and the failure to fund them is discriminatory under
the Human Rights Code.

The Appeal Board raised this matter with both the Appellant and the Respondent,
and provided the Appellant with a number of options, including adjourning this
Hearing in order to be in a position to provide evidence and argument on the
matter of the alleged discrimination under the Human Rights Code, or obtain
advice with respect to his rights in that regard, or proceed with the hearing in the
absence of advancing such a submission before this Appeal Board. The Appeal
Board notes that its jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the Ontario Human
Rights Tribunal.

24

The Appellant chose to proceed with the hearing, and makes no argument with
respect to whether the insurability of PSA screening tests was discriminatory
against men. The Appeal Board proceeded with this matter on that basis.29

It is a challenge to understand how the Board must apply the Code – a quasiconstitutional statute – yet the Board does not have the jurisdiction to deal with
constitutional matters. This is a topic for another discussion.

c. Canada Health Act
In Canada, the Canada Health Act,30 instituted in 1986, is the legal foundation for the
distinguishing characteristic of the Canadian single payer health care system of uniform
and universal access to a comprehensive range of publicly insured physician and hospital
services.31 To date, the CHA only has one Regulation, which outlines the prohibition of
extra-billing and user fees.32

The federal government uses its jurisdiction for taxation under section 91(3) of the
Constitution to assist in the funding of the Canada-wide publicly funded health care
system. The CHA is the umbrella legislation governing the conditions provinces must

29

Ibid.
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-6 [hereinafter ‗the CHA‘].
31
William Lahey, ―Medicare and the Law: Contours of an Evolving Relationship‖ in Jocelyn Downie et al.
eds, Canadian Health Law and Policy, 3d (LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2007) 1 [hereinafter ―Lahey‖] at 2.
32
CHA, Supra Note 30 Extra-billing and User Charges Information Regulations SOR/86-259.
30
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meet to qualify for full cash transfers of federal taxation funds to the provincial health
care programs.33 Tax funding takes place through the Canada Health Transfer (CHT).34

According to section 3 of the CHA, the objective of Canadian health care policy is to
protect, promote and restore the physical and mental well-being of residents of Canada
and to facilitate reasonable access to health services without financial or other barriers.
The purpose35 of the CHA is to establish criteria and conditions for provincial insured
health services in order to receive federal taxation funds/full cash contributions. The
CHA outlines, among other elements, the principles which underlie the publicly funded
Canadian health care system and act as the criteria for the ‗full cash contributions‘ from
the federal government to the provinces. These five principles – in addition to user fees
and extra billing being banned36 -- are outlined in section 7. Section 7 states that the five

33

It should also be noted that the federal government has extensive jurisdiction under other federal
legislation governing health issues across Canada and across borders. Statutes outlining such federal
jurisdiction include: the Department of Health Act, to protect against disease, to engage in health
surveillance activities and to conduct research; the Canadian Institutes of Health Research Act which
provides federal jurisdiction over the Canadian Institutes for Health Research, a major funding body which
supports health research regarding individual and population health; and the International Health
Regulations which seeks to prevent, protect, control and respond to the international spread of disease
while avoiding unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade.
34
The CHT came into effect on April 1, 2004. Prior to that time, starting in 1996, block funding was
provided under the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST)
http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/2011-02-e.htm,
http://www.fin.gc.ca/fedprov/fihc-ifass-eng.asp
35
Section 4 states: The purpose of this Act is to establish criteria and conditions in respect of insured health
services and extended health care services provided under provincial law that must be met before a full
cash contribution may be made.
36
Extra-billing
18. In order that a province may qualify for a full cash contribution referred to in section 5 for a fiscal
year, no payments may be permitted by the province for that fiscal year under the health care insurance
plan of the province in respect of insured health services that have been subject to extra-billing by medical
practitioners or dentists. 1984, c. 6, s. 18.
User charges
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principles are public administration, comprehensiveness, universality, portability and
accessibility.37 38 The federal government does not contribute revenue to all provincial
health care – the federal government only contributes to provincial health care that is paid
for by the provincial government and not by individual out of pocket payments or by a
private insurance plan, and that falls within the statutory definition of publicly ‗insured
health service‘.39 Under the Canada Health Act, ―insured health services‖ refers to
hospital services, physician services and surgical-dental service. The provinces may
choose to add additional health care services and practitioners to the provincially funded
health care plan – but this is not required by the federal Canada Health Act. 40 41

19. (1) In order that a province may qualify for a full cash contribution referred to in section 5 for a
fiscal year, user charges must not be permitted by the province for that fiscal year under the health care
insurance plan of the province. Canada Health Act R.S., 1985, c. C-6.
37

CHA, Supra Note 27 Program criteria – section 7 states: In order that a province may qualify for a full
cash contribution referred to in section 5 for a fiscal year, the health care insurance plan of the province
must, throughout the fiscal year, satisfy the criteria described in sections 8 to 12 respecting the following
matters: (a) public administration;(b) comprehensiveness;(c) universality;(d) portability; and (e)
accessibility.
38

Lahey states at page 37 that health care services outside of Canada must be paid for at the rate that would
have applied if the services had been provided within the province in question. This author cannot find the
citation within the CHA for this direction. As such, the CHA does not appear to require this action. Rather,
the payment by the province appears to be a provincial decision rather than a requirement under the CHA.
39
Insured health services are defined in section 2 of the CHA as: "insured health services" means hospital
services, physician services and surgical-dental services provided to insured persons, but does not include
any health services that a person is entitled to and eligible for under any other Act of Parliament or under
any Act of the legislature of a province that relates to workers' or workmen‘s compensation.
40
The Canada Health Act, in section 2, also defines hospital services and physician services. ―Physician
services‖ is defined as ‗medically required‘ services delivered by a person lawfully entitled to practice
medicine in the place in which the practice is carried on by that person:
―Physician services‖ means any medically required services rendered by medical practitioners. 40 40
―Hospital services‖ are ‗medically necessary‘ services provided both to in-patients or out-patients at a
hospital.
―hospital services‖ means any of the following services provided to in-patients or out-patients at a
hospital, if the services are medically necessary for the purpose of maintaining health, preventing
disease or diagnosing or treating an injury, illness or disability, … 40 40
41

This author notes that physician services under the CHA are referred to as ‗medically required‘ services
and hospital services are referred to as ‗medically necessary‘ services. The HIA, as we shall see, defines
physician services as ‗medically necessary‘ and hospital services as ‗medically required‘. Hence, there is a
definitional discrepancy between the federal and provincial definition of ‗medically necessary‘ as well as
‗medically required‘. This is a fundamental definition difference. The scope of service inclusion for
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It is important to note that within Canada, the vast majority of health care providers,
including doctors, are either self employed professionals in private practice or employees
of institutions or firms controlled and operated by independent corporate bodies.42 In the
case of physicians, the benefit of this autonomy allows physicians to treat patients
according to their own skill and judgment and not managerial direction. The downside of
this autonomy complicates managerial direction, particularly for the health care system as
a whole.43 So while provincial governments are responsible for regulating the quality of
health services and whether or not a health service is publicly funded, they are not
responsible for the clinical judgment of autonomously practicing doctors. A doctor is able
to use his/her clinical judgment regarding needed health care services for a given patient.
According to Lahey, physician generated demand for health care services is a leading
preoccupation in health care policy.44 Given that the government funds medically
necessary health care provided by such professionals as physicians, the government
might attempt to reduce its costs by limiting health care budgets and the services that can
be provided by doctors. This budget and service limitation has contributed to the public‘s
perception and/or experience of long wait times to access health care deemed by the
physician to be medically necessary.

d. Ontario Health Insurance Act:

‗medically required‘ services and ‗medically necessary‘ services is not defined in the CHA/federal or in the
HIA/provincial statutes and regulations.
42
Lahey, Supra Note 31 at 13.
43
Ibid at 13.
44
Ibid at 19.
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In Ontario, the provincial government pays for insured health care services for Ontario
residents via the publicly funded Ontario Health Insurance Plan (OHIP).45 46OHIP‘s
funding sources are based on both provincial taxation revenue and federal taxation
revenue, discussed earlier. OHIP is governed by the HIA. The Minister of Health is
ultimately responsible for the administration and operation of OHIP as it relates to the
CHA.47 As of 2006, both the Ontario Minister of Finance and the Ontario Minister of
Health and Long Term Care ―may‖ negotiate federal government contributions/cash
contributions regarding ‗insured‘ health services provided by a hospital or health
facility.48 49 The provincial and federal taxation revenue which pays for health care is not
unlimited, yet it is anticipated that more Ontarians will continue to seek publicly insured
health care - including out-of-country health care. The increased demand is likely due to
advances in medical technology coupled with an increasingly mobile and aging

45

The determination of Ontario based medically required and medically necessary health care services is
beyond the scope of this thesis.
46
It is unclear to the author at this time, what percentage of the Ontario government‘s annual budget is and
has been spent on out-of-country health services – both for those cases coming before the Board as well as
cases settled outside of Board Hearings. It is also not clear how much of the budget is spent on out-ofcountry health service administration and litigation. It is not clear how much is spent on the actual out of
country health service and the impact – medically and fiscally – from subsequent related health care follow
up in Ontario. These questions, although important, are not answered in this thesis as they were beyond the
scope of the Board‘s decisions.
47
HIA Supra Note 4 at s. 2(1), (2).
48
Ibid at s.3(1), (2).
49
This author notes that as of 2006, the Ontario Finance Minister began to represent the Ontario
Government and to become involved in financial agreements with the federal government regarding
insured services. Prior to 2006, it appears that only the Ontario Minister of Health represented the Ontario
Government in financial agreements with the federal government. With these two Ontario government
representatives – the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Health – it is unclear who has the final
decision making authority regarding financial cost contribution from the federal government. Given the
increased role of the Ontario Finance Minister as of 2006 to represent the Ontario Government in
discussions with the federal government regarding insured health services, it is speculated by this author
that financial discussions regarding insured health services began to take on legislative importance. The
increased prominence of the Minister of Finance in OHIP legislation may indicate a more important role of
fiscal and economic matters in the determination of insured services. However, the increased role of the
Minister of Finance – in addition to the Minister of Health - in insured service negotiations with the federal
government regarding cash contributions means that there are two political stakeholders from Ontario who
may or may not be in agreement as to what constitutes ‗medically necessary‘ and ‗medically required‘
publically insured health care.
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population. Recent research suggests that an aging demographic has an increased health
care utilization.50 If there is an increased utilization of the health care system then it is
likely there would be an increase in the government expenditure on health care services
and/or a decrease in the number of publicly insured health services. Ideally, the demand
for publicly insured health care aligns with the purpose of the insurance.51 How decisions
are made about what is covered by public insurance is at the heart of the system.52
Difficult decisions must be made regarding what is and is not covered by OHIP.
Currently, in Ontario, the government and representatives from the Ontario Medical
Association negotiate ‗behind closed doors‘ what health care services will be insured by
OHIP.53

It has been said that the process derives political legitimacy from the participation
of governments and clinical legitimacy from the participation of medical
associations. But these sources of legitimacy are likely to be undermined by the

50 Jason Nie, Li Tracy Wang, Shawn C, Rahim Moineddin, Ross Upshur, Health care service utilization
among the elderly: findings from the Study to Understand the Chronic Condition Experience of the Elderly
and the Disabled (SUCCEED project), 2008, 14:6 December, Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice,
1044-1049
51
Purpose of insurance
10. The Ontario Health Insurance Plan is continued for the purpose of providing for insurance against the
costs of insured services on a non-profit basis on uniform terms and conditions available to all residents of
Ontario, in accordance with this Act, and providing other health benefits related thereto. R.S.O. 1990,
c. H.6, s. 10.
52

Lahey, Supra Note 31 at 39.
The process of determining insurance coverage does include government decision makers and clinical
decision makers. However, it is unclear if this process of determining insurance coverage is based on
medically necessary and medically required health care or if the process is based on the government‘s
interest in cost controls and the clinicians‘ interest in reimbursement for their services or both. Either way,
the process is not transparent and the substantive arguments for inclusion and exclusion of insured health
care unclear.
53
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primary focus of the process on physician incomes and by the pervasive concern
of governments for cost-containment as an overriding policy objective.54

e. Health Services Appeal and Review Board
As will be outlined below, the academic literature has discussed the role of the courts and
the use of the Charter in health care decision making. In Ontario, there is a statutory right
for insured persons to appeal government health care decisions regarding denied insured
services to the Board, and the statutory right to appeal Board decisions to the Divisional
Court. However, the Board‘s actual procedures and the substantive arguments of the
parties and their association with Board decisions are under researched. It is not known
on a quantitative research basis if procedures involved in Board hearings have an effect
on the Board‘s outcome decision to grant or deny the request for health care services out
of country. It is also unknown statistically why the Board grants out of country health
care coverage in some cases and denies coverage in others. A closer examination is
required of the Board‘s statutes, regulation, jurisdiction, composition, procedures,
substantive legal arguments presented by the parties and the outcome decision given by
the Board. This section of Chapter 2 examines what is known about the Board from
legislation and released Board decisions.

i. Statutes, Regulation, Jurisdiction and Composition
HSARB was created in 1998 by the amalgamation of five tribunals.55 The Board‘s
enabling legislation is the Ministry of Health Appeal and Review Boards Act

54

Lahey, Supra Note 31 at 39.
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(MOHARB). While HSARB is the appeal mechanism for multiple pieces of legislation,56
the majority of the Board‘s work is with respect to one piece of legislation --the HIA.

Under the HIA, the Minister of Health has the authority to create an advisory panel
comprised of physicians to advise on the interpretation of insured services within the
Schedule of Benefits. An opinion from this advisory panel is required within 30 days of a
request from the Minister of Health or a physician.57 The HIA also authorizes the
Minister to create a Medical Advisory Committee58 whose duties are to be defined by the
Minister.59

55

The Health Services Appeal Board, the Health Facilities Appeal Board, the Health Protection Board, the
Nursing Homes Review Board and the Health Protection Board
56
MOHARBA, Supra Note 20 at section 6.(1) The Board‘s duties are to conduct the hearings and reviews
and to perform the duties that are assigned to it under the following Acts:
1. The Ambulance Act.
2. Repealed: 2007, c. 8, s. 216.
3. The Healing Arts Radiation Protection Act.
4. The Commitment to the Future of Medicare Act, 2004.
5. The Health Facilities Special Orders Act.
6. The Health Insurance Act.
7. The Health Protection and Promotion Act.
8. The Home Care and Community Services Act, 1994.
9. The Immunization of School Pupils Act.
10. The Independent Health Facilities Act.
11. The Laboratory and Specimen Collection Centre Licensing Act.
12. The Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007.
13. Repealed: 2007, c. 8, s. 216.
14. The Private Hospitals Act. 1998, c. 18, Sched. H, s. 6 (1); 2006, c. 19, Sched. L, s. 8; 2007, c.
8, s. 216.
57

HIA Supra Note 4 at s.5.
Ibid at s.7.
59
Ibid s.7(9)
Duties
The Medical Eligibility Committee shall perform such duties as are assigned to it under the Act or
by the Minister. 1996, c. 1, Sched. H, s. 6.
58
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The General Manager of OHIP has the authority to grant or deny enrolment in OHIP, to
confirm if a health service is an insured service under OHIP and to fund this service.
Under the HIA, the jurisdiction of the Board is to hear appeals from ‗insured persons‘
who have been refused health care coverage and/or the reimbursement of claims by the
General Manager of OHIP.60 Based on the Hearing, the Board can determine if the
requested out of country health service is or is not an ―insured service‖ under OHIP. The
Board can direct OHIP to take action or amend an OHIP decision as the Board sees fit as
long as it is in accordance with the HIA. 61

The HIA specifies that facts presented as evidence at a Board Hearing must be based
―exclusively on evidence admissible or matter that may be noticed under section 15 and
16 of the Statutory Powers and Procedures Act‖.62 63 Under the Board‘s Rules of Practice
and Procedure, it is at the Board‘s discretion whether to admit oral or written evidence
that is subject matter of the Hearing – at the Hearing if it is admissible in court but does
not have to be proven under oath.64

60

Ibid at s.20(1).
Ibid at s.21(1)
Powers of Appeal Board
21. (1) If a person requires a hearing, the Appeal Board shall appoint a time for and hold the
hearing and may, by order, direct the General Manager to take such action as the Appeal Board considers
the General Manager should take in accordance with this Act and the regulations. 2002, c. 18, Sched. I,
s. 8 (12).
61

Same
(1.0.1) For the purposes of making an order under subsection (1), the Appeal Board may amend a
direction of the General Manager or a practitioner review committee and shall do so in accordance with this
Act and the regulations. 2002, c. 18, Sched. I, s. 8 (12); 2007, c. 10, Sched. G, s. 16 (1).
62

Ibid at s.23(4).
R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22&23 [hereinafter ―SPPA‖].
64
Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule 16
63
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In addition, the SPPA, the MOHARBA, the HIA and its regulations do not give the
Board the authority to consider compassionate reasons as evidence of the need to grant
out of country coverage. The Board is also not authorized to grant monetary damages. 65

A final decision of the Board can be appealed to the Ontario Divisional Court along with
a transcript of the proceeding.66 Divisional Court can review the Board‘s decision on
questions of law or fact or both. The Court can also exercise all the powers of the Board
including endorsing the Board‘s direction to OHIP, substituting its own opinion and
requiring a rehearing by the Board.67

The Board is comprised of at least 12 members appointed by Orders in Council and with
the approval of the Minister of Health.68 No more than three members can be medical

65

Except, under Rule 16 of its Rules of Practice and Procedures, where a party has acted unreasonable,
frivolously, vexatious or in bad faith in the course of defending or prosecuting an action
66
Appeal to Divisional Court
24. (1) Any party to the proceedings before the Appeal Board under this Act may appeal from its
decision or order to the Divisional Court in accordance with the rules of court. R.S.O. 1990, c. H.6, s. 24
(1); 1998, c. 18, Sched. G, s. 54 (6).
Record to be filed in court
(2) Where any party appeals from a decision or order of the Appeal Board, the Appeal Board shall
forthwith file in the Divisional Court the record of the proceedings before it in which the decision was
made, which, together with the transcript of evidence if it is not part of the Appeal Board‘s record, shall
constitute the record in the appeal.
67

Powers of court on appeal
(4) An appeal under this section may be made on questions of law or fact or both and the court may
affirm or may rescind the decision of the Appeal Board and may exercise all powers of the Appeal Board to
direct the General Manager to take any action which the Appeal Board may direct the General Manager to
take and as the court considers proper and for such purposes the court may substitute its opinion for that of
the General Manager or of the Appeal Board, or the court may refer the matter back to the Appeal Board
for rehearing, in whole or in part, in accordance with such directions as the court considers proper. R.S.O.
1990, c. H.6, s. 24 (2-4).
68

MOHARBA Supra note 20 at s.7(1).
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practitioners.69 A Hearing can take place in front of an odd number of Board members.70
In this study, all Hearing decisions analysed took place before the typical panel
composition of three members. The Chair of the Board is responsible for the selection
and assignment of Board members to any given Hearing.71

ii)

The Board‘s Procedures

At the court level – as opposed to the tribunal level -- it has been argued that common
law requirements for fair procedures in court may, ironically, interfere with the goal of a
straightforward, understandable appeal process by imposing complex procedural
requirements, and thus impede access to justice.72Alternatively, ―speedy, informal and
inexpensive dispute resolutions backed by specialized expertise‖73 may facilitate access
to justice. Several factors are thought to facilitate access to justice at the tribunal level.
Pitfield – who has researched the Board‘s activities -- states that, in addition to factors
such as perceptions of bias and lack of transparency, the accessibility of procedures and
cost can act as significant deterrents in accessing the Board.74 Pitfield defined
‗accessibility of procedures‘ as the provision of information about the Hearing. This
would include the application of legislation, the provision of assistance to applicants
wishing to prepare an appeal, as well as the need for legal counsel for unrepresented
parties. In terms of cost, Pitfield states that the ―costs‖ of the appeal process at the Board
– which include the cost of hiring legal services, documentary and/or testimonial
69

Ibid s.7(3).
Ibid s.13(3).
71
Ibid s.13(2).
72
Caroline Pitfield, 2003 LLM Thesis, University of Toronto―Critical Evaluation of HSARB: Giving
Patients a Louder Voice in the Health Care System‖, 123-5 [hereinafter ―Pitfield‖] at 123-125.
73
Judith McCormack, ―Nimble Justice: Revitalizing Administrative Tribunals in a Climate of Rapid
Change‖ (1995), 59 Sask. L. Re. 385, online QL (AMPA) [hereinafter ―McCormack‖] at 5 of QL version.
74
Pitfield, Supra Note 72 at 123.
70

35

evidence, along with the cost of traveling to Toronto for oral hearings -- have more effect
on the applicant than on the defendant OHIP.75

This section of Chapter 2 examines the procedures of the Board from a legislative and
operational perspective. The enabling legislation, MOHARBA, as well as the HIA and its
Regulations do not specify any requirements regarding procedural protections for a
Hearing before the Board.76 However, several procedures were identified by the author
based on a review of decisions. These include: the date of the Hearing; the date of the
decision; the format of the Hearing (oral/written/teleconference/combination of formats);
whether the parties were self-represented or represented by legal counsel; if an interpreter
was present; and whether the Hearing was de novo or a review of a previous Board
decision. These procedures elements are listed in more detail below.

Dates (file/hearing/decision);
Pitfield identified the Board‘s ‗timeliness‘ as a major impediment to access to health care
services in terms of the delays between the notice of an appeal and the hearing itself, and
the delays in rendering a decision. She also identified that issues coming before the Board
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Ibid at134.
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Section 23(4) of the HIA does reference the SPPA regarding the admissibility of evidence at a hearing
(SPPA s.15) and the notice of facts and opinions (SPPA s16).
Findings of fact
23(4) The findings of fact of the Appeal Board pursuant to a hearing shall be based exclusively on
evidence admissible or matters that may be noticed under section 15 or 16 of the Statutory Powers
Procedure Act. R.S.O. 1990, c. H.6, s. 23 (4).
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were of increasing complexity.77 This increasing complexity may or may not affect the
―timeliness‖ of Board procedures.

According to the SPPA, the Board is authorized to establish timelines for its procedure
and to review all or part of its decision.78 79
Format (oral/written/teleconference/combination);
Hearings before the Board can take place in several formats. A Hearing can be held
orally, in writing or by teleconference call. A Hearing can also use a combination of these
formats such as a written submission by the patient/applicant and a teleconference or in
person appearance by OHIP before the panel. At the Hearing, the applicant – typically the
patient or the patient‘s advocate – under oath presents his/her evidence to the panel as to
why he/she should be granted health care service funded by OHIP and why they are
appealing OHIP‘s decision denying the service -- based on the HIA and Regulation 552.
Evidence may include testimony, an approval form provided by OHIP and completed by
the applicant‘s physician and witness‘ statements supporting the applicant. OHIP‘s
designate then presents OHIP‘s evidence to support its decision to deny funding for the
service to the applicant based on the HIA and Regulation 552. Once OHIP has presented
its case, the applicant may question the OHIP representative to clarify its presentation and
to make final remarks. Once both sides have presented their evidence, the panel thanks
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Pitfield, Supra Note 72 at137-140.
SPPA, Supra Note 63 at s.16.2.
Time frames
16.2 A tribunal shall establish guidelines setting out the usual time frame for completing
proceedings that come before the tribunal and for completing the procedural steps within those
proceedings. 1999, c. 12, Sched. B, s. 16 (6).
78

79

A Reviewed decision cannot again be reviewed by the Board Rule 21.09(6)
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the parties and ends the hearing. Further evidence or advocacy is not accepted by the
panel once the hearing has ended. The appeal is ended once a written decision is released
by the Board.

Self-representation/Lawyer
The MOHARBA, HIA and its Regulations do not require the applicant to have a lawyer
nor does the Board or government provide a lawyer or legal assistance to the applicant.

Interpreter
There is no requirement under the MOHARBA or the HIA to provide interpretation
services to the parties appearing before the Board. The Board does provide interpretation
services free of charge to parties if requested prior to the Hearing.
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Review of Its Own HSARB Decision
The Board has the jurisdiction to review and reconsider a panel‘s decision.80 Once
reconsidered by the Board, the decision cannot again be reviewed by the Board.81 The
review of a panel‘s decision can be the result of a request by a party or by the Board
itself.82 The Board will determine if it reviews a decision based on a number of factors
such as a material error, public interest, new evidence, reliance on or effect of decision,
consent of the opposing party to the review and the availability of additional appeal
venues.

iii)

Substantive Arguments of the Parties

If OHIP has denied out of country health care funding coverage, it tends to be based on
one of two conditions under the HIA: whether the applicant qualifies as an ‗insured
person‘ and/or if the health care service is an ‗insured service‘ under the HIA, Regulation
552 and the Schedule of Benefits negotiated between the Ministry of Health and the
Ontario Medical Association. For the purpose of this thesis, the assumption will be made
that the applicant qualifies as an ‗insured person‘. The focus of this thesis will be on the
determination by the Board of what constitutes an ‗insured service‘.

Insured Services
80

SPPA, Supra Note 63 at s.21.2(1)

A tribunal may, if it considers it advisable and if its rules made under section 25.1 deal with the matter,
review all or part of its own decision or order, and may confirm, vary, suspend or cancel the decision or
order. 1997, c. 23, s. 13 (20).
81
82

Rule 21.09(6).
Rule 21.03.

39

Under the HIA, an insured person is entitled to receive insured services.83 Insured
services include: prescribed services of hospitals and health facilities,84 medically
necessary services provided by a physician,85 and health care services provided by
prescribed practitioners86 – all under conditions and limitations that may be prescribed.
―Prescribed is defined as ―prescribed by the Regulations‖.87 Cabinet can make
regulations regarding what is and is not an insured service and the payment scheme for
the insured services.88 Regulation 552 governs insured services and specifically the
services provided by Ontario physicians if those physician services are specified in the
schedule of benefits89 and hospital services. An OHIP determination that a service is not
an ‗insured service‘ can be appealed to the Board. Typically, a service is not an insured
service because it is an excluded service under the HIA Regulation 552 s.24(1) or, in the
case of out of country services, it has not met the ―test‘ outlined in s.28. The details of
‗excluded services‘ and out of country coverage are outlined below.

Excluded Services
Excluded services are listed in the HIA Regulation 552 s.24(1). For the purpose of this
thesis, treatment that is generally accepted in Ontario as being ‗experimental‘ is one of
the services excluded from coverage listed in s.24(1). This section is analysed in more
detail later in this thesis. The experimental exclusion from coverage states:
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HIA Supra Note 4 at s.12(1).
Ibid at s.12(1)1.
85
Ibid at s.12(1)2.
86
Ibid at s.12(1)3.
87
Ibid at s.1.
88
Ibid at s.45(1)(e).
89
Regulation 552 Supra Note 3 at s.37.1(1).
84
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EXCLUSIONS
24 (1) The following services rendered by physicians or practitioners are not
insured services and are not part of insured services unless, in the case of
services rendered by physicians, they are specifically listed as an insured
service or as part of an insured service in the schedule of benefits or, in the case
of services rendered by optometrists, they are specifically listed as an insured
service or as part of an insured service in the schedule of optometry benefits:
…
17. Treatment for a medical condition that is generally accepted within Ontario as
experimental.
…
Treatment that is considered to be ―experimental‘ is not funded by OHIP whether the
treatment is available domestically or out of country.

Out of Country Coverage – the criteria ‗test‘ under s.28.4(2)
In Ontario90, an insured person may receive coverage for out-of-country health care
services under two conditions. The first condition is if emergency treatment is required91

90

The CHA s.11(1)(b) obliges all provinces to provide ―payment amounts for the cost of insured health
services provided to insured persons while temporarily absent from the province.‖
91
S.28.3 states in part 28.3 (1) In-patient services rendered outside Canada in an eligible hospital or health
facility are prescribed as insured services if,
(a) the services are medically necessary;
(b) it is medically necessary that the services be provided on an in-patient basis;
(c) in Ontario, the insured person would ordinarily have been admitted as an in-patient of a public
hospital to receive the services; and
(d) the services are rendered in connection with an illness, disease, condition or injury that,
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92

as a result of an acute, unexpected event which arose while out of Canada and requires

immediate treatment. The second condition is if the health care service was a nonemergency situation but received prior approval from OHIP. Non-emergency health care
can take place on an outpatient basis or an inpatient basis. For the purpose of this thesis,
the focus will be on non-emergency inpatient out-of-country health care services
(OCCNEIHS) under s.28.4(2) which during the period 2003/04-2007/08 stated:

s.28.4(2) Services that are part of a treatment and that are rendered outside Canada
at a hospital or health facility are prescribed as insured services if,
(a) the treatment is generally accepted in Ontario as appropriate for a person in the
same medical circumstances as the insured person; and
(b) either,
(i) that kind of treatment that is not performed in Ontario by an identical or
equivalent procedure, or

(i) is acute and unexpected,
(ii) arose outside Canada, and
(iii) requires immediate treatment. O. Reg. 31/92, s. 3; O. Reg. 596/93, s. 2.
(2) In subsection (1),
―eligible hospital or health facility‖ means,
(a) a hospital licensed or approved as a hospital by the government in whose jurisdiction the
hospital is situated in which complex medical and complex surgical procedures are routinely
performed, or
(b) a health facility licensed by the government in whose jurisdiction the health facility is situated
in which complex medical and complex surgical procedures are routinely performed. O. Reg.
31/92, s. 3.
92

Regulation 552 s.28.2 deals with emergency outpatient hospital services; s.23.3 deals with emergency
inpatient hospital services. Section 29 deals with physician services
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(ii) that kind of treatment is performed in Ontario but it is necessary that the insured
person travel out of Canada to avoid a delay that would result in death or medically
significant irreversible tissue damage.93

Under the s.28.4(2) ―test‖, the Board must determine if the out of country health care
treatment is generally accepted in Ontario as appropriate for a person in the same medical
circumstances as the insured person in question.94 In addition, the s.28.4(2) test requires
either that the treatment is not performed in Ontario by an identical or equivalent
procedure95 96 or if the treatment is performed in Ontario but travel outside the country to
receive the treatment is required to avoid a delay that would result in the insured person‘s
death or significantly irreversible tissue damage.97 98 The s.28.4(2) ‗test‘ does not provide
the Board with jurisdiction to assess economic factors such as service cost estimates, cost
effectiveness and/or cost benefit analysis on an individual or societal basis. The s.28.4(2)

93

Regulation 552, Supra Note 3 at s.28.4(2)(a)(b)(i)(ii).
For the purpose of this thesis, ‗out of country health care treatment is generally accepted in Ontario as
appropriate for a person in the same medical circumstances as the insured person in question‘ is also
referred to as ‗generally acceptable‘ or ‗GA‘.
95
For the purpose of this thesis, ‗identical or equivalent‘ is also referred to as ‗I/E‘.
96
―OHIP is in a better position than individual physicians to know what treatments are available in the
province. Before a patient is allowed to go out of the country for treatment, OHIP must be satisfied that the
treatment is not, in fact, performed in Ontario. Consulting with OHIP is the only effective way to make that
determination.‖ Sandra Blad v. General Manager OHIP, unreported decision, December 18, 1998
97
For the purpose of this thesis, ‗delay that would result in the insured person‘s death‘ is referred to as
‗delay-death‘ and ‗delay that would result in the insured person‘s significantly irreversible tissue damage‘
is referred to as ‗delay-MSITD‘.
98
This author points out that Ontario‘s HIA Regulation 552 s.28.4(2) test does not require the health care
service to be available from another Canadian province before it is considers out of country for compliance
with s.28.4(2) – the criteria is only if the health care service is not available in Ontario. Thus,
section.28.4(2) allows for the review of out of country health care services for potential public funding
before a review of Canadian provincial health care service options. As such, a non-domestic service is
examined before a domestic service. This is of interest to the author as the CHA requires that all provinces
– in order to receive ‗cash contributions‘ from the federal government - operate under the five principle
discussed earlier – including the principal of ‗portability‘ of health care services across Canada. The federal
CHA does not make reference to the portability of health insurance across Canadian borders. Thus, it is
unclear to the author how s.28.4(2) meshes with the CHA ‗portability‘ requirement.
94
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test also does not include any criteria regarding the compassionate circumstances of the
patient requesting the out of country treatment. As discussed earlier, the Board does not
have jurisdiction to assess whether a provision in legislation is or is not constitutional.
Prior Approval Requirement for OCCNEIHS: Section 28.4(5)
The request for the OCCNEIHS must be submitted by a practicing Ontario physician on
behalf of the insured patient. The physician must confirm that the OCCNEIHS requested
is generally acceptable for persons in the same medical circumstance as the patient. The
submitting physician must confirm that an identical or equivalent procedure to the
requested OCCNEIHS is not performed in Ontario or that a delay in receiving the
identical or equivalent provided in Ontario would lead to the patient‘s death or MSITD.
Based on the physician‘s submission, OHIP will approve or deny funding for the insured
service. Under section 28.4(2), if the OCNEIHS is to be approved, the requested health
care service must be approved by OHIP prior to its receipt.
Section 28.4(5) states:

Prior Approval
The following are conditions of payment of amounts for services prescribed in
this Section:
1.

An application for approval of payment must be submitted to the
General Manager by a physician who practices medicine in
Ontario on behalf of the insured person and the application must
contain a written confirmation from that physician that, in the
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opinion of the physician, one of the conditions set out in clause
2(2)(b)99 is satisfied.
2.

The General Manager must give written approval of the
payment of the amount under this section before the services for
which approval has been sought are rendered.

3.

The services must be received within the time limit set out in the
approval described in paragraph 2.

4.

If the services are covered by a preferred provider arrangement,
they must be received from a preferred provider.

It is important to recognize that the Board struggled with the issue of whether or not
OHIP had the discretion to fund OCCNEIHS that had not been approved by the General
Manager of OHIP prior to being received by the patient. In October of 2008, the Ontario
Divisional Court heard an appeal from a Board decision which upheld OHIP‘s decision
not to fund OCCNEIHS which had not received prior approval. In January of 2009, the
Ontario Divisional Court released its decision -- C.C.W. v. Ontario Health Insurance
Plan.100 The court ruled that the HIA Regulation 552 s.28.4(2) did not provide OHIP with
the discretion to retroactively approve OCCNEIHS.101 It is also important to note that the
court hearing (2008) and ruling (2009) came after the thesis study period (2003/0499

Regulation 552, Supra Note 3 at s.28.4(2)(b) refers to ‗either‘ identical or equivalent procedures or a
delay causing death or MSITD
100
2009 CanLII 712 (ON SCDC), [hereinafter ‗C.C.W.] <http://canlii.ca/t/224j3> retrieved on 2013-02-22
101
Ibid at para 57 ―Neither the Act nor the regulations expressly confer a discretion on the General
Manager to give retroactive prior approval for out-of-country medical treatment or to waive the
requirement for prior approval.‖ However, the Court did find that the Board should have considered the
urgency of the situation, objective of s.28.4(2) and the implied power of OHIP to grant retroactive approval
in certain cases = para 108 ―The Board reached an unreasonable decision in failing to find that the General
Manager has the implied power to give retroactive approval in urgent situations in order to meet the
objectives of s. 28.4 of Regulation 552.‖
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2007/08). As will be seen in the analysis of Board decisions made during the study
period, the interpretation of OHIP‘s discretion to grant retroactive approval and
reimbursement was variable.

3. Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to provide an overview of the existing Canadian health
care legislative system within which HSARB is situated. It is within this system and legal
constraints that Board decisions regarding the out of country coverage of health care
services are made. The overview highlights the complexity and extensive interaction
between various statutes. The overview also highlights the legislative definitions as well
as the lack of HSARB‘s specific procedural protections required under the MOHARBA
and the HIA. As well, the overview outlines the substantive test for OCCNEIHS outlined
in regulations.

Chapter 2 is also important because this thesis analyses the study‘s results relative to the
A4R theory and found that consistency with the A4R theory largely depended on the
legislative framework outlined here rather than on the study‘s quantitative data. In this
respect, the legislation complied with the A4R theory rather than the legislation‘s actual
operation.

46

Chapter 3
Literature Review: Part I
Need for Empirical Research

Need for Empirical Quantitative Research
Existing Empirical Research on Tribunals
Existing Qualitative Research on Tribunals
Existing Quantitative Research on Tribunal
Conclusion

47

Chapter 3
Literature Review: Part I
Need for Empirical Research

This Chapter outlines the academic discussion regarding the lack of Canadian empirical
research in the legal academic field and on tribunals specifically. Not only is
administrative law an under researched area of law, the lack of empirical research
regarding administrative law poses a significant risk to evaluating the work of the
tribunal and to the reputation of this legal academic field. The lack of research may be the
result of many factors including research capacity, complexity, difficulty, institutional
support and lack of prestige. This Chapter also reviews the limited existing qualitative
and quantitative tribunal research.

Need For Empirical Quantitative Research
Empirical Legal Studies is a growing field of legal study which emphasizes the use of
empirical research approaches similar to other social science disciplines such as
economics, political science, sociology, and psychology. ‗Empirical research‘ is defined
as the use of statistical techniques and analysis – including the systematic coding of
judicial opinions that facilitate descriptions of or inferences to a larger sample or
population as well as replication by other scholars.102 103 Despite the availability of

102

Michael Heise, ―The Importance of Being Empirical‖ 26 Pepp. L. Rev. 807 [hereinafter ―Heise‖] at 810
– Heise states that this narrow definition of empirical research is clearly distinct from traditional theoretical
and doctrinal counterparts – at 833 Heise argues that ‗[w]here empirical questions lurk, data warrant at least
as much respect as that accorded opinions and words‘.
103
Peter H. Schuck ―Why Don‘t Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?‖ 39 J. Legal Edu. 323
[hereinafter ‗Schuck] at 323- -24.
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empirical research tools, the current legal scholarship remains dominated by theory and
doctrine.104 Heise states:

―Our legal literature would be enriched if more academics, particularly law
professors, became more engaged in empirical legal research and produced more
of it … Empirical work sheds important light on old legal issues and identifies
and speaks to the issues that the more traditional theoretical and doctrinal genres
cannot reach. …‖105

The dearth of empirical research by legal academics may be the result of several factors
including: the lack of research being conducted outside of law libraries; most law
professors who generate much of the legal scholarship yet lack training in the area of
empirical research; the lack of prestige; the lack of internal and external incentives to
conduct empirical research; the risk of exposure to falsification through replication of
results and the fact that anecdotal evidence is often easier to collect than empirical
research.106 Lowery and Evans argue that legal research does not focus on basic research,
and, in addition to a lack of institutional support, there is a failure to teach methods and
paradigms and expand research arsenals for scholarly work. This lack of rigor in research
methods creates a ‗crisis of confidence of sorts concerning research that clearly exists in
the field‘.107 Doctoral work is particularly challenged. The doctoral contribution to

104

Heise, Supra Note 102 at 834.
Ibid at 834.
106
Ibid at 809.
107
Daniel Lowery and Karen G. Evans, ―The Iron Cage of Methodology: The Vicious Circle of Means
Limiting Ends Limiting Means‖ (2004) Vol 36 No 3Administration and Society 306 [hereinafter
―Lowery‖] at 308.
105
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knowledge and theory development has been minimal and doctoral research in the field108
is ―distinguished by its poor quality‖.109 The authors challenge the field to explore ways
of introducing rigorous empirical methods into curriculum and research.110 111

The urging for legal academic empirical research is not new. The development of good
theories is made even more difficult without the benefit of good data112 and the lack of an
empirical footing poses a threat to legal theory‘s persuasiveness and influence.113
In terms of quantitative research, a study by Arthurs et al,114 stated that developing and
applying statistical data in legal research was undertaken frequently by only 3% of
Canadian law professors, occasionally by 15% and not at all by 58%. Empirical research
methodologies were employed in less than 10% of the law review articles published in
each of five selected years of the study.115Arthurs et al conclude ―… that lists of research
projects undertaken by these institutions rarely indicate any empirical, interdisciplinary,
comparative or historical aspects.‖116 The Nuffield Report of 2006 points out similarities
to the Arthurs 1983 study. The Nuffield Report of 2006 found that, despite the
achievements and potential of empirical legal research, UK universities had a current
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Lowery, Supra Note 107 is referring to scholarly research in Public Administration
Ibid at 308.
110
Ibid at 307.
111
Ibidat 307.
112
Derek C. Bok, ―A Flawed System of Law Practice‖ (1983) 33 J. Legal Educ. 570 [hereinafter ―Bok‖] at
581.
109

113

Richard A. Posner, ―Against Constitutional Theory‖ (1998) 73 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1 [hereinafter ―Posner‖]
at 3.
114
H.W. Arthurs, Law and learning: Report to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of
Canada by the Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law (Ottawa: Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council of Canada, April 1983) [hereinafter ―Arthurs 1983‖] Table 1.
115
Arthurs 1983 Supra Table 4.
116
Ibid at 83.
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capacity crisis to undertake empirical legal research and that this crisis would grow
worse.117

Need for Empirical Research of Tribunals
In addition to the dearth of empirical research by legal academics generally, there is also
a dearth of Canadian empirical research of tribunals. For example, there is a disturbing
absence of debate in the academic literature regarding the actual administrative tribunal
procedures experienced by litigants, the substantive legal arguments and the association
with the outcome resource allocation decisions by tribunals. The lack of information and
debate is important because more citizens have resource allocation decisions determined
by tribunals than by courts.118 Administrative law – and a tribunal specifically -- is
concerned with everyday practice of administrative justice, not just judicial review of
administrative decision-making.119 Even more disturbing is the absence of thorough
empirical research regarding the actual functioning of tribunals and the evaluation of this
actual functioning related to its ideal functioning. Preliminary qualitative and quantitative
empirical research, as cited below, offer insights into tribunal functions. More
importantly, the cited tribunal research provides insights into study methodology
challenges and the importance of sound methodology upon which conclusions should be
based.
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The Nuffield Foundation, Nuffield Inquiry Law in the Real World: Improving Our Understanding of
How Law Works, Final Report and Recommendations, The Nuffield Inquiry on Empirical Legal Research,
(London, 2006), online http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/socio-legal/empirical/docs/inquiry_report.pdf at 39.
118
Cooper v. Canada (Human Rights Commission), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 854 at 899-900.
119
Lorne Sossin, ―Access to Administrative Justice and Other Worries‖ in Colleen M. Flood et al, eds,
Administrative Law in Context (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications Limited, 2008) 391-409
[hereinafter ―Sossin‖].

51

According to Sossin and Hoffman, tribunals are key in allocating scarce resources yet
their decision making process and content is under researched. Empirical research to
evaluate the accountability of tribunals ‗is one of the least scrutinized areas of
administrative law‘.120 The authors state that an assessment of health-related adjudicative
tribunals has never before been comprehensively undertaken.121

―The dearth of externally-focused empirical evaluation is not only a missed
opportunity, in our view, but may also pose a significant risk. ... Without this data,
the Boards may lack the baseline measurements needed to track changes over
time, evaluate the performance of decision-makers and staff, and engage in longer
term strategy planning. ... For academics, it is an under-scrutinized sphere of
administrative law and health system functioning that is both ripe for research
and, potentially, reform.‖122

The authors recommend the need for evidence and data driven strategies in order to
evaluate and achieve a tribunal‘s intended purpose.123 They argue that the current
research focuses on theory, doctrine, and procedures - not substantive decision making
that could be assessed through empirical research.

120

Lorne Sossin, and Stephen Hoffman, ―Empirically evaluating the impact of adjudicative tribunals in the
health sector: context, challenges and opportunities‖ (2010) 28 Windsor Y.B. Access Justice 343-360
[hereinafter ―Sossin and Hoffman‖].
121
Ibid at 345.
122
Ibid at 353.
123
Ibid at 117.
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―Once a system of empirical observation is in place, potential evaluators can
establish benchmarks according to which they can track and assess performance.
Such comparative points of measurement can be drawn from thoughtful
consideration, aspiration goals of leaders, expert judgment on what is possible,
data from similar tribunals in other jurisdictions (i.e. comparative analysis), or
previous empirical observations from the same tribunal (i.e. interrupted timeseries analysis).‖124
………
The two tribunal paradigms – process and substance – which present a unique
challenge for empirical evaluation as simple evaluation cannot be effectively
utilized. However, the fact that evaluation is not easy does not detract from its
importance.125

The authors make a final comment on the role of empirical research in legal academia.
While empirical research is not new to the health sector, it is rare in the context of
administrative justice. The authors state that the lack of empirical research may be due to
the complexity of the health system, methodological complications (simple research
design cannot isolate cause-effect relationships, lack of clear criteria and goals, few past
examples to emulate) and legal barriers. The lack of empirical research may also be due
to a lack of competence, capacity and academic prestige in the legal field to conduct such
empirical research.

124
125

Ibid at 359.
Ibid.
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―Finally, as recently highlighted by the Nuffield Inquiry on Empirical Legal
Research, the legal academy also suffers from a dearth of empirical competence
and capacity to conduct such studies. ... Empirical legal methodologies are also
not generally recognized to be as prestigious within the academic community as
traditional doctrinal investigations. The pervasive culture of deference to experts
and authority must further diminish the perceived value of objective empirical
work and weaken any apparent need for more rigorous research that is higher on
the hierarchy of evidence. Again, the focus on elements of process (e.g. bias and
independence) rather than impact (e.g. judicial decisions) as indicators of quality
and performance must also deter legal scholars from conducting work in this area
such that target outcomes are less likely to be assessed.‖126

Existing Qualitative Research on Tribunals
Two graduate theses undertook qualitative research on tribunals. The Jacobs 2009
doctoral thesis qualitatively analysed three Canadian tribunals regarding the factors
influencing daily independent tribunal decision making.127 Specifically, Jacobs examined
the internal commission relationships and their link to external bodies within the daily
workings of tribunal decision-making via 30 interviews, focus groups and nine months
observing daily operations of three commission (the Office of the Information and
Privacy Commission in Ontario, the Quebec Commission d‘acces a l‘information in
Quebec City, federal Privacy Commissioner‘s office in Ottawa). The study did not
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Ibid at 357.
Laverne Jacobs 2009 PhD Thesis, York University ―Fashioning Administrative Independence at the
―Tribunal‖ Level: An Ethnographic Study of Access to Information and Privacy Commissions in Canada‖.
[hereinafter ―Jacobs‖].
127
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examine structural guarantees of independence (financial security, security of tenure, and
the appointment and removal process) and did not reveal confidential information about
actual individual cases. Jacobs concluded that128 ‖when it comes to empirical studies
compiling and examining what it is that tribunals do, there is a dearth of Canadian
administrative law theory and information available.‖129 However, Jacobs stated: ―the
realities of tribunal existence are not that neatly packaged ―130 and factors affecting
tribunal independence did not ‗jump out‘. Nevertheless, the tribunals‘ institutional culture
was found to be an important factor.131 This thesis provided an interesting examination
of the factors affecting the independence of tribunal decision making and the ‗dearth‘ of
Canadian administrative law theory generally.
Brenda Gamble‘s 2002 doctoral thesis ‗What‘s In, What‘s Out – Stakeholder views on
the Boundaries of Medicare‘ for the University of Toronto‘s Institute of Medical Sciences
Department132 did not examine tribunals but rather undertook a qualitative study of
decision makers‘ views on what health care services should be publicly funded. The
views of ―policy elites‖ from key stakeholder groups across Canada were solicited. The
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Ibid. The theses comments are based on the SCC decision of Ocean Port Ltd. V. British Columbia
(General Manager, Liquor Control and Licensing Branch) [2001] 2 S.C.R. 781 and her review of the
academic literature as well as her doctoral thesis research. According to Jacobs, this was a landmark
decision with respect to the judicial statement that the amount of independence a tribunal should have is
determined by the will of the Legislature. Jacobs states that, based on a SCC decision, scholars have been
invited to determine the factors that affect the independence of various decision making bodies. However,
according to Jacobs, this decision has not been taken up as not much has been said or done on the
development of models of independence and impartiality that are true to the work of tribunals.
129
Ibid at 7.
130
Ibid at 343.
131
As a result of the dearth of theoretical application of models to the actual practice of tribunals, Jacobs
develops three new theoretical model regarding administrative independence; independence informed by
judicial dictates; independence informed by cultural understandings; independence informed by
fundamental values of fairness.
132

Hereinafter ―Gamble‖.
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general public was not included in assessing the views.133 The study concluded that
‗policy elites‘ wanted to continue ‗needs based‘ health care provided by hospitals and
doctors. The policy choices that were made earlier influenced the ‗policy elites‘ on what
should be funded by Medicare and any change would be based on the government‘s
ability to mediate the scope of conflict within existing institutional frameworks. This
qualitative study is interesting methodologically because in determining what health care
services should be insured, it excluded submissions from the general public and it did not
include the criteria for determining who were ‗policy elites‘.

Existing Quantitative Research on Tribunals
In his doctoral thesis for the Faculty of Law at the University of Toronto published in
1999, Chipman134 undertook an empirical quantitative research analysis of 669135
‗reported‘ decisions136 on multiple types of appeals over an eight year period of one
tribunal - the Ontario Municipal Board. Chipman sought to determine whether the
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A self administered 12 page questionnaire was mailed out in January to April 2002 to 4,934 ―provider‖
groups of which 2,523 were returned completed. In March to April of 2002 a web based version on the
questionnaire – which only included one question – was sent to 5,200 embers of the Canadian Federation of
Independent Businesses. Of the 5,200 web based questionnaire, 1,240 were returned completed.
134
John Chipman 1999 SJD Thesis ,University of Toronto ―Policy-Making by Administrative Tribunals: A
study of the manner in which the Ontario Municipal Board has applied provincial land use policies and has
developed and applied its own planning policies‖[Hereinafter ―Chipman‖].
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Ibid. - 348 cases for the time period 1971-1978 and 321 cases for the time period 1987-1994
136
Ibid - Methodologically, there was considerable provincial policy change over time which affected the
tribunal. It was not feasible to analyse all decisions. (Chipman at 340) Each year looked at 75-80 decisions
regarding planning appeals, referrals, assessment appeals and ‗other matters‘. The 75-80 decisions was less
than the total number handed down by the tribunal but were decisions where the tribunal made a specific
statement about its views on the matter in question. (Chipman at 341) Chipman coded the data based on:
identifiers, type of application, land use type, supporters and opponents, professional support or opposition,
expressions of provincial policy, potential areas of policy development, importance of policy to Board‘s
decision and the actual Board decision.
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tribunal applied provincial planning policy and/or developed and applied its own
planning policy in many areas where the provincial policy was silent.137 138

According to Chipman, Ontario tribunals have been the subject of rich, but often
generalized and theoretical literature. Yet despite their importance, there has been little
published empirical scholarly analysis of the manner in which such agencies actually
engage in their day-to-day activities.139

―Court decisions, particularly those of the more senior courts, are closely studied,
but the vast range of administrative decision-making, which probably touches
more persons closely than do judicial decisions, remains largely anonymous and
unaddressed.‖140
…
―Given their significant role, it is valuable to have a clear understanding of the
considerations they (tribunals) bring to bear in making decisions on matters under
their jurisdiction.‖141

Chipman concluded, based on his empirical quantitative research, the tribunal in his study
did not perform according to the theoretical models:
137

Chipman was also examining the relationship between tribunals and government and the degree of
tribunal independence in carrying out their mandate.
138
Chipman, Supra Note 134 at 338.
139
Ibid at 4. -―There is no lack of ―how to be successful before the Board‖ presentation materials, often of
high quality, prepared by lawyers, planners and other professionals who appear before it, but this is of
necessity of a limited and practically-focused nature, and is no substitute for analysis which attempts to
place the Board‘s decision-making in a more analytical context, to get behind what it does to examine how
and why it does it.‖
140
Ibid at 1.
141
Ibid at 3.
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―The OMB has not behaved as the literature of regulatory theory might have led
us to expect. … The reality of regulatory activity, as the commentators fully
recognize, can be far more complex and ambiguous, and the analysis of the
Board‘s decision-making certainly reveals a pattern far removed from the
theoretical norm.‖142
This quantitative research is of interest as it examines actual tribunal decisions and
undertakes statistical assessment of the coded results. Based on this quantitative study,
Chipman concludes that the tribunal did not perform according to theoretical models.
This is the first quantitative study of tribunals that identified the discrepancy between
administrative law theory and administrative law practice.

Karen Fernadez‘s 2009 York University, Master of Arts thesis, entitled Democracy,
Power and Decision-Making143 continues Chipman‘s study of the OMB. She examined
31 OMB decisions in the downtown Toronto core for the 8 1/2 year period of 2000 to
2008. Fernadez sought to determine who benefits from the process given the way the
OMB operates and how OMB decisions come to reflect the consistent nature of the
Board‘s own developed policies.144 Given the methodology for this study, the author
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Ibid at 319.
Hereinafter ―Fernadez‖.
144
Fernadez comments that while other studies had looked at the role of citizen participation, the role of
expert testimony and the effects of the appeals on the built environment, she wanted to investigate the
decisions of the OMB in an attempt to determine the role that it has come to play in approving
developments that are to alter the look of the city significantly‖ in relation to the adoption of the New
Official Plan and the planning for the downtown area.
143
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interprets the study results with caution145 but acknowledges the important development
of indicators such as approval rates, decision outcomes, number of decisions with
sufficient reasons for analysis, position taken by the Board, and policies referred to in the
final decision.

Caroline Pitfield, in her 2003 LLM thesis at the University of Toronto entitled ‗Critical
Evaluation of HSARB: Giving Patients a Louder Voice in the Health Care System‘146
examined public participation at the policy making level and the legal mechanisms to
challenge government decisions. Specifically, Pitfield sought to ‗evaluate‘ whether
HSARB, as a specialized appeal mechanism, provided patients with an accessible and
effective way to challenge government decisions about the availability of ‗insured‘ health
care both within and outside of Canada. She wanted to explore ―how good a job the
Board is doing as an appeal mechanism for those with complaints about access to health
care services‖ particularly as compared to the Courts and given the relative dearth of
review as to whether the tribunal could provide an alternate decision making mechanism
with the values of procedural fairness, reasonableness and Charter principles like dignity
and equality.147 Pitfield examined HSARB‘s statute, regulation, rules, annual report and
‗unreported‘ decisions available in hardcopy from the HSARB office.148
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Comment - For the eight and a half years of January 2000 to August 2008, approximately 4-5 cases
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available in hardcopy at the Board‘s Toronto office.‖.
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Pitfield concluded that HSARB had the potential to provide patients with an accessible
and effective way to challenge government decisions about health care availability but
had yet to fulfil its potential and needed to be more accessible and responsive. With
respect to the presence or absence of legal assistance provided by MOHARBA and the
HIA, Pitfield states:

―Those with lawyers (or with legal knowledge themselves) are better equipped to
formulate effective arguments, to do the proper research, and to use judicial
procedures to their advantage – examine and cross-examine witnesses, to bring
motions and to make objections, based on the Board‘s Rule of Practice, for
instance. They are also more likely to introduce legal arguments, or use statutory
interpretations, which can be effective ways of challenging OHIP‘s insistence that
a claim does not fall within the statutory scheme. Such advantages are in addition
to the obvious impact that legal knowledge, and familiarity with legal procedures
and relevant legislation, will have on the potential success of the appeal in the
first place.

The need to hire a lawyer to defend one‘s interests successfully in civil, and
particularly [sp] criminal proceedings, has been recognized by parties in such
disputes for years. There is also a constitutional right to legal counsel when
interests of sufficient importance – like liberty and security of the person – are in
jeopardy …
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Entitlements to health care services are not considered serious enough to warrant
state-funded counsel for those involved in Board proceedings. Still, appellants
may feel that they are significant enough to justify hiring a lawyer, particularly
given the potential complexity of the Board‘s proceedings and in the absence of
much information or assistance with respect to how they work.‖149

With respect to the Board, Pitfield concluded ‗there is a problem‘ as the ‗accessibility of
procedures‘ are complex, difficult to understand, and may require the assistance of a
lawyer or some form of legal assistance.
Pitfield also noted that there was a gap between the parties‘ expectations of HSARB and
the Board‘s limited jurisdictional powers.150 Pitfield argues for increasing HSARB‘s
discretion, allowing HSARB to be more compassionate and extending its powers,
providing assistance to unrepresented litigants, reinstating Charter jurisdiction, and
increasing the Board‘s expertise regarding medical necessity. Despite numerous
methodological challenges,151 this thesis provides important insights into the distinction
between procedural aspects of a hearing and the substantive legal arguments before the
tribunal.
149

Ibid at 129-130.
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Ibid at 100.
It is unclear what time period was studied, how many cases were studied and what the inclusion and
exclusion criteria was used. It is unclear what is the definition and indicators for ‗‘accessibility‘ and
‗effectiveness‘ i.e. are defined relative to the patients‘ expectations or relative to the tribunal‘s mandate or
the courts decree. There were no key informant or interview assessment with patients, OHIP or members of
the tribunal to qualitatively assess ―accessibility‖ and ―effectiveness‖. It is unclear whether this is a
comparison between the ‗Courts‘ and an administrative tribunal or just an analysis of the tribunal. It is
unclear if a ‗specialized appeal mechanism‘ differed from an ‗appeal mechanism‘ and ‗administrative
tribunals151 In the absence of qualitative data, a documentary review was undertaken by Pitfield of HSARB
related statutes, regulations, rules, annual reports and unreported decisions.
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Pitfield and Flood evaluated HSARB‘s out-of-country appeal process in terms of the need
for an accessible, equitable, quick and effective process for an appeal mechanism within
a publicly funded health care system.152 The authors reviewed HSARB‘s mandate,
composition, definitions, regulatory provisions, and decisions. The study raised very
interesting insights – particularly regarding the low success rates of appeals. However,
the study is methodologically unclear with respect to time frames and the definition of
medical necessity.153 It is also unclear if the study is based on Pitfield‘s LLM thesis or if
it is a new study. If the methodology is unclear, the insights from the study are to be
considered cautiously. However, the study was interesting in its exploration of
substantive legal arguments before the tribunal.
Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the academic discussion regarding the lack of
empirical research in the legal field and specifically the lack of empirical research on
Canadian tribunals. Adjudicative administrative tribunals are important because more
citizens have resource allocation decisions determined by tribunals than by courts.
However, our understanding of how tribunals make resource allocation decisions comes
largely through the academic analysis of judicial reviews undertaken by the courts, where
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Caroline Pitfield and Colleen M. Flood, ―Section 7 ‗Safety Valve‘: Appealing Wait Times Within a
One-Tier System‖ in Colleen Flood et al ed., Access to Care Access to Justice (University of Toronto Press
Incorporated, 2005) 477 [hereinafter ―Pitfield and Flood].
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The methodology of the study – particularly with respect to the time period covered by the decisions - is
unclear. For example, the article states 121 cases heard in 2002. The authors cite a 1995 case with respect
to s.28.4(2) dealing with delay. The authors also make reference to a 1999-2000 time period and then to a
2001 case heard in 2003 with respect to the release of a decision. The study also makes reference to
Applicant‘s understanding of ‗medical necessity‘ but it is unclear how many Applicants have this
understanding and if the understanding crosses all years.
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the courts are emphasising fair procedures protections. Administrative law is an under
researched area of law. This lack of administrative law research poses a significant risk to
evaluating the work of the tribunal and to the reputation of this legal academic field. Of
the empirical legal research on tribunals that does exist, there are several methodological
flaws and shortcomings which limit the interpretation and generalizability of the findings.
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Chapter 4
Literature Review: Part II
Judicial and Tribunal Decision Making Mechanisms

1. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the judicial and adjudicative
tribunal decision making mechanisms within which HSARB is situated. This chapter
outlines the debate about the increased or decreased role of the courts in health care
decision making and their oversight role of adjudicative tribunals through the use of
judicial review. The increased or decreased use of the courts as decision makers about
health care resource allocation is considered within the context of another academic
discussion regarding whether the court is deferring difficult resource allocations to
tribunals.

2. Courts as Decision Making Mechanism
Why is a discussion of health care resource allocation decision making by the courts of
importance to this thesis, which focuses on tribunal procedural factors, the substantive
legal arguments of the parties and tribunal decision? The answer stems from the fact that
the courts can provide, among other things, direction to tribunals with respect to the
tribunal‘s jurisdiction, procedural fairness, the appropriate standard of review and the
interpretation of legislation.
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Our traditional understanding of the courts and their health care resource allocation
decision making arises out of a review of the caselaw and the academic analysis of that
caselaw. In academic analysis, the use of the courts to allocate resources is discussed and
debated. The debate centres on whether there is an increased or decreased use of the
courts, why courts are being used as resource allocation mechanisms, whether the courts
are suitable resource allocators and how the judiciary sees its role relative to tribunals.154
There is also academic discussion about the role of government, the courts and tribunals
in consciously deferring health care resource allocation decisions to each other as a
means of dealing with or avoiding difficult health care allocation decisions.

Hadorn argues that there is a progressive attempt by litigants to use the court as a forum
for health care resource allocation – even if in reality litigation is a rare event. This may
be due to assumptions that the courts have the capacity to deal with complex resource
allocation issues and/or deal with constitutional rights. Litigation on questions of resource
allocation may be the result not only of issue complexity but of decision consistency,
individual judicial consideration, decision making capacity of institutions and political
aversion to sensitive resource allocations.155

Syrett argues that courtroom litigation is still rare. Litigation may be an evolving social
and political trend, coupled with the increasing public visibility of strategies of
154

With respect to the latter point, the courts themselves may have different opinions about their role in
health care resource allocation.
155

D. Hadorn, ―Emerging parallels in the American health care and legal-judicial systems.‖ (1992) Am J.
Law Med.18:79-95 [hereinafter ―Hadorn‖].
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rationing.156 According to Syrett, key factors in the UK in the use of the courts for health
care resource allocation is the attitude of the judiciary towards health care resource
allocation claims as well as institutional and constitutional competence of the courts to
adjudicate upon issues arising from allocation decision-making in healthcare. The
consequence of these assumptions is that judges have tended to adopt a restrained and
deferential approach toward such matters when argued before them. 157 This judicial
position has dissuaded many would-be litigants, who are likely to perceive other channels
(such as the political process) as offering greater prospects of success.158 Syrett states that
courtroom litigation regarding resource allocation is not the best arena in which to engage
in deliberations on the need for rationing and the principles which should underpin such
choices.159 The deferential approach of the judiciary to the government for direction
regarding health care resource allocation may be problematic. Syrett argues that the
government is unlikely to lead because ―of the propensity of politicians to engage in
strategies of ‗blame avoidance‘ on questions of healthcare rationing. There is scope for
other institutions within civil society to seize the initiative in generating wider
deliberations on such issues. ... the courts regard their role as primarily reactive to the
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K. Syrett, ―Rationing in the Courts: England‖ in Law, Legitimacy and the Rationing of Health Care: A
Contextual and Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) [hereinafter
―Syrett‖] at 159-178.
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For example, Syrett examined the extent the U.K. courts to engage in questions of health care resource
allocation in order to reach some conclusions about the openness of courts to employ public health law
principles and values in decision-making regarding healthcare rationing. He concluded that English courts
– the judges themselves - are generally more reluctant to prospects of evolution of a judicial role re
decision on allocation of healthcare.
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Syrett, Supra Note 156 at 161.
Ibid at 159.
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wider health policy context.‖160 However, despite the problems, judicial involvement in
health care resource allocation cannot be casually dismissed. Syrett states:

―... courts may make a telling and useful contribution to the process of
decision-making on the allocation of resource, although their capacity to
do so will, of course, be contingent upon their readiness to adjust their
restrained, deferential approach in the interest of fulfilling the sort of
instrumental, facilitative role … ‖161
Alternately, Mariner argues that in the USA there is an increased use of the courts as
health care resource allocation forums. This increase, it is argued, is a result of proposals
to reduce national expenditures for health care under Medicare and other programs. 162
These cost containment concerns have raised questions about the limits on legislative
power to distribute health care benefits. Mariner argues that the American legislative
power to distribute health care via the constitutional guarantee of equal protection
analysis has been a weak, rigid and imprecise source of protection for the sick. As a
result, there is a role for the courts to ensure a heightened scrutiny and flexible approach
to reviewing claims. Mariner concludes that American judges may be seeking a greater
role in health care resource allocation – a role she supports. However, when courts do

160
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Ibid at 178.
Ibid at 161.
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WK Mariner ―Access to health care and equal protection of the law: the need for a new heightened
scrutiny‖ (1986) Am J Law Med. 12(3-4):345-80. Review. PubMed PMID: 3330409 [hereinafter
―Mariner‖].
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adopt the role of resource allocators, it is unclear if the courts offer an explicit or implicit
recognition of the financial impact of resource allocation decisions.163

Use of the Charter as a Decision Making Mechanism
Whereas the Canadian Constitution outlines the jurisdiction of the federal and provincial
governments, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms outlines the rights of individuals
relative to governmental actions.

There is a debate whether the Charter is being used as a resource allocator of health care
and if this use is appropriate. Sheldrick argues that the Canadian courts have increasingly
been used to allocate health care resources under the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms and under the court‘s authority to judicially review administrative law
decisions.164 Charter challenges are resorted to because of the absence of effective
alternatives to challenge decisions regarding access to government funded health care.165
Alternatively, Greschner argued that there are few Charter challenges because of the
relative comprehensiveness of the publicly funded system in Canada. She argues that the
basic principles articulated in the Canada Health Act mirror values of equality and
protection of human dignity under the Charter.166
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Mariner, Supra Note 159.
Byron Sheldrick, ―Judicial Review and the Allocation of Health Care Resources in Canada and the
United Kingdom‖ (2003) 5 Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice 149 [hereinafter
―Sheldrick‖] at 163.
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Martha Jackman, ―Charter Review as a Health Care Accountability Mechanism in Canada‖ (2010)
Health Law Journal, Vol 18:1-29 [hereinafter ―Jackman‖].
166
D. Greschner, ―How Will the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and Evolving Jurisprudence Affect Health
Care Cost?‖ Discussion Paper No. 20 (Ottawa: Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada, 2002)
at 19.
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Both Flood et al.167 and Sheldrick argue that Charter challenges as a mechanism for
resource allocation decision making are costly and time consuming and may produce
policy outcomes that are undesirable from the perspective of both the state and the user
groups,168 and litigants have not necessarily seen judicial decisions as an effective form
of decision making.169

Sheldrick‘s position counters Flood‘s argument that the courts may be the best means to
protect welfare entitlements and rights.170 However, there is a distinction between the
recognition of a health right and the enforcement of that right. Flood and May argue that
where patient health care rights exist, the issue of enforcing those rights needs to be
examined.171 Jackman, alternatively, argues that there is no judicial recognition of a
constitutional right to publicly funded health care based on need in Canada.172 Flood and
May argue that patients need accessible, inexpensive means to deal with their rights in
health care.173 The ability to bring forth patient concerns about resource constraints to a
review body may also help shed light on inappropriate resource allocation decisions and
spur change.174
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―The evidentiary burden, costs and delays associated with ordinary litigation
make it an impractical means of enforcing patients‘ rights. Moreover, patients
cannot readily bring litigation against the system actors such as governments for
resource allocation decisions. If a patient charter of rights is to be meaningful it
must provide patients with an inexpensive, readily accessible, independent means
through which to file a complaint and have it quickly resolved.‖175

In terms of resource allocation, Jackman argues that the Charter has enormous potential
as a health care accountability mechanism.176 Jackman argues that there is a judicial
reluctance to use the Charter in rationing public funds for health care services.

Canadian residents have utilized the Charter as a mechanism to question the
government‘s decision whether to fund or not fund a health care service. In Auton,177 178
a Charter argument regarding the violation of the equality provision – s.15 – was brought
against the British Columbia government for its decision not to fund behavioural therapy
for children with autism. The SCC ruled, in a deferential opinion, that there was no
violation as the scope of Medicare was a matter for the legislature and not the courts as
long as the government maintained equality of constitutionally protected access. As there
was not a s.15 violation, the SCC did not consider cost arguments as s.1 justification.
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Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General) [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 (S.C.C.) also used s.15 to
challenge resource allocation re. the provision of deaf interpreters as an insured benefit – the SCC agreed
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According to Lahey, the decision by the SCC left the responsibility for allocating
resource to the governments and legislatures.179

Alternatively, in Chaoulli,180 resource allocation decisions were not left to the
governments and legislatures. In Chaoulli, the Supreme Court ruled that Quebec‘s
legislated prohibition on private medical insurance in the face of long wait times violated
the Quebec Charter. However, only a minority of the judges found that the Quebec law
violated section 7 of the Canadian Charter.181
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Lahey, Supra Note 31 at 53.
Chaoulli, Supra Note 19.
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This author must comment here on the Chaoulli case as it does relate to empirical results and analysis
found in this study. The Chaoulli case is an example where the opinion of the patient regarding a medical
procedure/hip surgery is different from his own physician. In this thesis study, when there is a difference of
opinion between the patient and their own physician this difference is termed a ‗discrepancy within team
patient‘. The discrepancy within team patient may take many forms but typically relates the general
acceptability of a given health care service for the patient and/or a delay encountered by the patient. In
order to understand the health care issues experienced in the Chaoulli case, one must read the original trial
decision released in 2000. The patient‘s hip problems appear to begin in June of 1994 and both hips are
operated on two years later as of September 4, 1996. The trial decision lists the following health care issues
and services over three years: the unemployed patient was treated for depression in 1993 and was also
treated for a heart attack by three specialists. He received a recommendation for heart surgery in January of
1994 and had the surgery in March of 1994. The patient‘s hip problems began in June of 1994. He was
examined by a doctor in June of 1994 and then referred by his family physician to a specialist (Dr. F.) who
saw him in January 10th of 1995. On January 11, 1995, Dr. F. gave his recommendation to the patient but
the patient wanted a second opinion. At a February 28, 1995 appointment, Dr. F. told the patient he was not
an ideal candidate for hip surgery. On March 27, 1995 the patient went to the emergency room. On April
11, 1995, Dr. F. saw the patient. On May 18, 1995, the patient received an operation on his left hip. From
July 1995 to December 1995, the patient consulted a ‗number of people‘. In January of 1996, the patient
fell on his shoulder. In April of 1996, the patient was operated on for a hernia. In February the patient met
with Dr. F. who determined the patient‘s right hip required an operation. On September 4, 1996, the patient
received an operation on his right hip. In the author‘s opinion, this is a significant number of health care
services provided to the patient some of which the patient does not appear to experience a delay accessing
care. In addition, the issue before the court with respect to the delay receiving hip surgery through the
public health care system appears to be resolved within approximately two years.
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The trial court also appears to question the validity that the patient‘s complaint results from the public
health service. The trail court stated:
Mr Zeliotis initiated a media campaign denouncing the delays in the health system. The truth is
that, bearing in mind his personal medical obstacles, the fact that he was already suffering from
depression, his indecision and his complaints which in many respects were unwarranted, it is hard
to conclude that the delays that occurred resulted from lack of access to public health services, and
in fact even the complaints made about the delays by Mr. Zeliotis may be questioned …
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Lahey states that:

‗… the right of Canadians to health care is in the process of transitioning from a
right that is defined by governments through their legislative and administrative
processes to a right that Canadians will be able, to some still uncertain extent,
demand from governments through the adjudicative process. Whatever else this
may mean, it certainly means a new kind of accountability that requires
governments to explain the rationale for their legislative and policy choices to the
overseeing courts.182
Lahey goes on to state that use of the judiciary to make resource allocation decisions may
unavoidably focus on the rights of an individual rather than the interests of the collective.
However, this individual focus ‗cannot be altogether bad‘ given the lack of participation
of affected individuals and ‗black-box‘ decisions of bureaucrats.183

The Charter raises two questions with respect to this thesis – 1) are tribunals themselves
subject to the Charter and 2) are tribunals able to review Charter questions submitted by
the parties. For example, are parties before a tribunal able to clarify whether they have a
It is possible to sympathize with Mr. Zeliotis, to understand the pain and anguish he felt, but one
cannot conclude that the problems and delays he speaks of were solely caused by problems of
access to Quebec health services. At the same time, the Court acknowledges that despite the fact
that his medical file is not entirely conclusive he has an ‗interest‘ in the broad sense in bringing
the instant proceedings. So far as he was concerned, he had real problems getting an operation and
this caused him suffering. He felt he would have had better access if there were a private system.
We cannot say this is true, but it is his opinion and he is entitled to it.‖
In this author‘s opinion, the Chaoulli case highlights the importance of understanding the patient‘s original
submission at trial and the trial court‘s decision based on this submission.
182
Lahey, Supra Note 28 at 57.
183
Ibid at 58.
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Charter right to a given health care service when the government denies provision of that
service.

With respect to whether tribunals are subject to the Charter, the 2001 Supreme Court of
Canada decision in Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v British Columbia (General Manager, Liquor
Control and Licensing Board)184, held that administrative tribunals as agencies are within
the operations of the executive branch of the government and are thus – like the
government itself – subject to the Charter. The question whether tribunals are able to
review Charter questions was resolved in the 2010 Supreme Court of Canada decision in
R. v. Conway185 which held that administrative tribunals are courts of competent
jurisdiction to hear Charter issues and grant general remedies - if Charter jurisdiction has
not been excluded by statute.186

3. Judicial Review
A quasi-judicial / tribunal decision can be judicially reviewed by the courts based on 1)
an alleged breach of procedural fairness or bias and/or 2) the tribunal‘s inappropriate
utilization of its specific standard of review. If a tribunal‘s decision does not comply with
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[2001], 2 S.C.R. 781, online QL (SCJ) [hereinafter ―Ocean Port‖] at para 32.
2010 SCC 22, [2010] 1 SCR 76 [hereinafter ―Conway‖].

Ibid - Conway at para 22 states: ―[t]he result of this question will flow from whether the tribunal has the
power to decide questions of law. If it does, and if Charter jurisdiction has not been excluded by statute,
the tribunal will have the jurisdiction to grant Charter remedies in relation to Charter issues arising in the
course of carrying out its statutory mandate (Cuddy Chicks trilogy; Martin). A tribunal which has the
jurisdiction to grant Charter remedies is a court of competent jurisdiction.‖
186
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procedures or substantive review relative to the standard of review, the court can quash,
set aside or remit the matter back to the tribunal.

Procedural Review of Tribunal Decisions
Administrative tribunals, such as the Board, are required to follow procedures that are
fair, particularly when Board discretion is involved.187 The court judicially reviews a
tribunal‘s decision primarily in terms of the procedures the tribunal followed in arriving
at the decision - as opposed to a judicial review of the tribunal‘s substantive outcome of
the decision itself. As such, tribunals will endeavour to follow procedures that are
endorsed by the courts in an effort to create a fair environment for both parties in which
the tribunal will come to an outcome decision. The tribunal will also endeavour to follow
procedures to avoid its outcome decision being overturned by the courts for failure to
follow fair procedures.

Decisions that are policy decisions, such as those made by the legislature or minister as
opposed to outcomes affecting an individual, do not typically require following the
procedural protections.188 The government has maintained that it is entitled to make
health policy decisions and has refused to extend the duty of fairness.189

The duty of fairness and the factors to be considered are established in caselaw. In Baker,
the duty of fairness was held to require full and fair consideration of the issues and
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‗meaningful opportunity to present various types of evidence relevant to their case and
have it fully and fairly considered.‘190 The Supreme Court in Baker also stated that the
right to participate, as an element of the duty of procedural fairness, ensured that:

―..administrative decisions are made using a fair and open procedure,
appropriate to the decision being made and its statutory, institutional and
social context, with an opportunity for those affected to put forth their
views and evidence fully and to have them considered by the decisionmaker.‖191
Baker also established factors which must be considered in the duty of fairness. These
include five factors for general procedural fairness - the nature of the decision and the
process involved in making it, the nature of the statutory scheme, the importance of the
decision to the individual affected, the legitimate expectations of the parties, and the
procedure chosen by the tribunal. Specific procedural fairness factors include - notice that
the decision will be made, disclosure of the info on which the tribunal will base its
decision, the opportunity to participate or make views known, full hearings similar to that
which occurs in courts, opportunity to give evidence and cross examine, right to counsel,
and oral or written reasons for its decisions.192
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According to Huscroft, the duty of fairness requires two things – (1) the right to be heard
and (2) the right to an independent and impartial hearing.193 ―Hearings‖ do not
necessarily have to be oral hearings as the modern state could not function if oral
hearings were required for every administrative decision.194 It has also been argued that
additional factors may influence an applicant‘s access to fair hearings. For example,
access to justice factors may include such things as the access to adequate legal
representation195 and physical access to administrative justice.196

Pitfield argues that any shortcomings with respect to determinations of fact are not
surprising as they are the natural result of administrative law‘s focus on procedure.
Pitfield argues that ‗[w]hat matters are how the process looks and not necessarily how
well it works.‖ In her view, tribunals have chosen the fairness of process over the
accuracy of factual determinations and questions whether judicial procedures are actually
fair and effective. 197

It is expected by this author that procedures are neutral and allow the substantive legal
argument with respect to the legislation to be the only determining factor(s) for the
tribunal decision. But what if the due procedural protections, so strongly entrenched in
administrative law, influence the outcome decision as much or more than the substantive
legal argument(s)? This is a core question for this thesis - whether these procedures are
193
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neutral or whether they – in addition to substantive legal arguments - influence the
outcome tribunal decision. Subsequent chapters in this thesis analyse, for example,
whether the procedures of the Hearing format and legal representation at the Hearing
affect the decision regarding resource allocation.

Substantive Review of Tribunal Decisions
A ‗substantive review‘ of tribunal decisions by the courts is not a review of the
procedures used by the tribunal but an actual review of the tribunal‘s decision relative to
the tribunals‘ jurisdictional mandate, the standard of review and evidence. In essence,
administrative law principles ensure decision-makers act within the bounds of their legal
authority.198 While it is argued that the courts appear to have a deferential approach to
decision-makers, including the decisions of tribunals,199 if the tribunal‘s decision is not
legally appropriate relative to its statutory authority, the courts can overturn the tribunal
decision.

For example, in Stein v. Quebec (Regie de l‘Assurance-Maladie),200 the Quebec Superior
Court overturned the Tribunal‘s decision to uphold the government‘s denial of out of
country colon cancer surgery reimbursement. In that case, Stein was told by his physician
that the liver metastases should be removed as soon as possible. Stein, after being
rescheduled for surgery several times, sought surgery out of country via a procedure that
was considered by the tribunal to be ‗experimental‘ in Canada. The Quebec Superior
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Court found the Tribunal‘s decision irrational, unreasonable and contrary to the purpose
of the Quebec Health Act and ordered reimbursement.201 According to Lahey, ―Stein
indicates an emerging willingness in the courts to demand that health care policy-makers
more tightly connect their decisions to an understanding (and a justification) of the
consequences of those decisions for real flesh and blood citizens.‖202

When a court substantively reviews a tribunal decision, it is reviewed according to a
standard. Until 2008, the standard of review varied for tribunals from correctness,
reasonable simpliciter to patent unreasonableness. The court provided guidance to
tribunals regarding the standard of review in the 2008 SCC decision of Dunsmuir v. New
Brunswick203 which established correctness and reasonableness as the two standards of
review. In the case of Flora v. Ontario Health Insurance Plan,204 the Ontario Court of
Appeal held HSARB‘s Standard of Review as one of reasonableness. In C.C.W. v.
Ontario Health Insurance Plan, the court confirmed that the Standard of Review for
HSARB out of country cases was that of reasonableness205 and deference was owed to
HSARB in the interpretation of its own statute.206

201
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The courts have been helpful in establishing the standard of review for tribunals and
HSARB specifically. However, the judicially reviewed tribunal decisions only reflect a
small percentage of all tribunal decisions. The small percentage of cases on appeal to the
courts may not represent the cases that come before a tribunal. Of the tribunal cases not
appealed to the courts, little research has been done to analyze the procedures and the
substantive legal arguments presented by the parties and the resulting tribunal decision.

4. Tribunals as Decision Making Mechanisms

Charter challenges before the courts review government decision making relative to legal
rights and norms. Administrative Law is about ensuring that governmental power is used
in an accountable, fair way relative to ordinary citizens.207 To different extents, both
constitutional law and administrative law deal with the legality of government powers.208

Administrative tribunals are important because more citizens have resource allocation
decisions determined by tribunals than by courts.209 Tribunals are concerned with
everyday practice of administrative justice not just the judicial review of administrative
decision-making.210
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Tribunals have evolved over the last quarter century from the old approach to governing
which was one of ―command and control‖ whereby administrative bodies imposed the
regulation and sanctioned any non-conforming behaviour to ‗new‘ governance.211 Under
the new governance model, the ideal is that the government uses a mixture of tools to
accomplish the government‘s goals including the concept of a ‗regulatory pyramid‘ of
escalating strategies as a means of flexibility in enforcing regulatory regimes.212 213

Our theoretical understanding of how tribunals make resource allocation decisions comes
largely from the judicial review by courts of individual tribunal decisions.

The

understanding of tribunal procedures and substantive legal arguments through the eyes of
the court in judicial review is not the only way to understand how tribunals operate:

―...for many years excessive emphasis has been placed on judicial review of
administrative tribunals. Indeed, in the beginning years of the subject, and for too
long, there was, in my view, far too much attention paid to legal controls of
administrative action, as reflected, for example, in the views of A.V. Dicey and
Lord Hewart of Bury, and not enough attention to what might be called a realistic
approach to the subject ... .―214
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5. Judicial and Political Deference to Tribunals
In the academic discussion regarding the use of the courts as a mechanism to allocate
resources, the issue of judicial deferral to the legislature and administrative tribunals
arises again and again. Ham states that political leaders are reluctant to allocate health
care resources at the macro level as they will have to accept responsibility for unpopular
choices. The retreat from explicit resource allocation decision making can be interpreted
as a political blame avoidance strategy to avoid unpopular decisions and shift these to
tribunals, health authorities and physicians.215 Ham states:

―In these circumstances, there is a tendency for policy makers to avoid blame
either by ducking tough choices or by devolving responsibility to others.
Rationing by guidelines rather than exclusions is one manifestation of this, in that
it leaves ultimate responsibility for deciding who should be given access to health
care resources to agencies such as sickness funds and health authorities at the
meso level and to physicians at the micro level.‖216

According to Flood, the larger debate around tribunal decision making regarding resource
allocation has to do with whether the government defers politically sensitive issues to the
courts and/or administrative tribunals as a way of avoiding unpopular decisions.217 218The
courts are deferential to the government and both the government and the courts avoid
215
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substantive resource allocation decisions by engaging administrative tribunals. According
to Flood, the legislature makes a conscious decision to devolve difficult decisions
regarding resource allocation away from the legislature and the courts and into the hands
of administrative tribunals.219 Flood states:

―Through statutes, legislatures give these tribunals and boards power over others. Their
reasons for doing so are as varied as the types of delegated decision-makers in existence.
Sometimes there is a desire to employ particular expertise that is not available within a
government department; sometimes there is a need for an independent and impartial
decision maker so that decisions are not seen to be dictated by political processes; and
sometimes, which is of greater concern, governments may try to bury or deflect attention
from inadequate funding for programs or tough resource allocation decisions by
devolving decision making to administrative agencies with court-like powers.
Judicialization can be appealing to governments, who ―clothe what are essentially
economic or social decisions with a sort of protective colouring that may bolster the
tribunal‘s credibility, or at least make it a little less vulnerable to criticism.‖220
…Whatever the reason for establishment of a board or tribunal, it is very important to
realize that the legislature – almost always at the behest of the government – makes a
conscious choice to devolve decision-making away from the legislature and not to the
courts but to an administrative body.221
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6. Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the debates regarding the judicial
and adjudicative tribunal decision making mechanisms within which HSARB is situated.
It is debated whether tribunals provide an accessible, inexpensive mechanism for
resource allocation decisions or whether they are just a mechanism for government and
the courts to defer or shift difficult and/or unpopular decisions.
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Chapter 5
Literature Review
Part III: Process and Substantive Theories

1. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to review the major health care resource allocation decision
making scholarship and to identify the current debates in the academic discussions. This
review will be used as the basis to develop a context within which to analyse tirbunal
decision making factors – specifically the study of HSARB resource allocation decisions.
This thesis does not review the scholarship on decision making capacity, appointment
process of decision makers, the independence of decision makers or governance and
regulation theory. These are valid ways to study resource allocation decision making.
However, this thesis quantitatively focuses on actual procedural factors faced by the
litigants and the effect these factors have on the decision outcome. The thesis also
critically examines the substantive regulatory ‗test‘ in order to determine which factors
actually influence resource allocation decisions. Thus, the literature review not only seeks
to outline the various procedural and substantive decision making theories but to also
establish, based on the existing empirical research, if the theories and the practical
application of resource allocation decision making are aligned. If the theory and practice
are not aligned, it is anticipated that the literature review will establish where the
disconnect is taking place.
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The literature, while providing an outline of the procedural and substantive theories, did
not summarize common themes. This needed to be derived by the author from a review
of numerous theories. An exhaustive review of the literature did not provide a
quantitative analysis or examination of whether the theory and the practical application of
resource allocation decision making were aligned. In essence, the lack of quantitative
research literature regarding the alignment of theories to practice made the congruity of
tribunal resource allocation decisions and any applicable theory difficult to understand.

This chapter is structured as follows: Part A examines access/procedural theories. Part B
reviews substantive theories regarding who makes resource allocation decisions technical review panels, physicians, multiple stakeholders and corporations. Part C
examines ‗other factors‘ which may contribute to resource allocation decision making –
such as economic theory and the ‗levels‘ of decision making.

The next chapter will analyse, based on a study of HSARB decisions, what is actually
taking place regarding resource allocation decision making. Subsequent chapters will
analyse the theories relative to the actual procedural and substantive factors affecting the
tribunal resource allocation decisions.

2. Part A - Access / Procedural Theories
The interest in health care resource allocation decision making arose because of difficulty
obtaining agreement on the principles / substantive approaches that should guide decision
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making.222 223 There was a need to ensure the decisions themselves were reached in a
legitimate and fair way rather than focusing solely on substantive elements because
procedural theory in health care resource allocation has been influenced by a number of
theorists including the writings of Daniels and Sabin on the A4R, Nelson,224 Calabresi
and Bobbitt225 and Orentlicher‘s226 and Chris Ham‘s 227 concern about transparent
decision making. In essence, there is a theoretical debate regarding the transparency of
procedures and whether procedural transparency is critical for the acceptance of a
resource allocation outcome. There is limited academic qualitative research on the
application of health care resource allocation decisions and there does not appear to be
any quantitative research on the application of procedural resource allocation decision
making theory to health tribunals.

One prominent procedural theory, developed in the late 1990s by Daniels and Sabin, is
entitled the theory of Accountability for Reasonableness (A4R). In essence, the theory
states that due to a lack of consensus over substantive distributive justice principles for
health care, society must rely on fair deliberative procedures that yield a range of
acceptable answers. In other words, Daniels and Sabin state that decision makers can
only legitimately allocate health care resources for consumption by individuals and
222
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society if the allocation process itself is accepted by society. In this respect, the outcome
decision regarding the health care resource allocation may not be agreed upon, but the
process for achieving the outcome is considered acceptable to individuals and society and
thus the outcome decision is accepted. A key aspect of this procedural theory is the need
to have a transparent decision making process. The ‗A4R‘ theory requires four conditions
of transparency: publicity, relevance, appeals and enforcement. Under the publicity
condition, decisions by decision makers must be publicly accessible. Under the relevance
condition, the rationale for decisions must rest on the evidence that fair-minded parties
agree is relevant. Under the appeals condition, a mechanism for challenging a decision
and/or a dispute resolution mechanism must be made available. Under the enforcement
condition, regulation of the process must be in effect to ensure the conditions of publicity,
relevance and appeals.

In 2008, Daniels and Sabin released a book entitled Setting Limits Fairly which asks the
question ‗how can a society or health plan meet population health care needs fairly under
resource limitations?‘ The authors recast their 1998 question regarding how to decide
about resource allocation decision making. The authors asked under what conditions
society should grant authority to individuals or institutions to set limits to health care?
The authors concluded – as they did in 1998 - that limits can only be acceptable as
legitimate and fair if they are established through a fair limit-setting process – according
to the theory of A4R – such that stakeholders accept the outcome as fair and legitimate.
Given the lack of consensus about approaches to rationing, society must rely on fair
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deliberative procedures that yield a range of acceptable answers.228 Procedural fairness
must, according to the authors, enable public deliberation and democratic oversight for
health care limits. The authors state that legitimacy to decide is a fundamental problem of
ethics and health policy regardless of financing, delivery systems or different countries
and that no democratic society has achieved consensus on distributive justice principles
for health care.229 230

The necessity for transparency in resource allocation decision making as outlined by
Daniels and Sabin is challenged by a number of academics. For example, in order to
discuss procedural fairness accurately, transparency itself must be further broken down –
something which is not done in the A4R theory. Nelson examined two types of
transparent resource allocation decision making - explicit resource allocation and implicit
resource allocation.231 Explicit resource allocation involves transparent decision making
that acknowledges cost related concerns as the justification for limiting access to
particular treatment. Implicit rationing involves decisions to limit access to care where
228
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cost considerations are not articulated in a transparent process but are nonetheless a
factor. In essence, both types of transparent resource allocation – explicit and implicit –
acknowledge factors – such as cost – differently in terms of transparency and its effect on
the outcome decision.

The American academics, Calabresi and Bobbitt state that explicit public, transparent
resource allocation decisions - that resulted in suffering and/or death -could exacerbate
social tensions.232 As a result, society tries to conceal any conflict of values in order to
avoid this social tension and appearing to make a ‗tragic choice‘.233 In other words,
transparent resource allocation decisions may have a negative effect on society rather
than allowing for acceptance by society.234 Interestingly in 2001, the UK academic Chris
Ham,235 advocates for the development of resource allocation guidelines in a fair and
open procedure so that decisions based on these guidelines are defensible. In other words,
the transparency of resource allocation decision making does not appear to be sufficient
without accompanying guidelines.

In 2003 Chris Ham, stated the challenge of rationing health care services needed a
systematic approach:
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―In an era of ever-increasing medical possibilities, publicly financed health care
systems face the challenge of determining what services should be covered for the
insured population. This challenge, usually referred to as health care rationing or
priority setting, words we shall use interchangeably, has led governments in a
number of countries to take a more systematic approach to the determination of
service coverage than has usually been the case in the past.‖236

Ham advocated for resource allocation guidelines along side of exclusions and the
responsibility for rationing takes place at many different points in the system - as opposed
to one decision making point.237

Need for Quantitative Research
There appears to be little empirical research regarding the application of resource
allocation decision making procedural theory to actual decision making. Two qualitative
research initiatives looking at theory‘s application to practice have been done by Ham
and Giacomini.

In his book, Reasonable Rationing: International Experience of Priority Setting in Health
Care,238 Ham investigated – based on case studies of five countries - the extent which
actual resource allocation decisions met Daniels and Sabin‘s four conditions (publicity,
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relevance, appeals and enforcement) in the A4R theory.239 Researchers for the Canadian
component of the case study stated that the rationale for priority setting is seldom
available to anyone other than decision makers. As a result, patients and the media are
not aware of the difficulties faced by decision makers and are not able to engage in
discussions around priorities. The researchers were also not aware of an appeal process
for a second opinion. 240

In the detailed reports of all five country studies, it was established that in decision
making about priorities at the macro level, there are gaps in cost and benefit information:

―Those responsible for priority setting therefore have to confront the need to make
decisions in conditions of incomplete information and likely conflicts between
objectives.‖241

Even if more accurate information was available it would still have to be interpreted by
policy makers in the process of determining priorities. Ham states:

239

The five countries included: New Zealand, Canada, the United Kingdom, Norway and the Netherlands
regarding health technologies. The following seven questions were asked of each country:
1. What procedures are used to determine whether health technologies should be funded?
2. What is the role of different institutions in these procedures?
3. What kind of evidence do these institutions expect/require/consider in making funding decisions?
4. What standard of proof do they expect to be demonstrated in agreeing funding?
5. What appeal mechanisms are available for reviewing decisions?
6. What does experience in your country say about the debate between those who argue for stronger
institutions and those who argue for better information to support priority setting?
7. To what extent does experience in your country meet the tests of accountability for reasonableness?
240
The authors appear unaware of the HSARB
241
Ham 2003, Supra Note 215 at 7.

93

―One clear conclusion from experiences so far is the sheer messiness of health
care decision making and the inherently political nature of priority setting. The
allocation of scarce resources between competing demands is at once an
economic challenge and a political puzzle. ..‖242

From the work undertaken by Ham, it appears that there is evidence of a partial retreat
from explicit rationing at the macro level. Instead of explicit rationing at the macro level,
the focus on the meso level of health authorities and micro level of physicians of
rationing could be interpreted as a political blame avoidance strategy in order to avoid
unpopular decisions and shift these unpopular decisions to tribunals, health authorities
and physicians.

―In these circumstances, there is a tendency for policy makers to seek to avoid
blame either by ducking tough choices or by devolving responsibility to others.
Rationing by guidelines rather than exclusions is one manifestation of this, in that
it leaves ultimate responsibility for deciding who should be given access to health
care resources to agencies such as sickness funds and health authorities at the
meso level and to physicians at the micro level.‖243

In their study of twenty four Canadian health policy documents from January 1998 to
January 2005, the authors – Giacomini, Kenny and DeJean - express concern about how
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process theories, which assist with procedural fairness, are reflected in policy244 The
authors found that the reviewed health policy documents cite health care frameworks but
the frameworks are not well defined, described, or evaluated, vary substantially and
provide little consistency. For example, the variability articulated in the terms ―equity‖
and ―accountability‖ suggested to the authors that policy makers currently develop ethical
principles for their frameworks based on their own understandings and not based upon
standard definitions. As such, the authors state that the development or reliance on an
ethics framework as a feature of health policy should proceed with caution.

In summary, the focus on procedures is the result of difficulty obtaining agreement on the
theoretical underpinning that should guide substantive resource allocation decisions. The
scholarship in the area of procedural theories focuses on pros and cons of legitimate,
transparent resource allocation decisions in order to yield a range of acceptable answers.
However, there is very limited qualitative research available and limited academic
commentary regarding application of procedural theory of health care resource allocation
decisions. There also does not appear to be any quantitative research on the application of
procedural resource allocation decision making theory at the tribunal level.

3. Part B - Substantive Theories
a. Review Panels
There is limited empirical research on the application of resource allocation decision
making theory by tribunals in Canada. The limited Canadian empirical research that does
244
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exist is not referred to by American academic discussion about health care resource
allocation decisions. Instead, the American academic discussion is based on theory not
empirical research. The academic theory discusses the creation of independent reviews by
specialized technical panels245 and independent and impartial governing boards.246 These
specialized technical panels would determine resource allocation. The debate is regarding
the scope of jurisdiction of these theoretical bodies.

Ruger argues that consumers alone, physicians or health experts, strict algorithms or costbenefit calculations, shared decision making within an informed consent model, fair
procedures or third parties such as insurers should not make health care decisions. Health
care decisions must involve an integrated mix of stakeholders:247

―Shared health governance extends beyond the individual patient-doctor
relationship to the institutions that oversee the health sector. For example,
patients must be protected from physicians who have financial incentives
to provide inappropriate and costly care, of who unfairly deny, or fail to
recommend, appropriate medical care; or who practice bedside rationing.
In the former case, peer review should motivate physicians to conform to
established standards. In the latter, appeals procedures should protect
individuals from unfair denial of care. An independent and impartial
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governing board should periodically review coverage and quality
decisions, hear and rule on patient and physician appeals, and require
guidelines to be adjusted. The board should also oversee and critically
review quality of care and other information, including physician
credentials and abilities. Many states currently have consumer grievance
and appeal procedures, while Medicare has a federal external review
system.‖248

In terms of economic theory, Peacock states that resource allocation panels are important
to the process of resource allocation decision making. Peacock states that resource
allocation decisions must consider the outcomes and trade-offs of their decisions and that
doctors must accept the key concepts that underpin programme budgeting and marginal
analysis and other economic approaches to priority setting.249
Sage argues for expert, independent review of disputes in order to screen and control
ineffective, costly litigation regarding health care resource allocation decision.250 Such an
‗administrative adjudication mechanism‘ would allow the use courts only to be used for
unsettled issues. In this respect, independent review panels represent an extension of
health care regulation rather than litigation management.251
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The independent review panels, according to Sage, offer a standard process for resolving
socially contentious entitlement issues that builds public values, strengthens therapeutic
relationships by reducing adversarial tensions, building patients‘ trust in their health plans
and providers, and rewarding compassionate behavior.252 Among other things, Sage
suggests that independent review procedures should be different for insured individuals
who are severely or chronically ill than for those who are only occasional users of health
care services.

The academic discussion reviewed above points to the need for specialized technical
review panels populated by a mix of stakeholders. The debate regarding specialized
technical review panels is regarding the scope of their jurisdiction. The jurisdictional
scope may include patient protection from: inappropriate and costly care, the denial of
care, the failure to recommend care. The jurisdiction may also require compliance with
guidelines, oversee the quality of care provided, and periodic review coverage. The
panels might also consider health outcomes and trade-offs and control for ineffective and
costly litigation as well as following different procedures for chronically ill patients
versus occasional patients.

b. Physicians
Resource allocation decisions by physicians based on medical necessity is debated in
the literature. The debate is about whether physicians, as a decision making
mechanism, determine ‗medical necessity‘ in the interest of the individual patient, the
society at large or a combination of the individual and society – or – if physicians
252
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should even be involved in these decisions. There is also discussion regarding the
determination of medical necessity as a clinical, contract or corporate function and
whether the term ‗medical necessity‘ is a term of art rather than a clinical term.253
This debate considers whether or not utilitarian values – as represented by economic
analysis, collective societal decisions versus individual physician decisions, and
physician models of service delivery should be considered. Why is the role of
physicians in decision making important to this thesis on tribunal resource allocation
decision making? In the substantive argument before the HSARB/tribunal, physicians
are required to determine if a procedure is medically necessary for a given patient and
if a delay receiving that treatment would result in harm to the patient. In this respect,
an understanding of the theory behind physician resource allocation decision making
is important.

Physicians Decide
Ubel254 255argues that physicians should determine medical necessity and thus resource
allocation for patients. Physicians, it is argued, are often asked to be "gatekeepers,"
determining their patients' access to medical therapies and technologies. At the same
time, most physicians have been taught that they should act as patient advocates,
pursuing patients' best interests regardless of cost. Ubel argues that healthcare rationing is
appropriate in order to help control healthcare costs, and that rationing decisions made at
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the bedside by physicians must be part of the rationing system. A system that attempts to
control costs by mandating an elaborate set of rules would be burdensome to physicians.

Physicians not to Decide
Barrett256, on the other hand, argues that Ubel's main conclusion that physician
participation in bedside rationing is essential to controlling healthcare costs ―is out of step
with the current focus of thinking and policy debate within Canada and other countries
with universal public healthcare systems.‖ Barrett states that in the Canadian context, we
collectively need to better understand the limits and choices in defining the "medicare
commons," which occurs at the intersection of the overall level of funding, the range of
comprehensiveness of services provided and the level of access that we are able to
provide. In order to facilitate this understanding and collective responsibility, a
deliberative, transparent process that engages patients and the public must be undertaken.
Ultimately, Barrett argues, physicians must accept responsibility to use scarce resources
prudently.

Veatch, like Barrett, opposes physicians allocating resources. He states that physicians
who are bound by the Hippocratic Oath make poor allocators of health care resources
because are they are working for the benefit of their patient at the expense of all others:257
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―There are serious problems, however, with permitting allocations to be made on
the basis of a clinician‘s interpretation of these traditional medical professional
values…. Clinicians will differ amongst themselves over how these conflicts
should be resolved. Even if they could agree completely, it would not follow that
lay people – the ones whose lives are at stake and the ones who created the pool
of resources to be allocated – would concur with the ranking. .. Because these
choices have nothing to do with medical knowledge, there is no reason why
clinicians should be the ones making them? It is the general lay public that creates
the money pool to support dialysis and creates the pool of cadaver organs to be
allocated. They should be the ones making the moral choices relating to medical
and non-medical goods and relating the pursuit of maximum benefit to maximum
justice or fairness in allocation. Clinicians should remain free to give undivided
loyalty to their patients. That is incompatible with asking them to be resource
allocators.‖258

Aaron argued against the determination of medical necessity and medical resource
allocation by physicians. A key factor that Aaron identifies is the link between
economic analysis of health care and the generally acceptable medical norms of
providing health care:

―… In general, medical norms currently call for providing all care that
promises net medical benefits. Under efficient health care rationing, some
care will not be provided even if it is beneficial when benefits per dollar of
258
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cost fall below some threshold. By definition, therefore, care that provides
positive benefits below that threshold will not be offered. Because community
tastes differ, some services that are deemed to generate sufficient benefits to
justify provision in one community may be found not to provide sufficient
benefits in another. Furthermore, judgments about medical benefits are often
imprecise and probabilistic. Ethical challenges will arise from attempts to
justify denial of care in one community that is available in others, or denial of
care with a probability of success (or cost-effectiveness) only marginally
lowers than that of another service that is available.‖259

c. Multiple Stakeholders
Lauridsen260 presents a third argument. He acknowledges the inevitable need for
rationing of healthcare has apparently presented the medical profession with the dilemma
of choosing the lesser of two evils. He states that physicians appear to be obliged to adopt
either an implausible version of traditional professional ethics or an equally problematic
ethics of bedside rationing. The former requires unrestricted advocacy for patients but
prompts distrust, moral hazard and unfairness. The latter commits physicians to rationing
at the bedside; but it is bound to introduce unfair inequalities among patients and lack of
political accountability towards citizens. However, Lauridsen argues that this dilemma is
false, since a third intermediate alternative exists. This alternative makes it possible for
physicians to be involved in rationing while at the same time being genuine advocates of
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their patients. According to this ideal, physicians are required to follow fair rules of
rationing adopted at higher organizational levels within healthcare systems. At the same
time, however, they are prohibited from including considerations of cost in their clinical
decisions.

According to Hunter,261 whether a physician should operate for the good of society, the
good of their patient or somewhere in between - this is a ―wicked issue‖. Clinicians
themselves are ambivalent on these matters. Many would prefer governments and
politicians to make these decisions openly in publicly funded healthcare systems, since
they determine how much of the overall budget is to be spent on healthcare. Others
believe it to be the responsibility of clinicians to decide how health care resources should
best be used in individual cases.

It is also argued that the physician‘s role itself is unclear and as such makes the allocation
of resources by physicians extremely unclear. According to Eike-Henner W. Kluge, until
the role of the physician in resource allocation is more thoroughly assessed, there will be
ongoing challenges in the formal decision making process.262 Physicians act as
gatekeepers – and conflict results. A physician has a fiduciary duty to their patient, a
gatekeeper‘s duty to government funded health care resources while being self employed
business operators.263 264
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Kluge argues that simply picking one model – either the Hippocratic, Social Service or
Business Model - will not solve the problem. Rather, a reconceptualizating of the three
mutually incompatible models for a ―service-provider monopoly‖ is required.

d. Corporations
The debate over the role of physicians in health care resource allocation may represent
the larger battleground of the clinical versus corporate control of health care. The battle
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104

may come to a head over the definition of the word ―medical necessity‘. Sage265 argues
that current allocation theories oversimplify the economic and clinical effects and focus
primarily on the determination of ―medical necessity.‖ According to Sage, medical
necessity is a term of art in health insurance contracts used to distinguish, at the margin,
covered from non-covered services.266

―To many physicians, the phrase ―not medically necessary‖ means ―not clinically
indicated‖, which makes them question why a seemingly nonprofessional party
such as a health plan has the right to challenge their professional opinion. To
many health plans, it means ―not covered even though not expressly excluded
from coverage,‖ which gives them a degree of comfort issuing denials based on
established insurance practice even though such decisions outrage physicians.
Consequently, decisions involving medical necessity are frequently characterized
by inconsistent administration, poor communication, distrust and, if disputes
arise, relatively unprincipled, results-oriented judicial resolution.267
Sage argues that disputes about health care resource allocation portray the struggle
between corporate interests and clinical judgment over health care decisions – and by
extension, the legitimacy of allowing cost considerations to override clinical judgment.
The concept of medical necessity (MN) is at the heart of insurance contracts. Sage argues
that MN has a multitude of meanings and operates at a symbolic and substantive level,
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sometimes referring to entitled medical benefits and sometimes referring to ideology of
political positioning.

According to Sage, a serious problem is that, because of its symbolic importance, health
professionals and policymakers often regard ―medical necessity‖ as a coverage standard
unto itself, rather than entwined with a historically determined, legally stylized insurance
document that itself operates within an increasingly complicated set of relationships
among purchasers, health plans, and providers.268 Sage argues that not only is there a lack
of empirical research in this area, the court‘s involvement is questionable given their
focus on the individual as opposed to the society at large:

―Absent empirical research, one must employ less precise tools to
explain medical necessity. Reading judicial opinions in medical
necessity disputes conveys several distinct impressions. First, there is
relatively little law in these cases. This is true even though, unlike
medical malpractice cases, their rationales are fully stated in
published text instead of being hidden in a jury‘s unexplained verdict
regarding liability. Second, the facts of principal interest to courts
concern clinical benefit to the specific patient bringing suit, not
―population health,‖ ―cost-effectiveness,‖ or the prudent use of
pooled social resources—in other words, identified rather than
statistical lives. Third, the time pressures created by disputes over
preauthorization and the potential conflicts of interest that beset both
268
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insurers and providers in managed care seem to make courts
apprehensive that the facts before them are incomplete or
untrustworthy. Fourth, hallmarks of procedural fairness
at early stages of the dispute—such as clear explanations regarding
denials, timely access to internal appeal mechanisms with competent
systems of gathering evidence, and unbiased external review—tend to
reassure courts that coverage cases can be viewed as contractual
matters and make courts less likely to reverse the health
plan‘s determination.‖269

Sage ultimately concludes, despite the lack of empirical research, that the oversight for
the allocation of resources should be based on a therapeutic (clinical judgment) rather
than contract relationship (corporate interests).

4. Part C: Other Theories – Factors Contributing to Resource Allocation Decisions
a. Economic Theory
Economic theory is the study of decision making regarding the allocation of resources –
particularly under conditions of scarcity.270 Costs are integral to priority setting and
economic theory – but are highly controversial.271 According to Ruger, economic
analysis is part of utilitarian theory – which requires the allocation of resources in order
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to maximize the social utility.272 273 The economic analysis, as part of the decision
process, typically looks at the cost of treatment relative to the society at large rather than
the cost of treatment to the individual. As such, resource allocation favoring the good of
society may be in conflict with resource allocation favoring the good of the individual.

It is important to note that not all academics agree that fiscal/cost issues should be
incorporated into health care resource allocation decision making. Of the academics that
advocate for the use of economic theory to be incorporated into decision making, there is
not consensus on the extent of its use. For example, Robinson274 argues that the
economists' approaches to priority setting (opportunity cost, marginal analysis and choice
under scarcity) are based on the premise that it is possible to design a rational priority
setting system that will produce legitimate changes in resource allocation. However, he
argues that the economic models need to balance pragmatic and ethical considerations
with economic rationality when making resource allocation decisions. Clinical autonomy
must be balanced with financial responsibility:
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―The results of priority setting will be implemented only if a decision making
culture that considers costs, outcomes, and trade-offs between alternative uses of
scarce resources has been established. Managers and doctors must accept the key
concepts that underpin programme budgeting and marginal analysis and other
economic approaches to priority setting. Successful application of priority setting
methods requires a degree of integration between funding and priority setting
mechanisms. If priority setting mechanisms conflict with funding mechanisms at
local or regional levels, or with budget setting mechanisms within provider
organizations, priority setting is unlikely to lead to changes in the allocation of
resources.‖275

While some academics argue that the use of economic analysis is key to the decision
making process, the extent of its use and the value placed on financial considerations
varies. For example, Callahan originally stated that for the greater good of society,
government resources – such as Medicare in the USA – should focus on age-based
rationing. The government should not pay for life-extending health care for persons who
have lived out their ‗natural lifespan‘. Rather, payment by the government for lifeextending health care would be limited to those of an age not considered to be beyond a
natural lifespan.276 This concept of rationing health care for the elderly was highly
controversial.
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Callahan subsequently modified his position approximately two decades later in 2008.277
Callahan stated that under the best of circumstances, age should be irrelevant in the
provision of health care. However, society‘s dilemma is how to ration health care in an
era of growing Medicare cost, public pressure and expectations for more health care.
Callahan argues that a society must reflect on whether there is an obligation to keep the
elderly alive as long as possible, regardless of the cost of doing so? Callahan argues that
there is a duty to help young people to become old people, but not to help the old become
still older indefinitely. Callahan argues that a more reasonable goal is maintaining a high
quality of life within a finite lifespan.278
One may well ask what counts as ―old‖ and what is a decently long lifespan? We
can generally agree that the present Medicare and Social Security eligibility
criteria of 65 years is quickly becoming outdated. My own answer is that someone
is old when it can be said that he or she has had a ―full life,‖ by which I mean
enough time to do most (though not necessarily all) of the things that a life makes
possible: education, family, work, and so on. As I have listened to people speak of
a ―full life,‖ often heard at funerals, I would say that by 75-80 most people have
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lived a full life, and most of us do not feel it a tragedy that someone in that age
group has died (as we do with the death of a child).279 280
Similarly to Callahan‘s position, Emanuel281 argues for a ‗complete lives‘ approach,
which priorizes younger people who have not yet lived a complete life and will likely not
do so without aid. Emanuel states that as an individual gets older in age, the probability
of receiving a medical intervention should significantly decrease.

Several academics debate the issue of cost and state that other non-cost information
must be considered. For example, Aaron argues that in resource allocation of health
care, a variety of analytical, political, legal, and ethical challenges emerge, including
the need to develop information on the expected medical benefit of various treatments
for particular conditions and to place values on those benefits and methods of
enforcing limits that can be enacted and sustained politically.282 However, Trebilcock
is of the view that imperfect information in the process of economic analysis is
pervasive283 - almost no exchange is entered into with absolute perfect information by
both parties.284 So, if the economic analysis information is imperfect, who makes
decisions based on this imperfect information? Politicians, judges, medical experts?
Trebilcock states that the incentive of elected officials is their political accountability
279 Callahan

, Supra Note 276..

280

It is interesting to note that at the time of this 2008 article, Callahan was 77 years old - ― There are some,
like me at age 77, who continue to work, but the numbers drop off rapidly by 80 …‖
281
G.P. Emanuel et al, ―Principles for Allocation of Scarce Medical Interventions‖ (2009), 373 Lancet 423,
at 428.
282

Aaron, Supra Note 259.
Trebilcock, Supra note 270.
284
Ibid.
283

111

to constituencies and election, judges may be just as likely as politicians to adopt
‗efficiency-determined conceptions of the social welfare‘ as notions of distributive
justice,285 and medical experts have no advantage making social and procedural
valuations.286

―Hence, the common law courts are viewed as maximizing a broad social welfare
function, while politicians and their delegates (for example, bureaucrats and
regulators) are viewed as captives of factional politics involving competition and
conflict among distributional coalitions. On this view, the common law will tend
to be concerned with efficiency, the political process with often cynically
motivated redistributional or rent-seeking objectives.‖287
Mehlman argues that the cost based resource allocation is to be compared not only to
other cost options but to the cost of denying treatment.288 Mehlman states that central
to cost saving is the concept of ‗statistical‘ lives saved versus ‗identifiable‘ lives
saved at any cost. Saving ‗identifiable‘ lives produces an emotional reaction and can
be very compelling.
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Ruger argues that both clinical and economic analyses are required for evidence-based
decision making. In terms of economics, Ruger does include cost analysis, comparative
pricing within a category of medical procedures and the importance of clinical case-bycase judgments by physicians while ensuring that the physician has the medical capacity
and is not financially influenced outside medical criteria.
According to Williams, concern has increasingly been expressed at the low level of
impact that economic evaluations have on the priority setting decisions they are designed
to inform.289 While clinical evidence on the benefit and the costs being the main criterion
used, Vuorenkoski et al argue that the criteria used for priority setting varied between
studies, and also between decisions. The decisions seemed inevitably to be partly valuebased in their nature, as the scientific or other exact evidence did not give a firm
foundation on which the decisions could be solely based.290

On a global scale, there are different institutional perspectives on the use of economics in
health care resource allocation decisions. The World Bank has done extensive work
reviewing the literature on economic approaches to allocating health care.291 The World
Bank report on the economics of health care priority setting concludes that because of
limitations in evaluation methodology, equity principles and practical constraints, the use
289
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of cost-effectiveness analysis in health care priority setting needs to be fundamentally
rethought.292 On the other hand, the World Health Organization-CHOICE program has
developed complex cost effectiveness tools for countries to analyse the cost effectiveness
of health care interventions to assist in decisions around allocating scarce health care
resources.293

b. ‗Levels‘ of Resource Allocation Decision Making
The literature also discusses the theory that there may also be ‗levels‘ of resource
allocation decision making. In other words, how a resource allocation decision is
made depends on the level where the decision is made. Four key authors discuss
‗levels‘ of decision making regarding resource allocation.

According to Sunstein,294 there are three levels of resource allocation decision making –
general, mid level and low levels regarding resource allocation decision making. The
level may affect the theory utilized for analysis. It is also often difficult to distinguish
between general, mid and lower level principles. Sunstein states that academics often try
to analyze the general principle of resource allocation relative to legal doctrines such as
contract law and constitutional rights such as freedom of speech and equality.
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Sunstein295 goes on to discuss the concept of ―Incompletely Theorized Agreements‖
(ITA) which further provides a model for understanding collective resource allocation
decisions. The concept behind ITA is that people can take different paths to common,
often partial agreement. Sunstein states that it is rare for anyone to theorize any subject
completely. There appears to be three levels of ITA – agreement on general principles,
agreement on mid level principles and agreement on lower level principles – the latter is
often seen in individual cases. Most often, people agree on a general principle but not on
a particular case. ITA may also involve collective agreement on mid level principles but
disagreement on both general theory and specific cases. There may also be agreement on
mid level and lower level principles but not higher level principles. This sort of
agreement is incompletely theorized in the sense that it is incompletely specified.
Incompletely specified agreements permit acceptance of general goals when people are
unclear about what the goals mean. This incompletely specified agreement hides social
disagreement while allowing for both stability and flexibility.
Emanuel identifies three levels of resource allocation regarding government decisions –
macro, intermediate and micro allocations. Macro-allocations to determine gross national
product expenditures on the resource; intermediate determinations about basic health care
packages for all; and micro allocations regarding a particular patient and a particular
service. Emanuel states that all intermediate determinations, as opposed to macro and
micro decisions, should be transparent.296 In terms of micro allocations, he states that the
problem with overutilization of health care resources has been in part driven by a medical
295
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culture and training that encourages physicians to ignore costs in recommending
treatments – particularly high volumes of office visits, hospitalizations, tests, procedures,
prescriptions.

Instead of three ‗levels‘ Orentlicher argues that allocation of resources is done either
through a centralized or decentralized model. In a centralized model, a commission is
established to develop guidelines for widespread use. The advantages of this model are
the increased legitimization of a transparent process involving broad participation, the
preservation of the physician-patient relationship and duty of loyalty, and the promotion
of consistency and fairness among patients.297 In a decentralized model, resource
allocation decisions are made on a case-by-case basis. The decentralized model was
considered advantageous because of the unfeasibility of centralized decision making for
most medical decisions. Orentlicher argues that a successful resource allocation model
would combine both the centralized and decentralized models. Orentlicher concludes that
centralized rationing alone is not feasible and physicians should make rationing decisions
in a treatment context while government should make cost-effective decisions, thus
limiting the resources available to physicians and eliminating any personal incentive
physicians may have for high cost care.298

Like Sunstein, Ruger states that parties can agree at one level but not at another such that
partial agreement and workable solutions are possible without requiring complete
297
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agreement. Ruger also argues, again like Sunstein, that there are three levels of resource
allocation decision making. The three levels include: the Conceptual Level concerning
values for human flourishing; the Policy Level concerning policies and laws such as the
division of the total sectors budget belongs within the context of the political unit and
should be evidence based.; and the Intervention Level which concerns specific patient
cases299 in which physicians should have the authority to make evidence based resource
allocation decisions.300However, Ruger301 argues that there is persistent disagreement and
little guidance about the principles governing resource allocation. There also is a lack of
guidance regarding the definition of what health care benefits302 or the evaluation of
outcomes.303

As a result, Ruger offers an alternative theoretical framework for health, ethics, policy and law
that integrates both substantive criteria and procedural mechanisms. She states we are at a
crossroads of

―…two dichotomous paradigmatic positions: consequentialism and proceduralism
- which adherents often present as mutually exclusive. Consequentialists argue
that we should assess health policy and laws by their consequences; proceduralists
believe that fair processes will yield fair decisions. Thus far, neither end of the
philosophical spectrum has promised or delivered a plausible solution, and
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attempts to incorporate both positions have been unsatisfactory. As a result, the
field is at a standstill. Any movement forward involved elements of both the
consequentialist and proceduralist frameworks. …‖304 305

Ruger states that ―[i]f we are to develop a new paradigm of health ethics, policy and law,
we must construct a framework that permits us to prioritize health goods and services
amidst widespread disagreement.‖306 Ruger outlines a new model to address these
problems. The model includes the following key principles:

1. Humans flourish and health is required to flourish – a person‘s ‗health
capacity‘ constitutes a person‘s ability to be healthy and thus flourish
2. Value is placed on ‗basic‘ or ‗central‘ health capabilities such as the
avoidance of premature death
3. A joint scientific and deliberative approach is needed to judge health care
interventions – based on evidence based medicine, expert opinion of
physicians and health experts, and input from individuals – physicians and
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distributing health care are unclear with no moral theory for allocation
3. Economic models need further development
4. Role of preferences, both individual and societal, unclear in models
5. Need more focus on ‗accountability for reasonableness‘ depending on different groups and
values
6. The current models are ‗indeterminate‘ – outcomes, needs, individuality, lack thresholds, all
benefits are not equal, determining ‗whose‘ preference i.e. citizens, medical experts, patients,
payers, regulators, etc
Ruger, Supra Note 246 at 141.
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experts should have authority for substantive decisions about allocation
decisions
4. Decisions are based on a shared concept of capacity for health functioning –
when disagreements occur, ‗practical models of agreement or consensus
facilitate workable solutions.‖
5. Moral obligation to provide high quality care not just ―equal access‖ to
‗decent minimums‘ or ‗adequate care‘
6. Evaluation of health care must consider costs ‗because we live in a world of
scarce resources‘ – cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) needs to be used to
compare interventions within a single population - economic considerations
need to follow and complement clinical considerations, not vice versa.

Ruger argues that both clinical and economic analyses are required for evidence-based
decision making. In terms of economics, Ruger‘s model does include cost analysis,
comparative pricing within a category of medical procedures and the importance of
clinical case-by-case judgments by physician while ensuring that the physician has the
medical capacity and is not financial influenced outside of medical criteria.
5. Conclusion
The purpose of this literature review was not only to outline the various procedural and
substantive decision making theories discussed in the literature but to also establish,
based on the existing empirical research, if the theories and the practical application of
resource allocation decision making were aligned. If the theory and practice are not
aligned, it was anticipated that the literature review would establish where and why the
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disconnect was taking place. The literature could then inform the quantitative research
design of this thesis. Unfortunately, while there were numerous procedural and
substantive theories in the literature, the empirical research regarding the application of
these theories to actual tribunal decision making was minimal to non-existent.
The review of the literature did, however, raise several themes. First, health care resource
allocation decisions are difficult but inevitable and decisions have to be made. Second,
resource allocation decisions are often made on the basis of incomplete information by a
variety of decision makers at various levels. Third, resource allocation decisions are made
in a context of a number of transparent and non-transparent factors such as economic
factors. Fourth, an accessible mechanism is needed to address resource allocation
disputes. A fifth theme involves disagreement about how resource allocation decisions
should be made – either based on agreed upon procedures and/or substantive legal
guidelines / ―test‖ requirements. Sixth, there is also disagreement regarding the objective
for resource allocation decisions i.e. should the decision be based on what is best for
society or what is best for the individual. Seventh, there is disagreement regarding the
mechanism to make resource allocation decisions – the courts, administrative tribunals,307
technical review panels, physicians or corporations. Eighth, there appears to be confusion
over the ‗right‘ of individuals to a health care resource. Ninth – and most important for
this thesis – there is a lack of quantitative empirical research regarding resource
allocation decisions – particularly at the tribunal level and specifically by the Health
Services Appeal and Review Board. Without existing quantitative empirical research,
307

The literature on the resource allocation decision making by tribunals, courts and the legislature is
confusing. Academics appear to agree that the courts defer to the legislature. However, the legislature
defers unpopular and/or difficult decisions to tribunals and courts oversee the tribunals. The courts
judicially review decisions of tribunals. In essence, it appears to the author that the courts and the
legislature are deferring to tribunals.
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research questions and methodology needed to be developed in order to understand the
reality of tribunal resource allocation decisions and what theories do and/should apply.
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Chapter 6
Research Methodology
Introduction
Administrative tribunals speak through their decisions. HSARB is no exception. In its
written reasons, HSARB outlines the case‘s context, the procedure that the Board
followed, the substantive submissions of the parties and its decision whether or not a
patient‘s request met legislated criteria.

In an effort to analyse factors which may affect the Board‘s health care resource
allocation decision making, the author examined Board decisions regarding 28.4(2)
Regulation 552 of the HIA for the fiscal 2003-2008 period relative to contextual,
procedural and substantive resource allocation theories. By analyzing statistical
associations within the Board decisions, certain trends evolved, some questions were
answered and many others arose.

The challenge methodologically was to identify a significantly large caselaw data set
(Appendix A), develop an objective research matrix (Appendix B), assess each individual
case relative to the research matrix (Appendix C and Appendix D) and statistically
analyze the results. As further discussed, certain trends emerged. However, as with many
exploratory research protocols such as this, several unexpected trends were also
identified. The following elements of the research methodology – case selection, sample
size, timeframe, research matrix and limitations – are outlined in more detail below.
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Case Selection
The case selection of Board decisions took place before the Board decisions were
uploaded in August of 2010 to the CanLII website. Board Hearing decisions available
from the Board‘s website that deal with Section 28.4(2) of Regulation 552 were analyzed
for the fiscal five year period from 2003 to 2008. The search engine on the Board‘s
website was used to identify all cases directly or indirectly dealing with s.28.4(2).
―Directly dealing with s.28.4(2)‖ refers to all cases where the review of non-emergency
inpatient health care service outside of Canada was the main issue. ―Indirectly‖ refers to
those cases where s.28.4(2) was not the main issue under review or where reference was
made to s.28.4(2) but it was determined that s.28.4(2) was not applicable. For instance, in
a case where an Ontario man requested health care in Quebec under s.28.4(2), the Board
determined that s.28.4(2) was not relevant as Quebec is not outside of Canada.

Sample Size of Case Selection
It was initially difficult to determine the sample size of Section 28.4(2) cases to be
reviewed. In the end approximately 400 HSARB decisions were analyzed. However, the
HSARB decision database presents several research challenges:

First, the electronic database of HSARB decisions, which was accessible only through the
HSARB website and not through standard electronic databases such as CanLII or
Quicklaw,308 was still in basic form.309 The HSARB website database could not be

308

At the time, the Consent and Capacity Board Decisions were linked to legal research databases. Thus,
the technology and administrative process existed to allow tribunal decisions to merge with existing legal
research databases. It was anticipated at the time that this thesis would recommend further exploration of
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searched by statute or regulation, section or successfully by key word. There is no
headnote or annotation of the cases on the database.

Second, HSARB case decisions could only be searched by an exact citing of the initials
in the style of cause. The HSARB initials may not correspond to the Court system style
of cause. For example, in the recent case of Flora, the Court citation for the Flora case is
Flora v. Ontario Health Insurance Plan, 2008 ONCA 538 (CanLII). The HSARB citation
is A.F. v. The General Manager, the Ontario Health Insurance Plan, File # 6681 [decision
released 11/21/2002]. The Flora case could not be located on the HSARB database if the
word ―Flora‖ or the initial ―F‘ is searched. Of the HSARB database cases, four cases had
the initials A.F. but only one of these four cases was the Flora case which was appealed
to the Ontario Court of Appeal.

Third, appealed HSARB decisions were not listed as such on the HSARB case decision
database. In this way, it is difficult to determine which cases were under review by
HSARB, under appeal to the courts, had new decisions resulting from court appeals or
stand as reported.

Fourth, searches through the HSARB case decision database were incomplete and
produced only a fraction of the actual cases. For example, a search under the HIA for ‗out
of country‘ cases only produced 4 cases. A search under HIA for ‗Regulation 552 section
linking HSARB decisions to existing legal research databases. The addition of HSARB decisions to CanLII
in August 2010 made this recommendation moot.
309
http://www.hsarb.on.ca/scripts/MOHSearchFile_Public.asp - this website is no longer active since the
addition of HSARB decisions to CanLII in August 2010.
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28.4‘ only produced 2 cases. Both searches did not identify the well known Flora case
which deals with ‗out of country‘ under ‗Regulation 552 section 28.4‘.

As a result, the HSARB case decision database was searched using the term ―s.28.4(2)‘.
Three hundred and eighty seven cases were identified for the fiscal period 2003-2008. All
these 387 cases were read and analyzed. Of the 387 cases, only 314 were directly on
point. The residual cases were either duplicates of a s.28.4(2) case, dealt with motions or
orders for existing s.28.4(2) cases or were not applicable.

In summary, the limited search function, the incomplete retrieval of all relevant case
decisions, the initialized HSARB citations, the difference between HSARB and Court
citations, and the lack of noting up of HSARB decisions made it difficult to find HSARB
section 28.4(2) cases and to follow cases appealed from HSARB to the Courts. As a
result, a very broad net was cast to capture all s.28.4(2) cases. From this initial analysis of
almost 400 cases, trends emerged and were further examined.

At the beginning of this thesis, one foreseeable recommendation was to revamp the
HSARB case decision website to address the problems listed above and to integrate the
HSARB case decisions to existing legal search engine e.g. CanLII310 links to decisions of
the Consent and Capacity Board along with other Tribunal decision databases. This in
fact was done by the HSARB administrative office in August 2nd of 2010. This is a
positive step. Also, given that the majority of Applicants before the Board are
unrepresented, non-legally trained individuals, it will be recommended by this author that
310

<http://www.canlii.org/en/on/>.
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a non-legal research database which is user friendly for the general public be further
explored.

Timeframe for Case Selection
The five year time period was selected for the case review of HSARB for several reasons.
First, the legislation and decision making bodies – HSARB and the Court – were
relatively stable in structure during this period. This relative stability allows for the thesis
to focus on the theory, interpretation and application of the legislation rather than on
changes to the legislation or structural changes to the decision making bodies. Second,
the timeframe spans a period of one Ontario elected government (Ontario Liberals 2003
to the present). This also represents a time period of relative political stability. Third, it
was assumed – perhaps incorrectly given the previous section‘s review of the HSARB
database – that the legal research technology would allow for accessing case decisions for
the period of 2002 and later. It should be noted that several important Hearings took place
before the Board before 2003 and subsequent Court decisions were issued after 2008. In
specific cases, the timeframe will be expanded to include such cases. Fourth, in the spring
of 2009 and again in the spring of 2011, the government amended s.28.4(2) of Regulation
552. The amended s.28.4(2), which is further discussed in the Epilogue section of this
thesis, presented a natural endpoint to critically assess the section. Fifth, this author was
appointed to HSARB in 2008 and began hearing cases from April 2008 to February 2009.
It was important for the research and the potential for the perception of bias that none of
the author‘s decisions were part of the research period.
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Research Matrix
A coding system, reflecting contextual, procedural and substantive issues, was developed
in order to perform quantitative statistical analysis associations between research factors
seen in the case data. The coding system was tested on 30 cases, refined and the initial 30
cases were subsequently recoded. The coding system was then used on all cases including
the initial 30 cases. An independent researcher randomly reviewed the accuracy of ten of
the three hundred and eighty seven coded cases. The random review confirmed that the
research matrix and coding system provided a level of accuracy. The coded data was then
inputted into a statistical package and analyzed. From this statistical analysis of
frequencies and cross tabulations, associations, trends and further questions emerged.

The research matrix sought to analyse the contextual, procedural and substantive theory
in resource allocation decision making relative to the actual decision making. Contextual,
procedural and substantive theory indicators were utilized. For example, contextual
indicators included medical diagnosis, patient demographics, and the geographic
distribution of requests for out of country health care. Procedural theory indicators
included timeframe for hearing, type of hearing, self-representation at hearing, language
interpretation, type of appeal and appeal requests. Substantive theory indicators included
the regulatory criteria of medically necessity and the delay accessing domestic care.

Limitations of this Thesis
This thesis will focus on the resource allocation decision making regarding health care
out-of-country criteria found in s.28.4(2) of HIA Regulation 552. There are also several
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administrative requirements under section 28 of Regulation 552. It was understood by the
author at the outset of this study that these administrative requirements for out-of-country
insured health care under section 28 of Regulation 552 are activated once a health care
service had been determined under section 28.4(2) to be an insured health care service
under OHIP. These administrative requirements include: approval for insured services
prior to the treatment,311 the production of written documentation,312 the submission of
accounts within given time limits313 or the General Manager of OHIP discretion to pay
accounts in extenuating circumstances despite non-compliance with prescribed
requirements.314 This thesis was to focus on section 28.4(2) rather than focusing on the
administrative requirements, cited above, following the determination whether a health
care service is an insured service under OHIP. However, the administrative requirements
– particularly the s.28.4(5) requirement for OHIP‘s prior approval before obtaining an out
of country health service – became increasingly dominant in the five year case review. As
such, it became necessary to include the s.28.4(5) for OHIP‘s prior approval of an out of
country request in the case analysis as time progressed in the study period.

It is important to note that the statistical relationships between procedural and substantive
factors and the decisions of the Board are correlations not causation relationships. As
311

Regulation 552, Supra Note 3 at s.28.4.(5) – Conditions of Payment
Recent relevant Case law - C.C.W. v. Ontario Health Insurance Plan, 2009 CanLII 712 (ON S.C.D.C.) – is
actually three cases – that of C.C.-W., J.F.-T. and the Estate of Linda Mailloux. All three cases were heard
and decided upon at the same time. The cases deal with the s.28.4(5) requirement for prior written approval
for payment of medical expenses when services cannot be obtained in Ontario. The court held that OHIP
does not have the discretion to waive this legislative prior approval requirement.
http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onscdc/doc/2009/2009canlii712/2009canlii712.html
312
Regulation 552, Supra Note 3 at s.28.4(5)2 – Conditions of Payment requirement of Written
Documentation
313
Regulation 552, Supra Note 3 at s.28.4(5)3 – Time limits for submitting accounts
314
HIA, Supra Note 4 at s.18(4) – General Manager payment discretion despite non-compliance with
prescribed requirements
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correlations, the factors must be more closely examined. It is highly recommended that
further qualitative research be undertaken to further explore the correlations in order to
determine the meaning behind the results. .
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Chapter 7
Patient Profiles
RESULTS

Introduction
The Board operates in response to appeals brought by patients seeking OCCNEIHS. As
such, it is the patient who activates the Board‘s jurisdiction and process. While extensive
information is available about the Board and OHIP, little is known about patients
appearing before the Board. For example, it is not known who is coming before the
Board (their age, sex, place of residence), for what medical reason (diagnosis) and where
they wish to go for medical assistance (the requested country, facility) or what procedure
they are requesting. This is a gap in our understanding of the Board and tribunals in
general.

To address the gap, each Board decision during the study period was analyzed in terms of
the contextual factors of patients‘ age, sex, place of domestic residence (Appendix F),
patients‘ diagnosis (Appendix G), treatment requested, requested out of country
treatment, and requested location of treatment (Appendix H and Appendix I). The
purpose of collecting and analyzing this information was to – in an investigational
manner – produce a ‗patient profile‘ and to determine if any trends might emerge which
might affect Board decisions.

Patient Age
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Only about 40% of the cases documented the age of the patient – as such, the results
should be interpreted with caution. Approximately 60% of the cases did not provide the
age of the patient. The majority of the patients (21.9%) appear to be in the age range of
25-64 – 11.7% of the cases were in the 45-64 year old range and 10.2% of the cases were
in the 25-44 year old range. Approximately 7.3% were minors in the 0-17 year old range,
2.5% were in the 18-24 year old range, 7.3% were in the 65-79 year old range and 2.2%
were in the 80+ year old range. As will be discussed later, 100% of patients stated some
form of diagnosis yet 60% of cases did not provide the age of the patient. Thus, it is
difficult to link patient diagnosis to the patient‘s age.

Patient Sex
The patient sex or deduced sex315 found in the Decisions indicated that the patients
appearing before the Board are approximately split evenly between males (47.9%) and
females (52.1%). There does not appear to be a significant difference between the
number of males and females accessing the Board.

Patient Residence
The residence of the patient or their deduced residence was mapped to their associated
LHIN designation which was further mapped to four areas of the province: North, South,
East, and West Ontario. The Patients‘ Residence data indicated a high percentage
(51.7%) of the cases were ‗Unknown‘ as they did not stipulate the geographic residence
of the patient. Of those that did, patients from the Southern part of Ontario (15.2%) and
315

‗Deduced sex‘ refers to those cases where the sex of the patient was no stated but may have used the
pronoun. For example, the pronoun ―her‖, ―she‖ or ―the patient‘s husband ― deduced sex of the patient as
female.
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the Western part of Ontario (14.6%) most often appealed to the Board. This number was
closely followed by the Northern part of Ontario (11.1%).

Patient‘s Diagnosis
The highest percentage of patients appealing to the Board have a collection of ‗Other‘
conditions (21.6%). ‗Cancer‘ (15.6%) was the second highest diagnosis followed by
‗Back Pain‘ (11.4%), ‗Head‘ (11.1%), ‗Joints‘ (10.8%), ‗Addictions/Mental
Health/Anorexia‘ (9.2%), ‗Obesity‘ (7%), ‗General Pain‘ (7%), ‗Heart
Disease/Circulation‘ issues (5.4%) and ‗Unknown‘ diagnosis at (1%).

Patient‘s Requested Treatment316
The patients requested surgery 49.2% of the time – almost half of all cases. This was
followed by medical assessments (14%), treatment (13.3%) and diagnostic procedures
such as an MRI, CTscan etc. (12.4%). The combination of categories dealing with
counseling, drug treatment, follow up to an existing out of country health care service and
unknown requests for treatment amounted to 9.2% of cases. Only 1.9% dealt with
transplants.

Table 1: Patients’ Requested Procedure

Frequency
VSurgery

155

Percent
49.2

Valid Percent
49.2

Cumulative Percent
49.2

316

The patient‘s requested treatment as outlined in the Decision was coded. Based on the large variations in
frequency for each code, the treatment requested was recoded based on the following six codes: surgery,
treatment (chemo, radiation, angioplasty, angiogram, scleroderma, the drug Herceptin), transplant,
diagnostics (MRI, XRay, CT scan, PET), assessment (medical opinion), and counseling, drug treatment
only, follow up, and ‗unknown‘.
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aTreatment

42

13.3

13.3

62.5

l Transplant

6

1.9

1.9

64.4

i

Diagnostics

39

12.4

12.4

76.8

d
Assessment

44

14.0

14.0

90.8

Counseling/Drug TMT

29

9.2

9.2

100.0

315

100.0

100.0

only/Follow up/Unknown
Total

Requested Location for Treatment
a) Country:
The patient‘s requested location for treatment was coded by country, state/province and
facility location. Based on the large variations in frequency for each country code, the
requested location treatment by country was re-coded globally into 7 categories – the
USA, Europe (including the UK), India, China, Israel, ‗Other‘, and ‗Unknown‘.317

317

All global locations were known/stated in the Decisions. There were no cases of a category of
‗Unknown‘ location for treatment. As a result, the ‗Unknown‘ location for treatment category was not used.
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Table 2: Global Location of Patients‘ Requested Treatment
Frequency
V
USA

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

263

83.5

83.5

83.5

27

8.6

8.6

92.1

lIndia

9

2.9

2.9

94.9

iChina

4

1.3

1.3

96.2

d
Israel

2

.6

.6

96.8

Other

10

3.2

3.2

100.0

315

100.0

100.0

aEurope + UK

Total (*)

The clear majority of requests are for health care services in the USA (83.5%). The next
closest requested treatment location is Europe and the UK (8.6%) followed by India
(2.9%), ‗Other‘ (3.2%), China (1.3%) and Israel (0.6%).

b) USA State:
Within the USA, there was a large variation of frequency for each American State. As a
result, the USA States listed in the Decisions were further coded as North, East, South
and West. 318Approximately 44.1% - the majority of Ontario patients before the Board sought treatment in the Northern USA.319 From the data, Ontario patients are seeking

318

The North included Ohio, Wisconsin, Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Montana, Idaho and Illinois.
The East included New York, Maryland, Massachusetts and Connecticut. The South included Florida, New
Mexico, Utah, Arizona, Alabama, Louisiana, Texas, Kansas, Kentucky, North Carolina and Virginia. The
West included California and Oregon.
319
Northern States:
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treatment in the Northern States of the USA (44.1%) is almost double the rate of those
seeking treatment in Southern States (20.3%). Patients also appear to infrequently access
the Eastern States for treatment (16.5%) and rarely appear to be accessing Western USA
States (1.9%).

Northern States – Requested Health Facilities:
If one looks at the facilities in the Northern States requested by the Ontario patients
appearing before the Board, 34.6% of patient requests are for the Mayo Clinic
(Minnesota), 10.2% are for the Cleveland Clinic (Ohio), 11.0% are for Detroit area
facilities (Michigan), 3.9% are for Royal Oaks (also Michigan), 34.6% are for ―Other
Facilities‖ and 5.5% are ‗Not Stated‘ in the case Decision. Note that Detroit facilities
(11.0%) and Royal Oaks (3.9%) combine to total 14.9% of cases for the State of
Michigan – or the second most requested State after Minnesota.

Of the Northern States, Minnesota was the State most often requested (40.9%) followed by Michigan
(38.6%) and Ohio (14.2%). The States of Illinois, Pennsylvania, Montana, Wisconsin and ‗Not Stated‘
totaled 6.4%. Thus, from this data, approximately 80% of Northern States accessed for out of country
health care services were in Minnesota and Michigan.
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Table 3: Patients‘ Requested Facility

Frequency Percent

Valid

Cumulative

Percent

Percent

V
1 Mayo Clinic

44

34.6

34.6

34.6

a2 Cleveland Clinic

13

10.2

10.2

44.9

l3 Detroit

14

11.0

11.0

55.9

5

3.9

3.9

59.8

44

34.6

34.6

94.5

7

5.5

5.5

100.0

127

100.0

100.0

i
4 Royal Oaks
d
8 Other
9 Not stated
Total

Northern States – Requested Treatment:
Of patients requesting out of country health care services in Northern States, almost 50%
- the clear majority of cases - are requesting Surgery (49.6%), followed by almost a
quarter (24.4%) requesting Assessments. Treatment was requested 13.4% of the time
followed by Diagnostics at 11.0%. Only small percentage – 1.6% - requested an out of
country health care service that was not surgery, treatment, diagnostics or assessment.
Thus, from this data, one can see that three quarters of the out of country requests were
for surgery and assessment.
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Table 4: Patients‘ Requested Procedure

Frequency Percent

Valid

Cumulative

Percent

Percent

V
1 Surgery

63

49.6

49.6

49.6

a2 Treatment

17

13.4

13.4

63.0

l4 Diagnostics

14

11.0

11.0

74.0

i
5 Assessment

31

24.4

24.4

98.4

2

1.6

1.6

100.0

127

100.0

100.0

d
6 Other
Total

Northern States – Requested State and Requested Treatment:
In order to understand what Northern States Ontario patients requested to perform a given
health care service, the Northern States were cross tabulated with the health care services
(surgery, treatment, diagnostics, assessment and other).

Minnesota had 28.8% of its cases requesting Surgery and 44.2% of its cases requesting
Assessment. Michigan had 65.3% of its cases requesting Surgery and 12.2% of their
cases requesting Assessment. Ohio has 66.7% of its cases requesting Surgery and 5.6% of
its cases requesting Assessment.
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Northern States – Requested Health Facility and Requested Treatment:
Ontario patients are not going to a particular State but to a health care facility within the
State. This raises the question what facilities and procedures within a given State are
being requested by Ontario patients?

A cross tabulation of the patients‘ requested health care facility by the type of health care
service produced the following results: of the requests for the Mayo Clinic (Minnesota)
half of the requests were for Assessments (50%) and Surgery 30% (29.5%). The
Cleveland Clinic (Ohio) requests were primarily for Surgery (84.6%) with no requests for
Assessment. The Detroit and Royal Oaks requests (both Michigan) has 71.5% and 2.5%
requests for Surgery respectively and 7.1% and 1.2% requests for Assessment
respectively.
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Table 5: Patients‘ Requested Health Care Facility

Clearly, from this Northern State data, patients are requesting different States for
different health care services – Mayo Clinic (Michigan) for assessments, the Cleveland
Clinic (Ohio) for surgery, followed by the Detroit and Royal Oaks also for surgery. Of
note is the highest request for surgery (‗Other‘ category) where the facility was not stated
in the Board‘s decision.
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Conclusion
From the results, we can see that the age of the patient was only given 40% of the time.
Of this 40%, approximately 7% were minors (0-17 years old), 2.5% were 18-24 years
old, 10% were 25-44 years, 12% 45-64, 7% were 65-79 year age range and 2% were over
80 years of age. Approximately 48% of females and 52% of males came before the
Board. While over 50% did not report their geographic location in Ontario, those that did
report were from the North (11%), the East, the West (15%) and the South (15%).

Patients indicated variable diagnosis including: ‗Other‘ conditions (21.6%). ‗Cancer‘
(15.6%) Back Pain (11.4%), Head (11.1%), Joints (10.8%), Addictions/Mental
Health/Anorexia (9.2%), Obesity (7%), General Pain (7%), Heart Disease/Circulation
issues (5.4%) and ‗Unknown‘ diagnosis at (1%).

The treatment requested was surgery (49%), medical assessments (14%), treatment (13%)
and diagnostic procedures (12%). The combination of categories dealing with counseling,
drug treatment, follow-up to an existing out of country health care service and unknown
requests for treatment amounted to 9.2% of cases. Only 1.9% dealt with transplants.

The majority of requests were for the USA (84%) followed by Europe and the UK (9%),
India (3%), ‗Other‘ (3%), China (1%) and Israel (0.6%). Of the USA treatment requests,
the majority of requests (44%) were for the northern USA compared to 2% of requests
for the western USA. Approximately 80% of northern State requests were for Minnesota
and Michigan. Patients before the Board requested different States for different
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procedures For example, Minnesota was for assessments (44%) and surgery (29%) while
Michigan was requested for assessments (12%) and surgery (65%) and Ohio was
requested for assessment (6%) and surgery (67%). Patients before the Board also
requested particular facilities to undertake particular treatment. For example, the Mayo
Clinic in Minnesota was requested for assessment (50%) and surgery (30%) compared
with the Cleveland Clinic in Ohio was requested primarily for surgery (85%) and not for
assessments (0%).

Based on this data, it is clear that the patients‘ context (age, sex, place of residence,
diagnosis) as well as their request for out of country coverage (requested treatment,
geographic treatment location and specific treatment facility) were factors before the
Board and outlined in the Board‘s decision. Of particular interest is the number of ‗pain‘
cases and the fact that patients were requesting particular facilities for specific treatment.
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Chapter 8
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Chapter 8
Research Question #1:
Do procedures statistically affect resource allocation decisions of the Board?
If so, what elements of the procedures create this statistical effect?

Procedures:

RESULTS

Introduction:
Tribunals, such as the Board, attempt to ensure procedural fairness and natural justice for
the parties. Ideally, a tribunal‘s procedures facilitate rather than hinder the parties‘
arguments on substantive issues. The purpose of analyzing the Board‘s procedural data
was to explore whether there is a correlation between the procedural aspects of the
Board‘s procedures and the Board‘s decision to grant or deny the patient‘s request for out
of country coverage. As such, this thesis seeks to answer the following question:

Research Question #1:
Do procedures statistically affect resource allocation decisions?
If so, what elements of the procedures create this statistical effect?

These procedural factors included: the time a case proceeds through the Board‘s system –
from the date of the appeal request to the hearing date through to the decision date
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(Appendix J); whether the hearing is oral, written or by teleconference call, or some
combination of oral/teleconference/written (Appendix K); whether a review was
requested of the Board‘s decision; the presence of an interpreter at the hearing; whether
parties were represented by a lawyer or were self-represented at the hearing; and whether
the hearing request was based on OHIP‘s denial of a prior approval application, a
reimbursement application or a combined prior approval-reimbursement application.

Duration the Appeal is at the Board:
Why are File Date, Hearing Date and Decision Date important in terms of number of
days a case is within the Board‘s system? These procedural elements – time within the
system - may influence the ability of the parties to present substantive arguments i.e. the
procedures‘ appropriateness relative to the patient‘s changing health status, whether
equivalent procedures exist in Ontario, and if there is a delay accessing a hearing or a
delay receiving a Board decision.

The analysis of dates sought to assess the total time a case took to be processed within the
Board. The timeframe in which cases came to the Board office (the File Number), the
time from the case arriving at the Board office to the time a Hearing was scheduled (the
Hearing Date) and the time from Hearing to the release of the Decision (the Decision
Date) were analyzed in terms of total time and total time by year.
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The data only permitted date assessments between the Hearing Date and the Decision
Date because of comparable day, month and codes. The File Number only provided the
year code and thus are not comparable.

Based on data analysis of the time from Hearing Date to Decision Date, a wide variation
was seen. Over the study‘s five year period, cases took between 3 days to 1,220 days
from the date of the Hearing to the date the Decision was released. The average over the
five years from Hearing Date to Decision Date was 160 days – or about 22.8 weeks
(160/7days) – or about 5.7 months (22.8/4weeks).

This range – 3 days to 1,220 days – is very skewed in comparison to a normal
distribution. This is a distribution which is very skewed to the lower values of Decision
days. The degree of skewness is indicated by a few extreme cases. In other words, the
majority of days between the Hearing Date and the Decision Date were in the lower
range of days – 0 to 200 days with a few outliers.

Hearing Date to Decision Date:
It is important to restate that the database selection of the cases over five years was based
on the Decision Date. As such, it is possible that a File Date and Hearing Date came
before the study period while the Decision Date would have fallen within the study
period.
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The overall average number of days in the system was approximately 160 days, but this
varied enormously between 2004 and 2006 years. In 2006, the average number of days
from Hearing Date to Decision Date was 137 days. In 2006, the average number of days
from Hearing Date to Decision Date was 289 days. Is this ‗Decision Date Year‘
significant? The year 2008 is very significant in terms of accounting for why a case takes
time between the Hearing Date year and the Decision. The graph below depicts the
average number of days between Hearing Date and Decision Date data:
Table 6: Average Number of Days between Hearing Date and Decision Date

From this graph, we can see how the fifth year rises beyond the other years of the study
in terms of mean number of days between the Hearing Date and the Decision Date. It
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raises the question what was taking place in the fifth year that caused this significant
finding. The cases in the fifth year may shine some light on this issue.

Further analysis identified that there were 17 cases in fifth year with respect to this
study‘s timeframe. The majority of these cases had a Hearing Date of 2007 and a
Decision Date of 2008. These 17 cases were then cross tabulated to see if the Board had
Granted or Denied the application. Only one of the 17 cases was Granted.

Type of Hearing – Oral, Written, Teleconference or Split
The Board can conduct three types of Hearings - where the parties appear in person,
referred to as Oral Hearings, by Teleconference or by Written submissions. Each party –
the Applicant and Respondent - determines which method of Hearing they wish for
themselves. While the majority of cases involves one type of Hearing, it is possible to
have a ‗split‘ Hearing where one party elects one type of Hearing while the other party
elects a different type of Hearing. For example, one party may elect an Oral Hearing
while the other party elects to join the Hearing by Teleconference. In such a case, the
Panel would appear in person, one party would appear ‗orally‘ and be in the room with
the Panel while the second party would join the group by teleconference call. In all cases,
the Board and the parties have the parties‘ written submissions before them.

Of all 315 Hearings, 192 cases - 61% - were Oral Hearings, 52 cases - 17.8% - were
Teleconference Hearings and 85 cases - 27% - were Written Hearings. These cases did
not add up to 100% because some of the cases were split cases. For example, the patient
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may have presented before the Board by teleconference call while OHIP attended in
person or vise versa.

Analysis was done on ‗split‘ Hearings to determine the type and number of split Hearings
that took place during the five year study period. Of the total cases for the five year
period, Oral-Teleconference Hearings took place 11 times, Oral-Written Hearings took
place four times and Teleconference-Written Hearing took place three times.

Type of Hearing relative to Disposition:
Of interest was whether the type of Hearing – oral, written, teleconference or ‗split‘ gave a party an advantage over the other party in terms of whether the appeal was
Granted or Denied by the Board. As will be discussed later, the Board has an overall
Grant rate of approximately 20% and a Deny rate of approximately 80% for the five year
study period. Based on this, further analysis was done on the majority of 192 Oral
Hearings. The table below indicates that an Oral Hearing was significant in a Board
Granting an appeal.
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Table 7: Oral Hearing vs. Board Grant of Appeal
Cross tabulation
Oral
No
Board -Grant

No

109

143

252

Expected Count

98.7

153.3

252.0

43.3%

56.7%

100.0%

14

48

62

24.3

37.7

62.0

22.6%

77.4%

100.0%

123

191

314

123.0

191.0

314.0

39.2%

60.8%

100.0%

Count
Expected Count
% within Board- Grant

Total

Total

Count

% within Board-Grant
Yes

Yes

Count
Expected Count
% within Board-Grant

The analysis indicates that there was a very significant association between an Oral
Hearing and the Granting of the appeal. This significant association was based on 48
granted cases. The 48 cases represented 77.4% of the oral cases granted where the
statistical average number of oral cases granted was only estimated to be 60.8%. In other
words, if the Hearing was Oral, the application was granted significantly more times
(77.4%) than expected (60.8%).
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The 48 oral cases were individually identified and subsequently analyzed. Of the 48 oral
cases granted by the Board for the study period, the majority of Grants by the Board
appear to be because the requested health care service is not ‗Identical or Equivalent‘ to
health care service in Ontario or there is a Delay accessing an Identical or Equivalent
health care service in Ontario that would result in the patient‘s death or medically
significant irreversible tissue damage to the patient.

This significant association between the type of Hearing – in this case an Oral Hearing –
and the Granting by the Board of the patient‘s appeal – was further analyzed by Year. In
the interest of time, only Decisions in the year 2004 and year 2006 were explored. No
significance was found for Year 2001. However, significance was found for Year 2006.
In other words, an Oral Hearing did not result in a significant number of Grants by the
Board for Year 2004 but it did result in a significant number of Grants by the Board for
Year 2006.

Parties: Represented by Lawyer or Self-Represented
The prevalent thought is that parties may be in a better position to present their facts and
argue the law if they are represented by a lawyer who knows the applicable law. Parties
who are self represented may not argue as effectively as a lawyer who knows the law in
question. In all court and tribunal hearings, there is significant concern that if a Hearing
takes place between a self represented party and a lawyer, the self represented party may
be at a disadvantage in arguing his or her case and the Hearing does not represent a ‗level
playing field‘. Is this true?
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To determine if this is the case at the Board, within the study period, the number of times
the patient was self represented versus represented by a lawyer and how many times
OHIP was represented by a non-lawyer versus an OHIP lawyer was analyzed. Then the
number of times both the patient and OHIP were represented by a lawyer was analyzed
relative to the Board‘s Decision to grant or deny the patient‘s appeal (See Appendix L for
details).

We know overall that the Board denied cases 80% of the time and granted cases 20% of
the time during this study period. Of interest was whether having a lawyer significantly
increased the percentage of granted application above the overall 20% rate on behalf of
the patient. It is understood that this is a crude measure as the nature of the case may have
influenced the Board‘s Decision within the study‘s timeframe. However, this measure
was examining Procedural aspects of the Board‘s Hearing – in terms of representation at
the Hearing - not the Substantive elements of that representation.

The data indicates that a very small percentage of patients were represented by lawyers.
In only 32 cases out of 315 total cases – 10.2% - did a lawyer represent the patient at a
Hearing. Approximately 282 cases out of 315 – 89.5% - did not have representation by a
lawyer.
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In 42 cases of 315 total cases – 13.3% - a lawyer represented OHIP at a Hearing.
Approximately 273 cases out of 315 – 86.7% - OHIP did not have representation by a
lawyer.

In 28 cases out of a total of 315 cases – 8.9% - both the patient and OHIP were
represented by lawyers. In 4 cases, the patient had a lawyer and OHIP did not. In 14
cases, OHIP had a lawyer and the patient did not.

Of the 28 cases with legal representation for both parties, how many of the cases resulted
in a grant or denial of the patient‘s appeal? Of the 28 cases where both parties had legal
representation, 9 cases – or about 32% of the cases – resulted in the Board granting the
Application on behalf of the patient. This grant rate of 32% is higher than the overall
grant rate of 20%.

Interpreter
This study sought to analyze the number of times an Interpreter was used and the
language of the Interpretation. The study found that Interpreters were seldom used in
Hearings. Only 3 cases - 1% of the time - used Interpreters.

Type of Appeal: Definitions
As of the timeframe for this study, there were at least three types of patient appeals to the
Board from OHIP Decisions not to fund an out of country coverage health care service.
These included:
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i) Prior Approval
- a request for approval of an out of country coverage health care service before the
patient accessed the out of country coverage health care service (termed ‗Prior Approval‘
or ‗Prior‘ requests);

ii) Reimbursement
- a request for approval of an out of country coverage health care service after the patient
accessed the out of country coverage health care service (termed ‗Reimbursement‘
requests) where Prior Approval not ever requested by the Patient;

iii) Both – Prior Approval and Reimbursement
- a request for an out of country coverage health care service both before and after the
patient accessed the out of country coverage health care service where, the Patient had
requested the out of country coverage health care service but had been denied by OHIP
but the Patient went ahead with the out of country coverage health care service anyway –
or - the Patient had requested the out of country coverage health care service but had not
yet heard back from OHIP on its acceptance or denial at the time of the out of country
coverage health care service delivered, but subsequent to the out of country coverage
health care service delivery, the Patient learned that OHIP denied its coverage (termed
Prior Approval and Reimbursement).
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The challenge in the reading of the Decisions for this study was the cases‘ reference to
the Prior Approval Form. The Prior Approval Form was intended to be submitted to
OHIP prior to receiving the out of country coverage health care service, in order for
OHIP to determine if the health care service qualified for OHIP funding. However, in
practice, the Prior Approval Form was often submitted after the out of country coverage
health care service was delivered. Thus, the Prior Approval Form was used for Prior
Approvals but also for Reimbursement requests as well as for combined Prior Approval
and Reimbursement requests. For this study it was important, therefore, to determine how
the Prior Approval Form had been used, not just that it had been used. This determination
was made after carefully reading each case.

Results:
i) Prior Approval
Approximately 28.5% of the time the Board overruled OHIP‘s denial of coverage if the
patient had sought prior approval from OHIP for the out of country treatment. Thus, the
patient who had sought prior approval from OHIP was significantly more likely to have
their request granted by the Board - 28.5% compared to an overall granting rate of
approximately 20%. It is important to note that approximately 72% of those with Prior
Approval still were not granted.

ii) Reimbursement
The Board overruled OHIP‘s denial and granted the out of country reimbursement to the
patient/Applicant 16.3% of the time - which is less than the overall grant rate of 20%.
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iii) Both - Prior Approval and Reimbursement
However, the picture appears to change if both Prior Approval and Reimbursement were
requested by the patient. The numbers of Prior Approval cases and Reimbursement cases
overlap such that 54 cases – or 25.8% - requested both Prior Approval and
Reimbursement for out of country health care service from OHIP.

A cross tabulation of the 54 cases was undertaken to determine if the Board granted the
appeal of those patients requesting both Prior Approval and Reimbursement for an out of
country health care service proved ‗extremely‘ significant. Of the 54 cases requesting
both prior approval and reimbursement, 17 cases were granted out of country coverage by
the Board. It appears that the chances of a Board grant were improved significantly if the
patient requested both a Prior Approval and a Reimbursement. Approximately 32% of the
time the Board overruled OHIP‘s denial and granted the Prior Approval-Reimbursement
request.

Review Requests
Under a ‗Review Request‘, one or both parties to a Hearing before the Board may, upon
receiving the Decision of the Board, request that another Panel of the Board review the
evidence and render its own Decision. The 315 case were reviewed to see the frequency
of Review Requests during the study period. There were extremely few Review Requests.
Only one case or 0.3 – less than 1% - requested another panel of the Board to Review of
the Board‘s Decision.
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Conclusion
The purpose of analyzing the Board‘s Procedural data was to explore whether there is a
correlation between the procedural aspects of the Board‘s procedures and the final
decision by the Board to grant or deny the patient‘s request for out of country coverage.
These procedural factors included: the time a case proceeds through the Board‘s system –
from the date of the appeal request to the hearing date through to the decision date;
whether the hearing is oral, written or by teleconference call, or some combination of
oral/teleconference/written; whether a review was requested of the Board‘s decision; the
presence of an interpreter at the hearing, whether parties were represented by a lawyer or
were self-represented at the hearing; and whether the hearing request was based on
OHIP‘s denial of a prior approval application, a reimbursement application or a
combined prior approval-reimbursement application.

It was found that the data only permitted an analysis of duration of the time a case took
from hearing date to decision date and not the total time from appeal application to
decision date. The duration of time from the hearing date to the decision date was
variable and was skewed by a few cases. In terms of hearing formats, oral hearings were
more likely to be correlated with a decision to grant of out of country coverage than other
formats – for a particular time period. It was also found that patients were unrepresented
90% of the time but when they did have representation they were more likely to be
correlated with the decision to grant coverage. The data revealed that interpreter and
decision reviews were seldom used. The data indicated that patients who had requested
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prior approval of out of country coverage from OHIP were more likely to be granted
coverage by the Board. However, patients who had requested prior approval and
reimbursement from OHIP received more coverage grants than prior approval requests
alone.
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Chapter 9
Substantive Arguments: Results

Introduction
Phase I: Overview of Arguments
Screening Test – s.24(1)17 ‗Experimental Treatment‘
Section 28.4(2) Test
Test Element #1 - s.28.4(2)(a): Generally Accepted in Ontario for Patient
Test Element #2 - s.28.4(2)(b)(i): No Identical/Equivalent Treatment in
Ontario
Test Element #3 – s.28.4(2)(b)(ii): Delay causing death and/or MSITD

Phase II: Discrepancies within Team Patient
Types of Discrepancies within Team Patient
All s.28.4(2) Elements Assessed for Year 5
Out of Country ‗Grants‘ by the Board
Granted Cases in Year 5
Conclusion
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Chapter 9
Research Question #2:
What substantive arguments affect resource allocation decisions?
Substantive Arguments:

RESULTS

Introduction:
The Board‘s Decision in a given case is based on its agreement or disagreement with
argument put forth by the parties – OHIP and the patient – relative to the Board‘s
jurisdiction, statute and regulations. According to the data, the Board denies the patient
out of country coverage approximately 80% of the time. The Board overrules OHIP‘s
denial of coverage 20% of the time resulting in a grant of coverage for the patient.
However, prior to this study, there was no empirical research to establish which
element(s) of the s.28.4(2) regulation were being argued and accepted by the Board
regarding the granting or denial of out of country coverage. Even though Board decisions
typically gave reasons for the decision, the reasons – particularly in the first years of the
study – often did not specifically comment on the acceptance or denial of s.28.4(2) test
elements. Thus, in order to clarify the acceptance or denial of s.28.4(2) elements, this
thesis asks the following question:
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Research Question #2:
What substantive arguments affect resource allocation decisions?

In order to analyse this question in more detail, this ‗Substantive Argument‘ section is
divided into two parts: Phase I320 and Phase II.

Phase I is an overview of the patient‘s argument, OHIP‘s argument and the Tribunal‘s
Decision on each of the three main elements of the s.28.4(2) test (see Appendix M) as
well as the screening test of ‗experimental‘ treatment. The details regarding the s.28.4(2)
test definitions, standard of proof, burden of proof and the evidence required is outline in
Appendix E. In hindsight, requests for prior approval and/or reimbursement should have
been included in the ‗substantive argument‘ analysis rather than ‗procedural‘ analysis in
order to determine the significance of s.28.4(2) relative to the prior approval requirement
of s.28.4(5). The prior approval requirement of s.28.4(5), as will be further discussed,
represents administrative non-medical criteria which can supersede the medical necessity
determination of physicians. In this respect, the importance of this development for the
substantive argument of the parties is better categorized under the substantive argument
analysis than the procedures analysis.

Phase II of this study examined the discrepancies between the patient and the patient‘s
physician(s) prior to a request being submitted to OHIP. This discrepancy between the
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Phase I further analyzed the s.28.4(2) cases to determine the: definition of test elements, the onus/burden
of proof for each element, the required standard of proof, on overview of the evidence presented to the
Board and any Board reasons/insights. The results and analysis can be found in the Appendix.
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patient and the patient‘s physician(s) is termed – for the purpose of this study - the
‗discrepancy within team patient‘ (see Appendix N). Phase II only examine discrepancies
within team patient that occurred in year 5 cases. Almost half of the year 5 cases coming
before the Board indicated there was a discrepancy within team patient regarding one or
more of the elements of the s.28.4(2) test. In hindsight, all years in the study period
should have been assessed for discrepancies in team patient. The reason year 1-4 were
not analyzed was the unanticipated nature of the ‗discrepancy within team patient‘. The
author had – incorrectly – assumed that only if the OCCNEIHS was approved by the
patient‘s physician would the patient come before the Board. This was not the case in
actuality. Patients who requested an OCCNEIHS but did not receive approval from their
own physician did come before the tribunal. In essence, the patient‘s physician and OHIP
were of the same opinion that the OCCNEIHS requested by the patient was not approved.

PHASE I – OVERVIEW OF ARGUMENTS

Screening Test – s.24(1)17‗Experimental Treatment‘
According to the legislation, if a treatment is determined by the Board to be experimental
it is automatically not funded by OHIP. The vast majority of patients - 81.9% - did not
argue that the out of country treatment was either experimental or non-experimental
while 13.3% argued the treatment was not experimental and about 4.8% argued the
treatment was experimental. OHIP argued the treatment was experimental in 13% of
cases and not experimental 4.8%. As with the patient data, OHIP did not argue for or
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against experimental in 82.2% of cases. From the data, the Board determined that a
procedure was experimental 7.6% of the time and not experimental 6.7% of the time.

Table 8: Summary of Arguments – whether procedure is ―Experimental‖
Experimental

Not Experimental

No Argument

Patient

4.8%

13.3%

81.9%

OHIP

13.0%

4.8%

82.2%

Board Decision

7.6%

6.7%

85.7%

Section 28.4(2) Test
Section 28.4(2) was amended in April of 2009. However, given that the study period
preceded the amendment, the following earlier version of s.28.4(2) that was in force
during the study period was used:

section28.4(2)
Services that are part of a treatment and that are rendered outside Canada at a hospital
or health facility are prescribed as insured services if,
(a) the treatment is generally accepted in Ontario as appropriate for a person in the
same medical circumstances as the insured person; and
(b) either,
(i) that kind of treatment that is not performed in Ontario by an identical or
equivalent procedure, or
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(ii) that kind of treatment is performed in Ontario but it is necessary that the insured
person travel out of Canada to avoid a delay that would result in death or medically
significant irreversible tissue damage.321

The results are as follows:

Test Element #1 - s.28.4(2)(a)
‗Generally Accepted in Ontario as Appropriate for a Person in the Same Medical
Circumstances as the Insured Person‘

According to the data, 81% (80.6%) patients argue that the treatment they requested is
generally accepted for a person in the same medical circumstances as they were in.
Approximately 4.8% of patients argued that the treatment is not generally accepted as
appropriate for them. In 14.6% the patient did not argue that the treatment was or was not
generally accepted as appropriate for patients in their condition. In almost 50% of the
cases – approximately 30% less frequently than the patient - OHIP agreed that the out of
country treatment is generally accepted as appropriate for the patient. Approximately
26% of the time OHIP argued the treatment was not generally accepted as appropriate for
the patient. In 25% of the cases, OHIP did not argue that the treatment was or was not
generally accepted for the patient. The Board determined that in 68% of the cases the
treatment was generally accepted for the patient and in 21% of the cases it was not
generally accepted for the patient. The Board did not make a determination regarding
general acceptability in 12% of cases.
321

Regulation 552 Supra Note 3 at s.28.4(2)(a)(b)(i)(ii)
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Table 9: Summary of Arguments – whether procedure is ―Generally Accepted‖
Generally Accepted

NOT Generally Accepted

No Argument

Patient

81%

5%

15%

OHIP

49%

26%

25%

Board Decision

68%

21%

12%

Test Element #2 – s.28.4(2)(b)(i)
‗Treatment That Is Not Performed In Ontario by an Identical or Equivalent Procedure‘

In approximately 48% of cases, the patient argued that there was identical / equivalent
treatment performed in Ontario and 30% there was not identical / equivalent treatment in
Ontario. In 23% of cases, the factor of identical/equivalent was not argued. OHIP argued
in 5% of the cases that there was no identical/equivalent and in 66% of the cases that
there was identical/equivalent. OHIP did not present an argument on this point in 29% of
cases. The Board determined that there was not identical/equivalent treatment in Ontario
14% of the time and 58.4% there was identical/equivalent treatment. In 28% of cases, the
Board did not address the issue in the Decision. At least half the time, the parties and the
Board agreed that there was identical/equivalent in Ontario (48% patients, 66% OHIP,
and 58% Board).
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Table 10: Summary of Arguments – whether procedure is ―Identical/Equivalent‖
I/E in Ontario

NO I/E in Ontario

No Argument

Patient

48%

30%

23%

OHIP

66%

5%

29%

Board Decision

58%

14%

28%

Test Element #3 – s.28.4(2)(b)(ii)
‗Treatment is performed in Ontario but it is necessary that the insured person travel out of
Canada to avoid a delay322 that would result in death or medically significant irreversible
tissue damage‘

Over 59.7% and 44.8% of cases delay causing death or MSITD respectively was not
argued by the patient.

OHIP argued that delay would cause death (0.3% - or 1 case) or MSITD (1%). OHIP
argued that the delay the patient experienced would not cause the patient‘s death (36%)
or MSITD (42%). OHIP did not argue delay causing death 63.8% and MSITD 57.5% of
the time.

The Board determined that the delay would cause the patient‘s death 5% and MSITD
11% of the time. The Board determined that the delay would not cause the patient‘s death

322

Delay itself was not enough reason for OHIP to fund out of country treatment. The delay, once
established, had to likely cause the patient‘s death or MSITD. The patient need only establish that the delay
is likely to cause their death or MSITD rather than both death and MSITD. The author assumes that if there
is patient death there is also MSITD.
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(46%) or MSITD (51%) – versus patients and OHIP who argue delay causing death –
26% and 0.3% respectively and delay causing MSITD – 45% and 1%. The Board did not
determine delay causing death 49% or MSITD 38% of the time. Clearly, there is a
significant patient-OHIP-Board difference of opinion regarding ‗delay‘.

Further analysis attempted to ascertain where the patient was experiencing a delay. This
was done by estimating potential points of medical assessment experienced by the patient
- delay accessing the patient‘s Ontario general practitioner, delay accessing an Ontario
specialist and delay accessing Ontario surgery. In terms of delay accessing their Ontario
general practitioner, 90% did not discuss this type of delay. Approximately 9% said there
was a delay accessing the general practitioner and 1% stated there was no delay accessing
the general practitioner. Approximately 79% did not discuss access to Ontario specialists
as a cause of the delay. Of those patients discussing delay causing death and/or MSITD,
delay to access an Ontario specialist was reported in 14% of cases. No delay accessing an
Ontario specialist was reported in 7% of cases. Approximately 83% did not discuss
access to Ontario surgery as a cause of the delay. Of those patients discussing delay
causing death and/or MSITD, delay to access Ontario surgery was reported in 15% of
cases. No delay accessing Ontario Surgery was reported in 2% of cases.
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Table 11: Summary of Arguments – whether procedure requested is due to Delay, Delay
causing Death, Delay causing MSITD
Delay

No Delay

N/A

Delay

No Delay

N/A

Death

Death

Death

MSITD

MSITD

MSITD

Patient

25.7%

14.6%

59.7%

45.1%

10.2%

44.8%

OHIP

0.3%

35.9%

63.8%

1.0%

41.4%

57.5%

Board

4.8%

46%

49.2%

11.4%%

50.5%

38.1%

Decision

PHASE II: DISCREPANCIES WITHIN TEAM PATIENT
Phase II was an unexpected research finding that emerged during case analysis. The
patients‘ argument for s.28.4(2) was not always cohesive. In Year 5, approximately 50 of
the 106 cases showed discrepancy within the patient‘s s.28.4(2) arguments. These
discrepancies within Team Patient were found in every area of the s.28.4(2) test.323 While
there may also have been discrepancies within the OHIP argument and dissent in the
Board‘s deliberations, these were not recorded in the written Decision.

Types of Discrepancies within Team Patient
There were a variety of types of discrepancies within Team Patient which reflected a
number of differences of opinion including:
-

disagreement between the patient and the general practitioner,

323

Discrepancies within the ‗Experimental‘ screening element were not analyzed for the purpose of this
paper but are available for future analysis
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-

disagreement between the patient and the general practitioner and specialist (the
latter who agree with each other),

-

the patient and the general practitioner agree but the specialist disagrees,

-

the patient and general practitioner disagreeing but the patient and specialist
agree,

-

the patient only reports the specialist disagreeing but does not report the general
practitioner‘s position and

-

discrepancies between the patient‘s Ontario based medical team and an out of
country medical opinion typically a specialist.

In one case, the patient reported that he did not have a physician and thus could not
present a medical opinion of his need for a particular out of country treatment. On the
other extreme, one patient reported seeing fourteen specialists who did not agree that she
should receive the out of country treatment.

All s.28.4(2) Test Elements of Patients‘ Argument Assessed for Year 5
While initially the first element of the s.28.4(2) test – GA - was assessed, this only
represented 17 of the 50 cases. As a result, all 50 GA, I/E, and Delay cases were analyzed
in order to increase the sample size and determine if any patterns could be seen. In
hindsight, Year 1 to 5 cases should have been included in the analysis of possible
discrepancies within Team Patient. Of the 50 cases, there were only 4 grants of out of
country coverage.324 The remaining 46 cases that had discrepancies within Team Patient
were denied coverage by the Board.

324

Cases #292 (06-HIA-0047 L.S.), Case #322 (06-HIA-0265 D.A.M.), Case #329 (06-HIA-0293 D.K.),
Case #362 (07-HIA-0018 S.F.)
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Out-of-Country ―Grants‖ by the Board
A cross tabulation analysis of GA versus Board decisions and I/E versus the Board
decisions found a pattern when there was a discrepancy in the argument of Team Patient the Board did not grant the patient‘s out of country request. The pattern is not significant
given the sample size of 4 grants. A larger sample size should be included to assess if this
pattern is significant.

The pattern changes when analyzing Delay (s.28.4(2)(b)(ii)). Delay causing death and
Delay causing MSITD both show the same pattern to each other which differed from the
pattern shown in GA (s.28.4(2)(a)) and I/E (s.28.4(2)(b)(i)). When there was a
discrepancy within team patient over delay, the Board granted out of country coverage
50% of the time.

Granted Cases Year 5
Four (4) cases in year 5 were granted by the Board when there were discrepancies within
Team Patient. Each case was reviewed in more detail in an effort to determine where the
discrepancy within Team Patient relative to the required elements of s.28.4(2). In
all four cases, the Ontario specialist was acting as a ‗gatekeeper‘. In three of the four
cases there was a discrepancy between the patient and the specialist regarding Delay
causing MSITD – s.28.4(2)(b)(ii). The remaining case dealt with the experimental nature
of a procedure. It is also interesting to note that physicians were not present at the
Hearing to answer questions from the parties or the Board.
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Chapter 10

ANALYSIS
of Quantitative Research Relative to Theory and Empirical Research

Introduction
This research sought to examine the influence of a tribunal‘s procedures as well as the
influence of substantive arguments of the parties on a tribunal‘s resource allocation
decision making. The challenge was to find a theory that addressed this research. Of the
multitude of theories, academic debate, academic discussion and review of existing
limited – and often flawed -- empirical research, this author found an absence of theories
which examined the correlation between a tribunal‘s procedures as well as the influence
of substantive arguments of the parties on a tribunal‘s resource allocation decision
making. In addition, none of the theories or academic discussion analyzed who was
coming before the tribunal, for what reason and how this might impact on the tribunal‘s
decision.

Given the overall lack of applicable theory relative to this thesis‘ research, this author
chose to review an academic discussion and a theory for the purpose of this analysis.
First, the academic discussion regarding the lack of empirical research in legal analysis –
specifically in terms of tribunal decisions - was reviewed. Second, this author reviewed
the A4R theory regarding the process of making resource allocation decisions. The A4R
theory was chosen because of the theory‘s potential for analysis relative to objective data
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on the Board‘s procedures. For example, the premise of the A4R theory is that, in the
absence of consensus of substantive distribution principles, a fair, transparent resource
allocation process should lead to the acceptance of a resource allocation decision. As
such, the focus of the A4R theory is on procedures rather than technically difficult
substantive medical and administrative substantive arguments. These substantive
arguments are difficult to quantify based on the empirical data source of Board decisions.
The study‘s data source - Board‘s decisions – consistently and in a standardized manner
recorded the Board‘s procedures. The Board‘s decisions did not consistently and in a
standardized manner record the submissions of the parties or information regarding the
patients‘ profiles. In this respect, patient profiles and the substantive arguments of the
parties allowed room for subjective interpretation while the Board‘s procedures did not.
Given the importance of objectively analyzing data in this quantitative study, the author
chose to statistically analyse the Board‘s process and subsequently compare it to the A4R
theory.

The A4R theory requires four conditions of transparency – publicity, appeals,
enforcement and relevance of evidence. This author analyzed each of the four conditions
relative to the study data. The A4R theory, as will be discussed in more detail, did not
represent the complexity of the tribunal resource allocation decision making in terms of
the influence of a tribunal‘s procedures as well as the influence of substantive arguments
of the parties on a tribunal‘s resource allocation decision making.
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The empirical results were then analyzed – not according to the A4R – but relative to
their original categories: patient profiles, procedures and substantive arguments by the
parties before the Board. Each element was analyzed in detail to determine if any trends
existed as they related to the research questions. The empirical results found numerous
trends. These trends are discussed later in this chapter.

Need For Empirical Research
This author‘s extensive literature review and attempt to analyse the research results
identified that the majority of legal scholarship exhibited a dearth of empirical research
and an abundance of theory and doctrine. According to Heise, current legal scholarship is
dominated by theory and doctrine.325 While the traditional approaches of theory and
doctrine are important, they cannot identify issues and shed light on key issues which are
more amenable to empirical research.326 According to Schuck, the call for legal academic
empirical research is not new.327 The use of empirical research is necessary to support
theory and doctrine. For example, Bok states that the development of good theories is
difficult without the benefit of good data.328 Posner states that the lack of an empirical
footing poses a threat to legal theory‘s persuasiveness and influence.329

There are a number of reasons why empirical legal research is not prevalent or the focus
of legal scholarship. Lowery and Evans argue that scholarly research lacks institutional
325

Heise, Supra Note 102 at 834.
Ibid at 834.
327
Schuck, Supra Note 100 at 329 observes that the two main forms of legal scholarship – theoretical and
doctrinal – account for ―almost the entire corpus of legal scholarship.
328
Bok, Supra 112 at 581.
326

329

Posner, Supra Note 113 at 3.
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support, and there is a failure to teach research methods and paradigms regarding
empirical research. This lack of rigor in research methods creates a crisis of confidence
concerning research that does exist.330

Need for Empirical Research on Tribunals
This author‘s theory research identified that there was a lack of empirical research on
tribunals. The author found extensive academic debate regarding judicial review of
administrative action. The literature by Hadorn, Syrett, Mariner, Flood, Sheldrick,
Greschner, Jackman, Lahey, Pitfield, and Heise - provides a rich legal academic
discussion – but focuses on the judicial discussion of administrative tribunals. Thus, in
addition to the dearth of empirical research by legal academics generally, there is a lack
of empirical research by legal academics on administrative law.

One of the few academic sources discussing the lack of empirical research on tribunals
can be found in the writings of Sossin and Hoffman. In a 2010 article, the authors state
that tribunals are key decision makers in allocating scarce resources but that the current
research on tribunals focuses on theory, doctrine, and procedures.331 The use of empirical
research to evaluate the accountability of tribunals ‗is one of the least scrutinized areas of
administrative law.332 Jacobs also stated that there was a ‗dearth‘ of Canadian
administrative law theory and information, that the realities of tribunal existence are not
that neatly packaged

333

and factors affecting tribunal independence did not ‗jump out‘.334
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Lowery, Supra Note 104 at 308.
Sossin and Hoffman, Supra Note 120.
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Sossin and Hoffman, Supra Note 120.
333
Jacobs, Supra Note 127 at 343.
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Chipman‘s empirical research also found that there was little published empirical
scholarly analysis regarding tribunal day-to-day activities.335 The tribunal did not perform
according to the theoretical models or regulatory theory. It was far more complex and
ambiguous and reviewed patterns far removed from theoretical norms.336

Sossin and Hoffman state that the lack of empirical research may be due to system and
research method complexity, a lack of empirical skills and academic prestige as well as
the pervasive culture within academia of deference to experts and authority. These factors
further diminish the perceived value of objective empirical work. For example, one
empirical study sought to ‗evaluate‘ HSARB as compared to the courts in providing
patients with an accessible and effective way to challenge government decisions.337
However, the ‗evaluation‘ indicators of tribunal versus court elements were not described
or analyzed according to research design protocols. Sossin and Hoffman recommend the
need for evidence and data driven strategies in order to evaluate and achieve a tribunal‘s
intended purpose.338 According to Sossin and Hoffman, the fact that evaluation is not
easy does not detract from its importance. Sossin and Hoffman also believe that the lack
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As a result of the dearth of theoretical application of models to the actual practice of tribunals, Jacobs
develops three new theoretical model regarding administrative independence; independence informed by
judicial dictates; independence informed by cultural understandings; independence informed by
fundamental values of fairness.
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Chipman, Supra Note 134 at 4 ―There is no lack of ―how to be successful before the Board‖ presentation
materials, often of high quality, prepared by lawyers, planners and other professionals who appear before it,
but this is of necessity of a limited and practically-focused nature, and is no substitute for analysis which
attempts to place the Board‘s decision-making in a more analytical context, to get behind what it does to
examine how and why it does it.‖.
336
Ibid at 319.
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Pitfield, Supra Note 72.
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Sossin and Hoffman, Supra Note 120.
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of empirical research is not only a missed opportunity but may also pose a significant risk
by not studying changes over time or evaluating decision-makers.

These two authors state ―that an assessment of health-related adjudicative tribunals has
never before been comprehensively undertaken and is ripe for research and, potentially,
reform.‖ However, there has been preliminary research regarding HSARB undertaken
which forms the basis for further exploration. For example, Flood and Pitfield identified
the low success rate of appeals at HSARB and Pitfield identified a gap between the
parties‘ expectations of HSARB and the Board‘s limited jurisdiction.

In order to address the gap of a lack of empirical research -- identified by Heise, Schuck,
Bok, Posner, Lowery and Sossin and Hoffman, Jacobs and Chipman -- and to address the
methodological challenges, this author undertook a literature review of existing tribunal
empirical research. The author reviewed the existing empirical research of Jacobs,
Gamble, Chipman, Fernadez, Pitfield and Pitfield and Flood in order to identify possible
research design strategies, statistical indicators and to learn from the limitations of the
empirical research on tribunals. After an extensive review, no research design, statistical
indicators or analysis could be identified regarding interplay between the influence of
tribunal procedures and substantive arguments by the parties on the tribunal‘s decisions.
However, the literature identified several statistical indicators that were incorporated into
the author‘s methodology. These statistical indicators included: unforeseen factors
influencing Board‘s decision (Jacobs); the exclusion of the general public and lack of
information on subject inclusion (Gamble); the coding and statistical analysis of actual
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tribunal decisions (Chipman);339 approval rates, decision outcomes, and the position
taken by the Board (Fernandez); insights into significant role of lawyers in formulating
effective arguments (Pitfield); the gap between the parties expectations of HSARB and
the Board‘s limited jurisdictional powers (Pitfield)340 and the low success rates of appeals
(Pitfield and Flood).

From these empirical studies, this author saw the need to further explore who were the
parties appealing a government decision (patient profiles), why the party was appealing
the government decision (substantive argument) and what part of the party‘s substantive
appeal was accepted by the tribunal, if any. It was also assumed that the process
(procedures) by which parties appealed a government decision before the tribunal was a
neutral process and did not affect the tribunal‘s decision. This latter aspect – the Board‘s
procedures – was analyzed relative to the A4R theory. The details of this analysis are
listed below.
.

339
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Chipman, Supra Note 134.
Pitfield, Supra Note 72 at 100.
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Accountability for Reasonableness (A4R) Theory:
The A4R theory states that societies lack consensus on substantive distributive justice
principles. Because of this lack of consensus, society will only accept resource allocation
decisions if the process used to determine the resource allocation is considered by those
affected to be fair. Fair processes are those processes which are transparent. Transparent
processes are characterized as having four conditions: publicity, relevance, appeals and
enforcement. In essence, if the four conditions of transparency are fulfilled – publicity,
relevance, appeals and enforcement – the resource allocation decision is considered to be
fair and transparent and thus more likely to be acceptable even if there is no consensus
regarding the resource allocation decision.

Why is the A4R theory important? The A4R theory is important because – if society
continues to have a lack of consensus on substantive distribution principles, and the
process used to determine the resource allocation is not considered fair by those generally
affected, would the society still accept the resource allocation decision? What if the
process itself influences the resource allocation decision irrespective of the submissions
of the parties before the decision maker? What is a revised resource allocation decision
making mechanism? According to the A4R, the four conditions of transparency are
required for a process to be considered ‗fair‘ and thus important to the acceptability of a
resource allocation decision. If the four conditions of transparency are not met, is a
resource allocation decision still acceptable?
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This study will analyse the Board process relative to the A4R theory with the assumption
that there is a lack of consensus on substantive distribution principles – as seen in the
substantive arguments of the parties before the Board.

Overall, elements of the theory of A4R were found in the analysis of the cases. However,
the theory‘s transparency conditions of publicity, relevance, appeals and enforcement are
not ‗fine grain‘ enough to capture procedural elements that may affect decision making.
Second, the A4R theory strays away from it purpose of focusing on the process of
decision making and into the area of substantive arguments via its relevancy of evidence
condition.341 The A4R provides an important starting point for a critical analysis of the
procedures involved in resource allocation decision making. An analysis of the A4R‘s
transparency conditions of appeals, publicity, enforcement and relevance is outlined
below. However, the A4R needs to be supplemented with quantitative research in order
to provide a more ―fine grain‖ analysis of the impact of the general procedure and
individual procedural factors on Board decisions.

Appeal Condition
Under the A4R‘s ‗appeals‘ condition, a mechanism for challenging a resource allocation
decision must be made available. While the Board has jurisdiction to hear appeals from
OHIP decisions, a decision of the Board can review its own decision or its decision can
be appealed to the courts.

341

Paul Brest, ―The Substance of Process‖ (1981) 42 Ohio St. L.J. 131.[hereinafter ―Brest‖]. – Brest
argues that the role of the courts in terms of representational-reinforcing review and the fundamental values
cannot be separated.
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The mechanism for challenging a resource allocation decision of the Board is based on
the legislative scheme outlined in Chapter 2. The province, according to s.92(7) of the
Constitution, deals with the delivery of health care. The provincial HIA outlines the
jurisdiction of the Board to hear appeals from ‗insured persons‘ who have been refused
health care coverage and or the reimbursement of claims by the General Manager of
OHIP. The Board also has the jurisdiction to review and reconsider a decision made by a
previous panel of the Board.342 This appeal option for the Board to review and reconsider
its own decision was only used once in this five year case study. Whether or not the
Board‘s decision to review and reconsider its own decision, a decision of the Board may
be further appealed to the Ontario Divisional Court by ‗any party‘.343 During the study
time period and based on the data source of Board decisions, it was unknown how many
Board decisions were appealed to the Divisional Court.

While the condition of ‗appeals‘ requires a ‗mechanism‘ for challenging a resource
allocation decision, the A4R theory does not require a knowledge of who is appealing the
decision and why a resource allocation decision is being challenged. It is unclear if the
Board decision was appealed for procedural or substantive distribution reasons. In
summary, the A4R appeals condition to make available a mechanism for challenging a
resource allocation decision is established in the legislative context within which the
Board operates. Thus the appeals condition is present.

342
343

based on 2009 Rules s.21.2(1).
HIA, Supra Note 4 at s.24(1).
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Publicity Condition
According to the A4R‘s ‗publicity‘ condition, decisions by the decision maker must be
publicly accessible. The publicity condition as it relates to the Board is weakly met,
according to the author, due to the difficulties in electronically accessing the decisions
that corresponded to the study period. These difficulties in electronically accessing the
decisions are outlined in more detail in the methodology chapter of this thesis. The Board
decisions analyzed for this study, were retrieved in 2009 from the Board‘s public website.
It is unknown if the study period decisions were available online or through the Board
office prior to 2009. The Board‘s decisions were posted on CanLII as of August 2,
2010.344

The core research element for this study – Board decisions – did not indicate if the
hearing was attended by members of the public other than those involved in a given case.
Thus, it is difficult to determine from the data within the decisions if the hearings were
attended by the public. Even if the decisions and hearings were / are public, it is
important – for future research – to analyse whether the public experiences and perceives
the hearings and the decisions to be accessible. The public may be encountering barriers
to access that are not captured in the study. Overall, the publicity condition is present.

Enforcement Condition
The A4R theory‘s condition of ‗enforcement‘ requires the regulation of the process to
ensure the conditions of publicity, relevance and appeals. Board decisions may be
appealed to the courts. Through the oversight mechanism of judicial review of
344
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administrative action, discussed in detail in Chapter 4, the courts have the jurisdiction to
review the Board‘s decisions. In a review of the Board‘s procedures, the court may
examine the conditions of publicity and appeals – and infrequently the substantive
conditions of relevancy. However, this judicial review oversight by the court takes place
only if a Board decision is appealed to the courts. Few tribunal decisions are appealed to
the courts. As such, there is only the enforcement condition of judicial review if an
appeal is granted by the court.

Currently, according to the legislative scheme, there is a requirement that the Board
reports its activities to the Minister of Health annually. It is possible that this requirement
could provide an enforcement condition. However, there is no requirement that the Board
report the conditions of publicity, relevance, appeals or enforcement to the Minister or
any member of the public. Overall, the enforcement condition is present.

Relevance Condition
The A4R relevance condition requires that the evidence be based on what fair minded
parties agree is relevant. In the opinion of this author, the relevance condition is
challenging for two reasons. First, the relevance condition requires evidence. Second, the
evidence is based on what fair minded parties agree is relevant. In this study, the parties
before the Board do not agree on what evidence is considered relevant. For example,
OHIP may consider the evidence of the medical necessity of out of country treatment
only if it is provided by a physician. The patient may consider their own non medical
assessment of the medical necessity of out of country treatment to be relevant evidence.
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Patients may feel that their own evidence of medical necessity outweighs the medical
necessity determination of physicians – either their own physicians or the physicians
providing evidence for OHIP. The challenge is who decides what is relevant evidence
upon which resource allocations are to be made? Currently, it is the lay Board that makes
the final decision on medical necessity and insured out of country health services.
Overall, it is unclear to the author if the relevance condition is met.

Problems Comparing A4R Theory to the Empirical Research Results:
The application of the A4R theory to the actual resource allocation decisions of the Board
was difficult. The difficulty arises for several reasons.

First, in addition to the dearth of empirical research specifically with respect to tribunals,
it is the opinion of this author that there is no research or theoretical model on the
interplay between tribunal procedures, submissions by the parties before the Board and
the Board‘s resource allocation decision. Although the A4R theory deals with the process
of resource allocation decision making – in the author‘s opinion -- it is incomplete as it
does not address the substantive arguments of the parties or the interaction of the
procedures and the tribunal‘s decision. It also does not address who is appearing before
the resource allocation decision making body or the reasons for this appearance.

Second, three of the four A4R conditions - publicity, appeals and enforcement were not
included in the tribunal‘s written decisions – the main data source for this research. The
conditions of appeals and enforcement had to be analyzed relative to the legislative
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scheme outlined in Chapter 2. The appeal condition does not examine the applicant – in
this case the patient – and why a decision is being appealed. The condition of publicity
was analyzed relative to the author‘s assembly of Board decisions located on the Board‘s
public website. As a result, three of the four conditions for the A4R were not part of the
quantitative study that was undertaken. Only the fourth condition of the A4R theory, the
relevance of evidence condition, could apply to this quantitative study. Thus, from the
initial analysis of the empirical study results relative to the theory there was the
expectation that the theory did not apply to the majority of the study.

Third, the ‗relevance‘ condition of the A4R can be reviewed based on data analyzed for
this study. However, the relevance condition deals with the acceptability of evidence that
is considered relevant by fair minded parties. Evidence supports substantive arguments. If
this analysis is correct, there is a contradiction with the purpose of the theory and the
components of the theory. The purpose for the A4R theory is to provide a process for
making acceptable resource allocation decisions when the society cannot agree on
substantive distribution. The theory does not purport to deal with substantive issues.
Evidence is a substantive issue. As such, the A4R theory moves to the realm of
substantive distribution. It is unclear how the agreement between the parties regarding
what evidence is acceptable is to take place. The results of this study indicate there is not
agreement between the parties or the Board regarding what evidence is acceptable. For
example, in the study, one party – OHIP – may only accept medical evidence provided by
physicians regarding the medical necessity of an OCCNEIHS. The patient may rely on
medical evidence that is provided by non-physician sources. There may be disagreement
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between the patient and their own physician(s) – what is termed in this study as
―Disagreement within Team Patient‖ - regarding the medical necessity of a given
OCCNEIHS for that patient. Thus the evidence submitted by the parties at the tribunal
hearing – is not considered relevant by all parties. As such, this author questions whether
the relevance condition is an assessment of acceptable procedures or if it is an assessment
of the submission of the parties before the Board.

Fourth, this author is of the opinion that the A4R theory is a general replication of legal
process undertaken by the courts and tribunals.345 Each of the A4R conditions of
publicity, appeals, enforcement and relevance of evidence are seen in judicial and quasijudicial resource allocation decision making. For example, court proceedings and
decisions – unless sealed – are ‗publicly‘ accessible. Unless outlined otherwise by statute,
all court decisions can be ‗appealed‘ to a higher court. Preliminary court proceedings and
appeal courts can ‗enforce‘ the conditions of publicity, appeals and the relevance of
evidence. The courts also give extensive consideration to relevance, admission and
weight of evidence. In fact, extensive rules of civil procedure, rules of criminal
procedure, case law and academic discussion are available to guide the determination of
what evidence is relevant.

Fifth, based on the quantitative data in this study, the A4R theory itself is a traditional but
limited theory to analyse the procedural factors in this study of the Board - for several
reasons. The main reason is that the A4R theory does not address key significant factors
345

In a criminal proceedings for first degree murder, for example, the court decision may not be agreed
with but if the process for determining the decision is considered fair and transparent the decision will be
accepted.
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in decision making that are only evidenced through quantitative research. For example,
according to Heise, traditional approaches of theory and doctrine are important, but they
cannot identify issues and shed light on key issues that are more amenable to empirical
research.346 For example, the A4R does not capture who is requesting the appeal, why the
appeal is being requested, the influence of specific procedural factors on the Board‘s
resource allocation decisions (Research Question #1) and the substantive arguments of
the parties (Research Question #2) on the Board‘s decision. The use of empirical research
is necessary to support theory and doctrine. Bok states that the development of good
theories is difficult without the benefit of good data.347 Posner states that the lack of an
empirical footing poses a threat to legal theory‘s persuasiveness and influence.348

Why is this empirical research important? It is important because it provides a more
holistic understanding of what is taking place before the Board relative to the Board‘s
decisions. The empirical research provides a holistic analysis that is essential to
accurately support recommendations of what should ideally be the resource allocation
decision making mechanism versus what currently is the resource allocation decision
making mechanism.

This study identified many trends that were not evident from the A4R theory.
Additionally, the empirical results of this study did not map easily onto the A4R theory.
An attempt was made by the author to integrate the empirical research into the A4R

346
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Heise, Supra Note 102 at 834.
Bok, Supra Note 112 at 581.
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189

theory. In this respect, the study‘s empirical results regarding the patient profile, and the
procedures of the Board could be analyzed relative to the appeal condition of the A4R
theory. The study‘s empirical results regarding the substantive arguments of the parties
could be analyzed relative to the relevance condition. However, instead of attempting to
force the research results into a limited theory, the author analyzed the results according
to their original categories of patient profile, the procedures and the substantive
arguments of the parties. The results, listed in detail in the previous chapter, are analyzed
below:

Empirical Analysis:
Patient Profile Analysis
Why is data on the patients‘ age, sex, residence location, diagnosis, requested treatment,
geographic treatment location and specific facility of importance to this thesis? This
thesis critically examines what is currently taking place regarding the granting or denial
of OCCNEIHS by the Board. While Chapter 2 outlines the larger context within which
the Board operates in response to an appeal request - little is known about the party which
activates the appeal process or why they are appealing a resource allocation decision.

To address this gap in information, patient data referred to in the decisions during the
study period was coded and analyzed. Based on this analysis of patients‘ factors, several
patterns and novel issues emerged. The first three factors – patient age, sex and residence
– did not highlight any major patterns or novel issues. This lack of patterns or novel
issues may be the result of under reported data within the decision. However, in the
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analysis of the patients‘ diagnosis, requested treatment, requested location and facility for
treatment, certain patterns and novel issues began to emerge.

Patient Age
Approximately 60% (58.7%) of the cases did not provide the age of the patient. This may
be due to the development of privacy legislation at the provincial and national level that
may have heightened the need to protect personal health information. Thus, the role of
external legislation to the HIA may have influenced the data recorded within the decision.
This lack of data makes any potential patterns or themes questionable.

Patient Sex
With approximately an even split between male and female requests, there does not
appear to be a significant difference between the sexes in the ability to access the Board.
The success rates of male versus female requests are beyond the scope of this thesis, but
the data is available for statistical analysis.

Patient Residence
The residence of the patient coming before the Board may be a proxy indicator for
political, cultural, philosophical and economic factors – which require further study.349 350
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Residence may be one proxy indicator of different geographic variations in OCCNEIHS diagnosis,
referral patterns and ‗access to health‘ philosophy by the medical profession. For example, it is difficult to
say why patients in Southern and Western Ontario appeal most frequently to the Board. Southern Ontario
may be geographically closer to the Board‘s oral hearings based in Toronto making access to the Board
easier. The West is farther away from the Board than parts of Eastern Ontario, yet Western Ontario has
almost double the rate of Eastern Ontario cases before the Board. The West may be tempted by health care
services closely accessed in the United States relative to those available domestically and thus appealed to
the Board for OHIP funding more frequently than the East. In terms of the East, it may be that the East is
satisfied with their access to domestic health care services. It may also signal a barrier – such as a language
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Patient Diagnosis
Unlike the under reporting of patient age, sex and residence, only 1% of patients did not
know their diagnosis. This low percentage of unknown diagnosis would indicate that
99% of patients who knew their diagnosis had some form of contact with the health care
system in order to receive a diagnosis. This raises an important issue of ‗who‘ is
assessing the patient and determining the patient‘s diagnosis.

In terms of the actual diagnosis, the highest percentage of patients appealing to the Board
have a collection of ‗Other‘ conditions (21.6%),351 with ‗Cancer‘ (15.6%) ranking
second. Of interest in this data is the high percentage of pain352 cases. If one adds the
Back Pain category (11.4%) with the General Pain category (7%), pain ranks second
(18.7%) as the diagnosis for the patient wanting to go out of country for health care
services – ahead of the category of cancer (15.6%).

‗Pain‘ is an interesting category. Pain is often considered a patient‘s subjective
experience rather than an objective, quantifiable medical diagnosis by a physician. The
high percentage of ‗pain‘ cases reported coupled with the lack of objective, quantifiable
barrier - to accessing the Board. Further analysis and focus group or key informant surveys may distill this
information.
350

The Board decisions did not reference the duration of residence or previous residence. For example,
university students seeking OCCNEIHS may reside within a geographic area for the duration of their
education while previously and in the future reside is a different geographic location. Such information is
important to understand the history and culture.
351
See Appendix G: Patient Profile – Diagnosis and Pain. Appendix G provides a list of the ―Other‖
conditions which comprise the 21.6% of cases.
352
It should be noted that while all categories may include pain – such as pain with cancer or pain with
degenerative hips – pain was only ranked as a category if it was the primary health concern. Thus, cancer
was not ranked in a pain category but rather in the ‗cancer‘ category. Similarly, a painful degenerative hip
was ranked in the ‗joints‘ category rather than in the ‗pain‘ category.
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medical diagnosis by the physician may lead to a discrepancy between the patient and the
physician regarding generally acceptable treatment and the urgency or delay in receiving
the treatment. This possible correlation requires further research.

Patient Requested Treatment
Almost half of the out of country requests were for surgery (49.2%) followed by medical
assessments (14%), treatment (13.3%), and diagnostic procedures such as an MRI,
CTscan etc. (12.4%). The combination of categories dealing with counseling, drug
treatment, (9.2%) of cases and only 1.9% of the requests dealt with transplants.353

It is interesting to note that the potentially most expensive health care services – surgery
and transplants – occupy spots for both the most (surgery) and least (transplant) requested
health care services. As will be discussed later, the Ontario judicial decisions dealing
with transplants (for example, live liver transplant) provided some of the most detailed
judicial direction at interpreting the legislative criteria of s.28.4(2). In other words,
despite being the least requested service – less than 2% of all cases -- the transplant
category has provided judicial interpretation guidance on s.28.4(2) for 98% of the other
requested out of country cases.

Requested Location for Treatment
Country:
Based on the data, the current OCCNEIHS issue is clearly one of health care sought in
the USA. While the numbers of non-USA out of country coverage requests are currently
353

See Table 1: Patients‘ Requested Procedure
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very small, a preliminary review of the non-USA cases appears to indicate a ‗family of
origin‘ link. For example, a patient may request out of country coverage from OHIP for a
medical procedure in China. The relatives in China may have arranged the Ontario
patient‘s visit to a Chinese specialist in China who subsequently conducts the medical
procedure in China. The Ontario patient‘s follow up home care may also be undertaken in
China by Chinese relatives. In this respect, requests for out of country health care service
may be based on family and or friend origin as well as factors such as the reputation of
physicians/facilities/procedures, physical proximity, access to websites or peer networks,
etc. – rather than based only on an Ontario physician‘s determination of medical
necessity.

Geographic Location and Treatment Requested
It appears that out of country cases under s.28.4(2) are predominately seeking American
treatment (84%) with almost half of Ontario patients before the Board requesting
treatment in the northern USA (44%) – specifically in Minnesota, Michigan and Ohio.
Thus, as of 2003/04-2007/08, OHIP‘s out of country program is based largely on requests
for treatment in a few northern states. Overall, patients are requesting out of country
surgery approximately half the time (49%) followed by Assessments (14%), Treatment
(13%), Diagnostics (12%) and a Combination of medical care (9%). Organ transplants
only represent 2% of cases.354

354

Again, caution must be used in interpreting the geographic location and treatment requested as these
variables were not standardized across the case decisions or OHIP medical codes. Ideally the out of country
locations for each treatment requested – standardized based on Ontario medical codes - should be cross
tabulated with the Board‘s granting or denying of OHIP funding. This data is available within the database
constructed for this thesis and is an area for further research.
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Patients know, very clearly, what their diagnosis is, what treatment they want and the
facility they want to go for that treatment. In this respect, patients are not going to the
State but to the health care facility within the State. Another way to look at the data is
that patients are requesting different States for different treatment e.g. Mayo Clinic
(Michigan) for assessments, the Cleveland Clinic (Ohio) for surgery, followed by the
Detroit and Royal Oaks also for surgery. Of note is the highest request for surgery
(‗Other‘ category) where the facility was not stated in the Board‘s decision.

Conclusion - Patient Profile Analysis
The research revealed several patterns and novel issues with respect to diagnosis,
treatment requested, and requested location of treatment. For example, 99% of patients
knew their medical diagnosis, desired treatment and where the treatment was offered.
Almost 50% of requests were for surgery. Patients are predominately seeking American
treatment (84%) and requested different States and health facilities for different health
services. Interestingly, pain was significantly reported as a reason for requesting
OCCNEIHS. The analysis raises the question - who is determining the patients‘ medical
diagnosis and treatment and according to what standard? This data may inform the type
of expertise required to assess medical conditions, the quality, location and availability
procedures and those procedures which are insured by OHIP.

The volume of locations and services requested by the patients implies that health care
resources themselves are not scarce. Health care out of country appears to be plentiful.
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Thus, it is questionable if the theory of ‗scarce health care resources‘ is accurate for this
situation. The scarcity appears to be the limitation on domestic public tax dollars to fund
the out of country care. As such, the decision whether or not to publicly fund out of
country health care may be more of a public policy decision than one of procedural
fairness and medical necessity.

The specificity of the patients‘ requests also implies that the patients had contact with an
out of country medical system and/or had likely conducted some of their own research
into their condition and treatment options and facilities – this research appears to have
taken place through friends, family and/or the Internet – not necessarily through the
medical profession in Ontario. This raises interesting questions regarding the role of the
patient and the role of the patient‘s medical professional(s) in the out of country treatment
of the patient. The patient may be playing a greater role in determining their medical
treatment than was previously assumed. However, the Ontario legislative criteria for out
of country coverage appeared to be aimed – for the study period -- at the opinion of the
medical profession in Ontario. If research regarding the medical facility, the treatment
research and request for this treatment is conducted predominantly by the patient and not
the physician, the evidence presented to the Board would likely be that of the patient and
not the physician. The theory that physicians are determining the appropriate medical
care for a patient and are assessing the delay in accessing this care may not be valid.
Patients may be attempting to determine the medical care they are to receive and whether
or not there is a delay in accessing this self determined care – either because of
dissatisfaction with the medical professional, gaps within the medical system, the
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increased use of technology such as the internet to access medical options and/or a
development in our culture to think and access resources globally. If both the patient and
physicians are independently determining medical care and assessing medical delay, the
medical system has two sets of ‗gatekeepers‘ – patients and physicians -- attempting to
access publicly funded health care services.

Alternatively, if physicians are acting in a fiduciary role for their individual patient by
supporting the patient‘s request for out of country treatment, OHIP and then the Board
are forced to take on a greater gate keeping non-fiduciary role in allocating resources.
The fiduciary role and gate keeping role of the individual‘s physicians are conflicting and
require new theoretical discussions which are beyond the scope of this paper.

Ideally, the contextual patient factors would be cross referenced with the Board‘s
granting or denial of OHIP funding. Due to the exploratory nature of this research, it is
recommended that this further study by undertaken.

Procedures Analysis
The A4R theory suggests that, in the absence of consensus, the procedure for making
difficult resource allocation decisions is critical. According to the theory, parties that are
unable to achieve consensus on substantive elements should accept the outcome if the
procedure for determining the outcome is considered fair and legitimate. The following
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analyses show the actual as opposed to the theoretical decision-making results.
Significant trends were found for the variables of legal representation, forum and
administrative requirements.

Duration Appeal is at the Board:
It is important to note two facts about tribunals and procedure time. First, access to a
tribunal and the resulting decision is commonly thought to be a faster process than access
to the courts and the resulting decision. Second, unlike some tribunals, the Board is not
required by statute or regulation to receive, hear and issue a decision within a specified
time.

From the data, case Decisions in 2008 took significantly longer from Hearing Date to
Decision Date. So, what happened in 2008 that made this significant difference in the
number of days a case was within the system between the Hearing Date and the Decision
Date? Among many possible explanations, three in particular come to mind.

First, in 2008, the leadership of the Board changed. The transition from the old Chair of
the Tribunal to the new Chair of the Tribunal may have affected the timing of the review
of the Decisions by the Chair and thus the release of Decisions.

Second, two Boards – the Health Services Appeal and Review Board (HSARB) and the
Health Professions Appeal and Review Board (HPARB) were amalgamated and fell
under the same Chairperson. Many of the members of one Board were then cross-
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appointed to the other Board. This administrative procedure and new member learning
curves may have influenced the release of Decisions. While the focus of Administrative
Law is on the procedural fairness a Tribunal provided to the parties, it may be
underestimated how important Tribunal internal processes are on procedural fairness in
terms of the ability to conduct timely Hearings and release Decisions.

Third, several key s.28.4(2) cases were before the courts in mid 2008 – after the study
period‘s completion. The author speculates that Board‘s Decisions regarding out of
country coverage that were before the courts may have influenced the timing of the
release of further Board Decisions e.g. the Board may have wished to wait for judicial
guidance on s.28.4(2) cases before releasing its Board Decision.

Overall, this empirical study found that the results for one year – 2008 – cannot be
generalized to all years. This is important because recommendations for an ideal decision
making mechanism must examine data over time to accurately address issues. If only the
data results from 2008 were used for example, the results would inaccurately reflect what
has been taking place in the other four years.

Type of Hearing Relative to Disposition:
If a Hearing was oral, the application was granted significantly more times (77.4%) than
expected (60.8%) but only for one year (2006). Again, this analysis points to the fact that
significance cannot be generalized but rather one year – 2006 but not 2004 -- may be
accounting for the importance of the oral hearing. This is important because any
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procedural changes must accurately address issues not blips in the data that are
generalized.

The importance of oral hearings in 2006 raises a number of interesting questions – was
the increased number of Grants a function of the Year 2006, the cases themselves, the
oral advocacy at the Hearing, the Panel deciding the case or other factors? The
exploratory research nature of this project does not propose to answer the question but
recognizes that further research needs to be done on the Year and influencing factors
rather than just on type of Hearing.

Parties: Representation by Lawyer or Self-Represented
Statistical analysis of the data indicated that legal representation was significant for the
patient relative to the grant of an Appeal. A number of issues come to mind regarding
legal representation.

First, the presence of a lawyer representing the applicant/patient and arguing against an
OHIP lawyer appears to lead to an increased chance of the appeal being granted in favor
of the patient. It is unclear, based on the data, if it is the presence of a lawyer for the
patient or the actual argument of the lawyer for the patient that results in a higher Grant
rate. One might also speculate if a lawyer acts as an initial filter by only representing
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cases before the Board which are considered ―strong‖ cases which may result in a grant
of resources.

Second, the legal representation by both parties may move the argument from the
patient‘s compelling circumstances argument and OHIP‘s physician/medical argument to
a more legal argument about the s.28.4(2) Test. Legal representation may not only affect
how the arguments are delivered but also the relevancy of the evidence used to support
the arguments. In this respect, legal representation may move the s.28.4(2) argument to
become more of a legal argument rather than a focus on a medical opinion – in essence,
changing the focus of the test based on the capacity and skill of the party – in this case
the lawyer.

Third, the representation by both parties before the Board may indicate that the nature of
the actual case is of legal significance.

Fourth, at s.28.4(2) Board Hearings, the patient was always arguing against OHIP. OHIP
was typically not represented by a lawyer. OHIP was typically represented by the OHIP
General Manager -- or his designate -- overseeing out of country applications. The
General Manager or his designate is a physician. OHIP is consistently represented at all
s.28.4(2) Hearings before the Board. While not ranking as representation by a lawyer, the
OHIP representatives would have had successive experiences over the five year study
period with s.28.4(2) which might give them a legal knowledge advantage over the
patient who had no representation. In other words, the fact that OHIP was not represented
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by a lawyer at the Hearings should not indicate they were not proficient in the legal
arguments that may have been put forth by legal representation.

Fifth, OHIP appears to match or exceed the patient lawyer with an OHIP lawyer in all but
4 cases out of 315 cases – the 4 cases where the patient had a lawyer but OHIP did not. In
a relatively small number of cases -- 14 cases -- OHIP had a lawyer and the patient did
not. This low number needs to be taken in the context of the OHIP General Manager or
his designate consistently arguing OHIP‘s case in 273 cases in front of the Board. Given
the 273 cases argued by OHIP, it may no longer be accurate to say OHIP is unrepresented
but instead has specialized knowledge.

Interpreter
The study found that Interpreters were seldom used in Hearings. Only 3 cases -- 1% of
the time -- used Interpreters. One fundamental aspect of natural justice is the ability to
understand the case being put forward. If a patient did not understand the procedural or
substantive case being put forward there could be a significant denial of natural justice.
An official Interpreter, in the language of the patient‘s choice, is arranged and provided in
advance of the Hearing to the patient by the Board – free of charge. It is up to the patient
to determine if an Interpreter is needed. Given the availability of these resources to
address any financial and/or language barrier, it is interesting why more parties do not
request an Interpreter. Parties in need of an Interpreter may either be unaware of this free
service or those in need of an Interpreter are not coming forward with appeals to the
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Board. More research needs to be done on this area as it represents a possible barrier to
access justice.

Type of Appeal: Prior Approval, Reimbursement or Both
As with all administrative tribunals, the Board must operate within its statutory
jurisdiction. The Board cannot decide on issues outside its jurisdiction. As of January
2009, the Divisional Court of the Ontario Superior Court, in the case of C.C.W. clarified
the Board‘s jurisdiction. The Court determined that OHIP has no discretion to grant out
of country coverage for cases that have not received prior approval from OHIP. Thus,
OHIP can only grant prior approval for out of country coverage. The Board, as of January
2009, only hears cases that deal with Prior Approval for a health care service outside the
country that have been denied by OHIP. Based on the court‘s direction, the Board does
not have discretion to grant cases that request reimbursement without prior approval for a
health care service outside the country. In other words, a case may fulfill the criteria
s.28.4(2) but may then not be eligible for actual funding because Prior Approval from
OHIP according to s.28.4(5) was not received. It is important to note that this Prior
Approval requirement under s.28.4(5) always existed in the regulation. However, the
enforcement of this regulation did not come into prominence until the later Decisions in
the study period. Thus the extent of enforcement of an existing legislated provision was a
key factor.
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The time frame for this study was before the Ontario Court of Appeal‘s ruling of January
2009 on Prior Approval. This study of the Board‘s Decisions therefore analyzed cases
that had Prior Approval and those that did not.

Early study period cases made little reference to s.28.4(5) criteria or the lack of discretion
OHIP had to approve out of country coverage health care service if the Patient‘s request
came in after the Patient had received out of country treatment. The author observed that
there was a gradual tightening up of s.28.4(5) criteria such that it became more of an
issue in the written Decisions as the years progressed. In essence, the one part test of
s.28.4(2) – a determination if the health care service was insured by OHIP -- has evolved
into a two part test which included not only the medical assessment of s.28.4(2) but also
the administrative assessment of s.28.4(5) – the requirement for prior approval. This two
part test for out of country coverage – s.28.4(2 and s.28.4(5) -- represents a key shift in
focus. Instead of the s.28.4(2) criteria of ‗medically necessary, based on medical opinion,
an out of country health care service was being denied on administrative basis –
requiring Prior Approval under s.28.4(5). Where initially the focus was on determining if
a health care service was an ―insured service‖, now a grant of out of country coverage
under s.28.4(2) may be denied if the patient did not request administrative approval
before accessing the health care service under s.28.4(5).

In terms of analysis, the author speculates that there may have been an influx of
applications to OHIP where patients had researched and accessed the out of country
treatment on their own without physician assistance or even approval. Physicians may

204

also have abdicated their referral role to patients because they didn‘t have the time,
networks and/or the technology to seek out of country services or to assess the
availability of domestic services. In terms of health care costs, it may have been easier for
the government and the courts to tighten up an administrative regulatory process rather
than to tighten up the medical opinion process. It is also important to note that most
privately funded health care plans also require Prior Approval for the funding of nonemergency procedures. In this respect, the tightening up of s.28.4(5) to require Prior
Approval was in line with the private health care insurance plans.

It is of interest, but beyond the scope of this current study, to analyze the number of cases
granted approval as OHIP insured services under s.28.4(2) but ultimately denied for not
receiving Prior Approval as required in the legislation s.28.4(5).355

Review Requests
This ‗Review‖ request is a form of a second appeal to the Board. Given that only one
Review was requested during the five year study, it is assumed by the author that parties
either take the decision of the Board as the final decision on the matter or proceed to
judicial review of the matter through Divisional Court. Alternatively, it is speculated by
the author that, having been denied by the Board, the patient will then access their private

355

A further analysis was undertaken of the 17 Prior Approval-Reimbursement cases which the Board had
granted thus overturning OHIP‘s Decision. The majority of the Decisions for the 17 cases took place in
2006 (n=9) and 2007 (n=6). This is interesting because although the Divisional Court clarified the Prior
Approval-Reimbursement issue under s.28.4(5) in its 2009 ruling, the three combined cases before the
Court in 2009 received Decisions from the Board in 2006 and 2007. The Board in those three cases ruled
that only prior approved health care service would receive OHIP funding. Yet at the same time there
appears to be Prior Approval-Reimbursement cases also being granted by the Board. Hence, the Board was
not consistent with its application of the legislation and judicial interpretation was sought.
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insurance coverage once they have, at the request of the insurer, attempted to have the
health care service paid for by government public insurance rather private insurance. If
this is correct, corporations – such as the private health insurance companies -- are using
the Board as a screening method for out of country coverage.

Conclusion – Procedures
Research Question #1:
Do procedures statistically affect resource allocation decisions of the Board?
If so, what elements of the procedures create this statistical effect?

Answer
Yes, procedures statistically affect resource allocation decisions. There is a statistical
correlation between certain Board procedures and Board decisions. The elements of the
type of Hearing (oral, written, teleconference), legal representation, and the enforcement
of previously unenforced legislation create this statistical effect.

The assumption of the procedural theory of A4R is that people will accept a substantive
outcome if the procedure to determine the substantive outcome is considered fair. This
research identifies that at the Board the procedure itself can influence the outcome. It is
difficult to say if individuals would accept a substantive outcome if they understood the
significant influence procedure had on the outcome. In essence, procedure is not neutral.
If procedures are not neutral they may not be considered fair. If procedures are not
considered fair, the substantive outcome may not be acceptable. On the other hand, it
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may not be humanly possible for a tribunal to create a ‗fair‘ procedure – only to
approximate ‗fairness‘. For example, a tribunal may in good faith attempt to facilitate
access to a hearing by making the hearing forum available to those who cannot appear
before the Board in person. In this respect, hearings may be available by teleconference,
via written submissions or a combination of forums.

Of interest is the tightening up of the interpretation of regulatory criteria during the study
period such that the emphasis on compliance was not just the medically focused s.28.4(2)
test but also the administrative requirement s.28.4(5) test – moving the test from a one
part test to a two part test. It is interesting to note that the s.28.4(5) requirement for prior
approval is an administrative requirement not a medical requirement. Thus, a patient may
meet the medical criteria for out of country coverage but not meet the defining criteria of
prior approval for the out of country coverage. In essence, the one part test for
OCCNEIHS has moved from a medical necessity determination by physicians (s.28.4(2))
to a two part test that now includes administrative requirement (s.28.4(2) plus s.28.4(5)).

The statistical relationships, it must be stressed, were correlations not causation
relationship.356 In other words, the study cannot report that having legal representation at
the hearing caused the Board to significantly grant insurance coverage for out of country
health services. The study can only say that there was a correlation between the factors.
As a correlation, the factors must be more closely examined in order to determine the

356

For example, cases that had legal representation at the hearing were more likely to receive their
requested resource allocation from the tribunal irrespective of the submissions of the parties before the
decision maker
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meaning behind this result. It is highly recommended that further qualitative research be
undertaken to further explore the correlations.

Substantive Argument Analysis
Phase I – Overview of Arguments
Screening Test: s.24(1)17 - ‗Experimental Treatment‘ Analysis
According to the legislation, if a treatment is determined by the Board to be experimental
it is automatically not funded by OHIP. It is therefore surprising that 4.8 %
(approximately 5%) of patients argued that their requested treatment was experimental -in essence, sealing their fate as there is no chance of OHIP funding.357 It is likely that the
patient did not understand the legislation and/or that the jurisdiction of the Board does not
allow the funding for a treatment that is determined to be experimental. If a patient had
representation by a lawyer, the lawyer should have advised the patient of the inability of
the Board to fund ‗experimental‘ procedures. Even if the patient was self represented, the
pre-Hearing conference (PHC) should identify if the patient plans to argue that the
treatment is experimental and thus beyond the jurisdiction of the Hearing.

Test Element #1 - s.28.4(2)(a)
‗Generally Accepted in Ontario as Appropriate for a Person in the Same Medical
Circumstances as the Insured Person‘
357

It is possible that a treatment was experimental at the time of the patient‘s request to OHIP but it is no
longer the case at the time of the Board Hearing. In such a scenario, it would be questionable if OHIP
would not have tried to settle the case before it appeared before the Board. However, the patients‘ argument
was coded at the time of the Hearing making it unlikely that the health care service was not currently
experimental
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This element of the s.28.4(2) test – whether the out of country treatment is generally
accepted as appropriate for the particular patient (GA) -- is of critical importance. If an
out of country procedure is not considered generally acceptable for the patient, the
s.28.4(2) test stops here. The legislation will not fund a patient‘s procedure that medical
professionals have determined not to be appropriate for the given patient. The patient
who fails on this element of the test will not be eligible for consideration under the
identical/ equivalent or delay elements of the test.

Automatic Denial:
It is unclear why approximately 5% of patients would argue that the requested procedure
is not generally accepted as appropriate.358 Several thoughts come to mind upon
reviewing this result. First, the patient may not understand that he/she will not receive
funding for a requested procedure if they argue the procedure is not appropriate for their
condition. This misunderstanding should be clarified at the Pre Hearing Conference.359
The fact that it is not clarified prior to the Hearing leads one to question the

358

It is not possible, from the written Decisions, to know if the patient had a disagreement one or more
physicians as to the appropriateness of the treatment but chose not to present this medical opinion at the
Hearing.
359

Pre Hearing Conference Screen
Pre Hearing Conferences are held prior to the Hearing so that the parties – the patient and OHIP – can
assess each other‘s arguments as well as allowing for any questions or assumptions to be clarified. Because
Pre Hearing Conference information is not available to the Board Panel for the Hearing and is not
contained within the written Decision, it is unclear if the discrepancy within Team Patient was evident at
the time of the Pre Hearing Conference. This area – the Pre Hearing Conference – needs to be further
investigated to determine if Team Patient discrepancies are evident at this stage of the process and need to
be addressed before proceeding to the Hearing stage.
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successfulness of the Pre Hearing Conference as a means of screening cases for
compliance with the Board‘s jurisdiction. Second, the Pre Hearing Conference may
accurately communicate the Board‘s jurisdiction but the patient may choose to make a
policy argument that the treatment should be covered by OHIP. Again, policy arguments
such as this are outside the jurisdiction of the Board. Third, the patient may present a
medical opinion – that the treatment is not appropriate – but the patient may be in
disagreement with that medical opinion.360

OCCNEIHS Sought but Not for an Ontario Delay:
An interesting issue arises here – and again in the ‗discrepancies in team patient‘ section patients may not be requesting to go out of country solely for ‗delay‘ reasons. Patients
may be requesting out of country treatment because Ontario physicians do not deem the
treatment appropriate for the patient. For example, the patient argues the treatment is
generally accepted 81% of the time while OHIP agrees that the treatment is generally
accepted 49% of the time. This 30% difference is a significant difference of opinion
between the patient and OHIP. This is an interesting finding because the popular belief is
that patients are going out of country for treatment because of domestic delay when, in
reality, patients may be seeking treatment that is not medically considered by Ontario
physicians as being appropriate for them.

Lay Board versus OHIP Medical Expertise
360

The patient may also present a medical opinion from a physician from an out of country institution
indicating the treatment is medically necessary thus countering the Ontario physician‘s opinion.
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The lay Board is overturning medical expertise of OHIP‘s Decision in 19% (68% Board - 49% OHIP=19%) in favor of the patient. If OHIP has medical expertise to assess if an
OCCNEIHS is or is not generally accepted by physicians in Ontario as being appropriate
for the patient and the Board is a lay panel without this expertise, the 19% overruling
must be based on the quality of the parties‘ medical evidence coming before the Board
and/or its interpretation of that medical evidence.361

Test Element #2 – s.28.4(2)(b)(i)
‗Treatment that is Not Performed in Ontario by an Identical or Equivalent Procedure‘
There is a significant difference between the patient (30%) and OHIP (5%) whether the
treatment is not available in Ontario. This may be due to the nature of the test (proving a
negative) and/or the fact the treatment is available in Ontario but not available for the
specific patient.

Evidentiary Difficulty:
In this element of the test, the patient must prove a negative – that the identical/equivalent
treatment is NOT performed in Ontario. It is unclear how the patient is to know and thus
to prove that a treatment is NOT performed in Ontario. This element is very difficult to
prove if there is no access to a centralized database.362 For example, OHIP appears to
361

– given that the Board‘s jurisdiction does not allow for financial, compassionate grounds or Charter
claims.
362

If the patient must rely on the doctor for treatment or for a referral, the doctor may or may not have the
knowledge or the network to know where – if at all – the treatment is performed in Ontario. It is unrealistic
– with the current technology available to general practitioners - to expect a practitioner to know what
treatments are available throughout the province of Ontario. The practitioner, in acting in the interest of the
patient and with the limited resources of time and technology, may state that there is – to the practitioner‘s
knowledge – no identical or equivalent treatment in Ontario. From the cases reviewed, it was unclear what
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have OHIP billing records that substantiate that a treatment is performed in Ontario.
However, in 29% of cases, OHIP does not state a position whether the treatment is
identical/equivalent in Ontario. Given the OHIP billing records, OHIP should have an
idea if the treatment is performed in Ontario -- as they are paying for the treatment.

The difficulty proving this element of the test may cause patients to rely on the alternate
criteria of domestic ‗delay‘ as the reason for requesting GA out of country coverage.

Available – but not for the Patient:
Even if an identical or equivalent treatment is performed in Ontario, the physicians at the
treatment location may override the general practitioner or specialist‘s referral and state
they will not perform the treatment on the given patient – perhaps because they do not do
enough of the procedure to keep up their skill, they consider the patient too risky for the
procedure or they consider another out of country location a better option for the patient.
In all cases, the treatment would be available in Ontario and generally acceptable as
appropriate for the patient – but just not available to the patient.363 Again, the patient may

evidence could be used by the patient to substantiate the argument that there was no identical/equivalent
performed in Ontario i.e. was evidence based on the number of attempts to determine if an
identical/equivalent existed – or – the actual total number of treatment services offered.
363

An interesting question arises whether an identical/equivalent treatment performed in Ontario that is
privately insured qualifies as an identical/equivalent treatment performed in Ontario for OHIP‘s out of
country purposes. The understanding may have been that only OHIP treatment is considered. This is not
clear from the legislation and there was been no judicial direction from the courts on this matter. OHIP has
argued that non-OHIP treatment in the private sector qualifies as an identical/equivalent treatment
performed in Ontario.363 The Board disagrees with this position taken by OHIP and has ruled that only
OHIP identical/equivalent treatment qualifies as identical/equivalent treatment.

212

have difficulty proving this element of the test and choose to rely on the alternate criteria
of domestic ‗delay‘ as a reason for requesting out of country coverage.

Test Element #3 – s.28.4(2)(b)(ii)
‗Treatment is performed in Ontario but it is necessary that the insured person travel out of
Canada to avoid a delay that would result in death or medically significant irreversible
tissue damage‘
Significant Differences:
It is interesting to note that approximately half the time, delay is not argued by the patient
– 59.7% do not argue a delay would cause death, 44.8% do not argue that a delay would
cause MSITD. When the patient does argue delay, a delay causing death (25.7%) and/or a
delay causing MSITD (45.1%) significantly differs from OHIP‘s agreement that a delay
would cause death (0.3%) and/or MSITD (1.0%). Clearly, OHIP and the patient are not in
agreement over the question of a ―delay‖. This may point to a difference in expectations
as to the amount of time that constitutes a ―delay‖.

How Delay is Measured:
The difference in expectation as to what constitutes ‗delay‘ may be a function of how
delay is measured. For example, the test for ‗delay‘ is a prospective assessment of the
This element of the test also raises the question whether ‗identical‘ treatment is the same as ‗equivalent‘
treatment. It also raises the question who determines if the given treatment is ‗identical‘ and/or
‗equivalent‘? Currently, it appears to be the patient arguing against OHIP. It is also unclear when a
treatment no longer is deemed ‗identical‘ or even ‗equivalent‘. For example, in a treatment for tumor
removal, the medical procedure for tumor removal may be via traditional surgery or traditional surgery
using a different surgical technique. In this example, is the tumor removal the identical? Is it equivalent? Or
is it the technique to remove the tumor? Currently, it is the lay panel of the Board that must determine,
based on the evidence presented by the patient and by OHIP, whether the treatment is identical or
equivalent.
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impact of delay on the patient‘s health. This would be particularly difficult if a health
problem – such as chronic pain – was diagnosed based on a subjective report or if a
health condition had a little known etiology – such as in the case of rare diseases.

The data also raises the question ‗when does the delay start‘? Where delay is reported, it
appears to occur at the level of getting an appointment with an Ontario specialist and
getting an Ontario surgery appointment. However, the Ontario Wait Time Strategy lists
wait times from the time the specialist recommends a treatment i.e. surgery. The wait
time does not include the time the patient incurs waiting to see his/her GP, to get
diagnostics for the GP, to get a referral from the GP for an appointment with a SP, to wait
for the appointment with the SP, to meet with the SP, to have diagnostics done for the SP
– all of which may be months to years – before the SP determines the treatment is
required, or not. This additional time may be what the patient refers to as ‗delay‘ rather
than just the delay experienced on the waitlist for treatment. The patient, OHIP and the
Board may be operating on different definitions of ‗delay‘. In essence, there may be at
least two types of delay – one delay as defined by medical professionals in the Wait Time
Strategy and another delay based on the experience and expectations of the patient.

Phase II: Discrepancies within Team Patient
Team Patient discrepancies in Years 1 through 5 were not coded initially for one main
reason -- the author made the assumption in designing this research study and code
book that if the patient appeared before the Board then there would be a medical
necessity determined by a physician. In this respect, it was assumed that there were no
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discrepancies within Team Patient. In other words, the patients and the physicians
were in agreement regarding the criteria for s.28.4(2). It became clear, while analyzing
the cases, that this was not the case. By Year 5 cases, the author was attuned to these
discrepancies. The voided assumption of ‗no Team Patient discrepancies‘ led to the
development of a more detailed coding system for Year 5 patient arguments.

The rate of discrepancies within Team Patient – between patients and their own
physicians -- is remarkable because the legislative grounds for granting out of country
coverage are based on medical opinion for medically necessary services. The
discrepancies had an effect on the Board‘s granting of out of country coverage in that the
Board appears to grant primarily in favour of the medical opinion. Although this is
preliminary exploratory data, the difference of patterns warrants more investigation
beyond this study.

Conclusion:
A key finding of this research is the Board‘s five year study denial rate of 80%. However,
this means that in 20% of the decisions the lay Board overruled the medical expertise of
OHIP. This raises the question -- what element or elements of the s.28.4(2) test caused
the Board to overrule OHIP‘s decision?

Research Question #2:
What substantive arguments affect resource allocation decisions made by the Board?
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Answer
All substantive arguments are correlated resource allocation decisions but most clearly
when there was a discrepancy between patients and their own physicians. For example,
the research found a significant number of discrepancies within Team Patient at all levels
of the s.28.4(2) Test. The patients were, in essence, seeking out of country treatment
when it was not medically approved by their own physicians. When there was a
discrepancy within Team Patient, the Board appears to side with the medical opinion.

It is important to note that the appearance of a pattern of ‗discrepancies‘ between the
patient and his/her doctors regarding treatment out of country may be signaling a
challenge to medical opinion as the gatekeeper to medical resources. Patients now have
multiple sources of medical information and social networks to assist them in
determining medical options. This discrepancy within team patient may reflect a
significant change in the doctor-patient relationship.
Discrepancies within Team Patient may also be evidence of an indirect method of health
care resource allocation. For example, if a physician does not consider a medical
procedure to be GA for the patient, the physician may state that the procedure is not
immediately available – as it is not immediately required medically for the patient. This
may be interpreted by the patient as a ‗delay‘. In another example, the patient‘s physician
may actually state to the patient that the treatment requested is not GA but the patient still
wishes to proceed. In this respect, the patient and the patient‘s physician disagree on GA
but the patient still requests OCCNEIHS from OHIP.
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Three other trends are worth noting. First, across all study years, the patient only argued
‗delay‘ approximately 50% of the time. However, patients did argue GA over 80% of the
time. This may indicate patients are requesting OCCNEIHS for treatment not considered
GA in Ontario rather than solely for the popular belief that OCCNEIHS are sought
because of delay in accessing Ontario care.

Second, patients clearly see ―delay‖ differently than OHIP or the Board. There appears to
be at least two perspectives on ‗delay‘ – one delay time considered by medical
professionals and one delay time considered by the patient.

Third, there is a complete absence in the decisions of economic discussions, cost-benefit
analysis, official medical and political consensus regarding OCCNEIHS that are covered
by OHIP, regulations specific to OCCNEIHS, or algorithms to calculate coverage.

It is important to note that there was no requirement under s.28.4(2) or s.28.4(5) or
anywhere else in the legislative scheme that required evidence to be presented regarding
the financial costs of the OCCNEIHS. It is understandable, therefore, that the Board
would not require evidence regarding the financial cost of the OCCNEIHS or make
reference to financial costs in Board decisions. No submissions regarding financial costs
were presented by the parties. There was no indication that the Board considered – either
implicitly or explicitly – the cost of the OCCNEIHS. The cost per patient or the cost to
society was not discussed as an element in the resource allocation decision making.
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Overall Conclusion
This chapter reviewed the academic discussion regarding the lack of empirical research in
legal analysis – specifically in terms of tribunal decisions. The lack of Canadian
empirical research relative to the overabundance of theories reflected the author‘s
research experience. This chapter also reviewed the A4R theory regarding the process of
making resource allocation decisions. The author analyzed each of the four conditions of
transparency - publicity, appeals, enforcement and relevance - relative to the study data
and found that the four conditions were present but were not ‗fine grain‘ enough to
identify procedural factors which statistically influenced Board decisions. The author
concluded that the A4R theory does not represent the complexity of the tribunal resource
allocation decision making in terms of the influence of a tribunal‘s procedures. For this
analyses, empirical research was needed.

The empirical data of tribunal decisions was analyzed to determine if correlations and
trends could be established. The data was analyzed relative to the categories of patient
profiles, procedures and substantive argument. This was done in order to accurately
determine what was currently taking place and what an ideal resource allocation decision
making mechanism should entail. The empirical results found numerous correlations and
trends that were not identified by the A4R theory.

In term of a Patient Profile, the analysis revealed patients know what diagnosis they have
and are requesting specific facilities for specific treatment. Overall, Ontario‘s
OCCNEIHS issue is largely based on patients requesting surgery in northeastern USA.
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Of interest was the large number of ‗pain‘ cases. Why is this important? Pain, unlike
many other health conditions, is very subjective. It is not easily diagnosed by, for
example, MRIs or blood tests. There may be a connection – while beyond the scope of
this thesis – between a patient‘s subjective experience of pain and their attempt to seek
treatment which often is at odds with the approval of that treatment by their own Ontario
physician.

In terms of Procedures, the analysis revealed a correlation between legal representation
and the resource allocation of OCCNEIHS in the Board‘s decisions. As discussed earlier,
oral hearings and delays between hearing date and decision release were found to be
significant – but only for one year – 2006 and 2008 respectively. While the empirical
results highlighted trends – such as the influence of legal representation – it also
highlighted that there was no data to analyse regarding cost considerations.

In terms of Substantive Arguments of the parties before the Board, the empirical research
highlighted a number of interesting issues including:
-

a number of experimental and unnecessary medical cases that did not fall within
the Board‘s jurisdiction;

-

patients – rather than solely physicians - played a significant role in determining
OCCNEIHS;

-

administrative requirements, such as prior approval, could overrule treatment that
qualified under medical requirements;
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-

counter to public perception, more patients were arguing that a OCCNEIHS was
GA rather than arguing that there was a Delay to access that treatment;

-

patients appear to be defining one of the legislative criteria – delay – differently
than the medical authorities.

The empirical research also identified the lack of reference to economic factors when
determining resource allocation. This lack of reference to economic factors included: the
absence of cost-benefit analysis of treatment and non-treatment. There was also a lack of
reference to medical expert consensus on approved treatment and treatment protocols or
to multi-disciplinary panels of experts to assess ethical/medical/fiscal issues. There was
also no reference to a separate regulation that specifically dealt with OCCNEIHS or an
alternate forum to the Board where patients could bring their concerns about the health
care system in general. Given that these factors – economic factors, expert consensus on
approved treatment, treatment protocols, multi-disciplinary panels of experts, separate
regulations or alternate forums for patient concerns – were not the HIA or in Regulation
552, it is not surprising that they were not included in the Board‘s decisions.
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Chapter 11
WHAT IT SHOULD BE
Research Question #3:
The Revised Resource Allocation Decision Making Mechanism

A revised resource allocation decision making mechanism may mean different things to
different people. For this thesis, a revised decision making mechanism would be based on
empirical data, expert consensus on multiple relevant factors and would involve a clear
process that produced decisions that are acceptable to the parties affected and society in
general.

In order to develop a revised resource allocation decision making mechanism, it was
necessary to assess what system currently existed. The previous chapters examined
procedural and substantive resource allocation theories, analyzed the current resource
allocation decision making mechanism of HSARB relative to the A4R theory, and
reviewed the academic discussion regarding the need for empirical legal research. It also
analyzed the existing qualitative and quantitative empirical studies. While the scholarship
indicated that resource allocation decision making was difficult, it did not provide
guidance or analysis of the interaction between procedures, substantive arguments
guidance and resource allocation decisions. The scholarship did not propose a revised
resource allocation mechanism.

A4R
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The scholarship did present several theories for determining acceptable resource
allocations. This thesis focused on one of these theories - the A4R theory. The
assumption behind the A4R theory is that due to a lack of consensus on substantive
distribution principles, a fair, transparent resource allocation process is necessary in order
to create the acceptance of a resource allocation decision. This author analyzed each of
the A4R theory‘s four conditions relative to the study results and found that the four
conditions were present but did not identify several factors identified by the empirical
data results of this study. If the A4R theory did not capture these complexities of the
Board‘s decision making process, the A4R would not accurately inform Question #3 –
What should a revised resource allocation decision making mechanism entail?

Empirical Research
As a result, this author undertook an empirical analysis of current activities taking place
at HSARB hearings – as documented in Board decisions - in order to accurately identify
what procedural and substantive factors currently influenced Board decisions. Based on
this analysis, factors were identified that should and should not be added to a revised
resource allocation decision making mechanism. The current HSARB system was
analyzed with respect to: what patients were coming before the Board and why and what
the Board‘s procedures were in an attempt to create a neutral, fair proceeding which
focused on the substantive arguments, as well as the substantive arguments put forth by
the parties. The Board‘s procedures and the parties‘ substantive arguments were analyzed
relative to the Board‘s decision to grant or deny resources. The analysis of these factors –
the patient profile, the Board‘s procedures and the actual substantive arguments of the
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parties. This impact of these factors on Board decisions what analyzed. This analysis
informed the following proposed resource allocation decision making mechanism.

Patient Profile
The empirical analysis revealed that patients knew their diagnosis and were requesting
specific facilities for specific treatment. These results indicate that the patients were very
motivated and had undertaken extensive research not only of their own diagnoses but also
of the services available to address their diagnosis.

Importance of Patient Input
Instead of assuming that patients are subverting physicians as the assessor of medical
necessity by inserting the patient‘s own opinion of appropriate medical necessity, patients
need to be included in the determination of OCCNEIHS. Their expectations, experiences
and their attempts to problem solve difficult health care situations are, in effect, an
invaluable evaluation of the system. Ideally, patients are not only able to provide insights
into the existing system but they are also well positioned to contribute ‗bottom up‘
solutions. In this respect, the experiences, formal and informal networks, information
sources, research and ideas of patients needs to be more closely examined and
incorporated into a revised resource allocation decision making mechanism. A revised
resource allocation decision mechanism therefore includes the patient‘s diagnosis,
experience attempting to attain the required health service, the type of treatment sought
and its location, patient expectations and information sources, insights, and proposed
‗bottom up‘ solutions.
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Importance of Specialized Medical Expertise Relative to Diagnosis
Of particular interest arising from the empirical analysis of patient diagnosis was the
large percentage of patients experiencing pain and seeking OCCNEIHS. Pain is a
subjective medical experience which may not lend itself to objective diagnosis by
physicians. The issue of pain may be signaling that not all medical conditions are suitable
for traditional objective physician medical necessity assessment. Future research should
analyse whether patients with difficult to diagnose medical conditions – such as pain –
are significantly more likely to apply for OCCNEIHS. If this is the case, there will need
to be policy discussions regarding subjective/difficult to diagnose medical conditions, the
current domestic system and OCCNEIHS. In terms of a revised resource allocation
decision mechanism, specialized expertise should be included in the area of highly
prevalent subjective medical conditions such as pain.

Procedures
Importance of Time Series Empirical Research
The empirical research undertaken for this study identified that specific procedural
factors had a significant effect on the Board‘s resource allocation decisions. For example,
across all years, the presence of legal representation was correlated with positive resource
allocation decisions. The empirical research also identified certain year-specific
variations in the data, such as the significant effect of oral hearings on resource allocation
decisions – but for only one year. These two trends – legal influence over all years and
oral format influence for one year – point to the need to undertake time series empirical

224

research in order to correctly assess what is currently taking place and what ideally
should take place. For example, if the research only examined the year and found that
oral formats influenced decisions, the research might conclude that oral formats always
influenced decisions. This would be incorrect and misleading. Only an empirical time
series would identify ongoing versus time limited trends. Thus, a revised resource
allocation decision mechanism must include a time series of data in order to correctly
identify trends.

Elimination of Non Neutral Procedural Factors
The fact that the empirical results indicated that procedures were not neutral changes any
assumptions and theories. For example, the A4R theory, as it currently stands, states that
if agreement cannot be reached on substantive distribution principles, people are more
likely to accept a substantive distribution decision if the process is considered fair. In
other words, according to the theory, it is the substantive argument that influences the
resource allocation decision, not the process. However, if the Board‘s procedures are not
considered neutral with respect to legal representation such that it is disadvantaging nonrepresented parties, would the decision still be accepted? If the procedures of the Board
are not neutral but could affect the resource allocation decision, it is questionable if such
procedures should be required at all. Possibly not. The challenge would be to create a
revised resource allocation decision making mechanism that decreased or eliminated the
influence of procedural factors while still attempting to ensure the procedures were fair
and neutral. The resource allocation mechanism would ideally depend on factors
available to all current and potential parties. Thus, a revised resource allocation
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mechanism would eliminate the influence of procedures on decision outcomes and ensure
that all information was available to the parties.

It is important to note that the research not only identified trends in the present data but
also identified that certain factors were not present. These missing factors included: the
lack of a separate regulation that specifically dealt with OCCNEIHS and the lack of
discussion of economic factors such as the cost and the cost-benefit of OCCNEIHS.

Separate OCCNEIHS Regulation
A revised resource allocation decision making mechanism should have a separate and
specific regulation regarding OCCNEIHS within the HIA. Within the regulation, key
definitions, the criteria to apply to OHIP for an OCCNEIHS, the criteria to appeal an
OHIP decision to HSARB, the jurisdiction of HSARB and the factors which HSARB
uses to assess an OHIP decision should be clearly outlined. Such an OCCNEIHS
regulation should clarify the role of HSARB and patients‘ expectations.

Further Stratification of ―Delay‖
One of the issues, discussed in this thesis, is the concept of ‗delay‘ and the difference in
the understanding of this term. This difference of understanding can lead to conflicting
expectations. For example, patients are defining the ‗delay‘ accessing treatment
significantly differently than OHIP or medical experts. Patients begin to experience
‗delay‘ from the time they have an appointment with their family doctor. OHIP may
define ―delay‘ as the time between a specialist‘s recommendation for treatment and the
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actual delivery of treatment. The gap – the time between seeing a family doctor and the
actual treatment versus confirmation by a specialist that treatment will proceed and the
actual treatment – may result in appeals before the Board. Thus, the clarification of terms
and expectations via a separate OCCNEIHS regulation should address this discrepancy
and potentially decrease the number of appeals before the Board.

Economic Factors
If a revised resource allocation decision making mechanism must consider whether or not
public funds should be allocated to an OCCNEIHS, it should consider economic factors
related to this OCCNEIHS. For example, there is no discussion in the data or the
regulation regarding the cost of a particular treatment, the cost of the OCCNEIHS relative
to the domestic equivalent treatment or an economic benefit of such a treatment. Thus, a
revised resource allocation decision making mechanism that determines the allocation of
public funds should consider the cost and benefit economic factors related to the
OCCNEIHS and how these factors are evaluated, not just the medical necessity of the
OCCNEIHS.

Substantive
The empirical research highlighted a number of interesting substantive issues including:
the number of experimental and unnecessary medical cases that did not fall within the
Board‘s jurisdiction but were not screened out before the hearing process; the increasing
role of patients and administrative requirements in determining OCCNEIHS; the
definition of ‗delay‘ – as discussed earlier -was significantly different between patients
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and OHIP; and more patients were requesting OCCNEIHS because they felt the treatment
was generally acceptable for their situation rather than because there was a delay
accessing the treatment domestically. A revised resource allocation decision making
mechanism would screen out appeals that did not fall within the jurisdiction of the Board.
For example, cases where both the patient and OHIP agreed that the OCCNEIHS was not
appropriate for the given patient would not proceed to appeal. The administrative
requirements – such as the requirement to receive prior approval from OHIP before
receiving an OCCNEIHS – would, as discussed earlier, be clearly established. Including
the increased role of the patient, as discussed earlier, is an essential evaluation tool of the
current system. A revised system would also clearly establish how and who determined
the medical necessity of OCCNEIHS. Currently, there appears to be some confusion
whether the patient, the general practitioner, the specialist, an out of country physician or
some combination of these individuals, determines if an OCCNEIHS is required. A
revised resource allocation decision making mechanism would continue to include the
actual patient diagnosis by an Ontario physician, but would require that the actual
diagnosis be mapped to the official treatment consensus statements of medical experts in
order to determine the required medical treatment.

It is important to highlight three essential factors that should be taken into account in a
revised resource allocation decision making mechanism: political uncertainties, variations
in medical consensus over time and unforeseen circumstances. For example, a newly
elected provincial political party may have a different perspective on the extent of
OCCNEIHS provided. Medical technology may evolve for a particular medical condition
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such that a disease like cancer would no longer require surgery but be treated by generic
drugs. This development in the medical technology would influence the medical
consensus on treatment. Unforeseen circumstances, such as social unrest or natural
disasters, may divert expertise and funding away from a revised OCCNEIHS mechanism.
Each of these factors would need to be continually updated.

Computer Assisted Algorithm as a Decision Making Mechanism
It is unrealistic to assume that the current lay Board has the expertise in multiple relevant
considerations – such as medical, administrative, economic and political factors. Each of
these factors requires a significant level of expertise and the field of expertise has its own
internal challenge in achieving consensus. A revised resource allocation decision making
mechanism would use the expert consensus on each factor rather than trying to establish
consensus about the factor. Given that expert consensus evolves over time, the resource
allocation decision making mechanism would be a ‗living tree‘ based on criteria and
consensus information available at the time of decision making.

Given the potential extensive developments within each factor, the multitude of factors
and potential variations, uncertainties and interactive complexities, it is recommended by
this author that a revised resource allocation decision making algorithm be developed and
utilized to allocate resources. The algorithm should include the following variables with
respect to the OCCNEIHS: screen out any factors which do not fall within the jurisdiction
of the Board, physicians diagnosis of the patient in question, expert consensus on medical
treatment for a given diagnosis, the OCCNEIHS administrative requirement in order to
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qualify for OCCNEIHS review, the cost-benefit analysis of OCCNEIHS treatment, fiscal
budget for the given time period, patient feedback including their experience, insight and
ideas regarding potential solutions as well as political issues and/or uncertainties. All of
these factors would vary over time as unforeseen circumstances arose and factors
developed. The complexity of this algorithm would require computer assistance for
continually updating each factor. In this respect, one decision making body is not
required to have expertise in all areas that may influence the resource allocation decision.
Rather, the combined expertise of multiple factors would influence the resource
allocation decision.

This expert consensus and the algorithm itself would be made available to health care
professionals and the public. In this respect, interested parties could assess the probability
of being granted resource allocation. Individual patients and their doctors could request
that OHIP apply and provide reasons why the algorithm resulted in the approval or denial
of an OCCNEIHS. Algorithm denials could be appealed to HSARB.

Jurisdiction of HSARB
One of the key issues of this study was the jurisdiction of HSARB. The study identified –
as part of Question #1 – that the Board‘s procedures were inadvertently not neutral and
may, in and of themselves, have affected the Board‘s decision. This was true of legal
versus non legal representation. The study also identified that, for a certain year, an oral
hearing format significantly influenced the Board‘s decision. To avoid these inadvertent
influences, this author recommends that the jurisdiction of HSARB change. HSARB
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would no longer be required to hear de novo evidence from lawyers or non-lawyers in an
oral format. Rather, HSARB would review whether OHIP had utilized the algorithm,
discussed above, in making their decision to grant or deny an OCCNEIHS. The lay
HSARB Board would be well positioned to review OHIP‘s compliance with the
algorithm, while not being required to have expertise in any of the algorithm factors.
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CHAPTER 12
Conclusion

Our current understanding of tribunal resource allocation decision making has been
through the analysis of judicial review of tribunal decisions and/or the capacity,
independence and appointment process of tribunal members. This analysis of tribunals
provides incomplete information. This thesis sought to provide a more comprehensive
understanding of tribunal resource allocation decisions by empirically analyzing whether
a tribunal‘s procedures and the substantive arguments of the parties affected the tribunal‘s
decision. In terms of procedures, the public perception is that the tribunal‘s procedures
are neutral and did not affect the tribunal‘s decision. A leading theory, Accountability for
Reasonableness (A4R), is based on the assumption that resource allocation decisions are
acceptable even when society does not agree on the substantive distribution principles if
the process for arriving at the decision is fair and transparent. If the procedures are not
fair, transparent or neutral, the author questions whether resource allocation decisions
would still be accepted. If there is a statistical effect of the tribunal‘s procedures on the
tribunal‘s decision, it was of interest to know what factor(s) caused this effect and how a
revised decision making mechanism can deal with the factor(s).
An extensive review of the literature did not identify a theory that applied to three key
elements of the Board‘s decisions- a profile of the patient before the tribunal, the
procedures of the Board and the substantive arguments of the parties. Given the lack of
applicable theory and the academic need for legal empirical research, a research
methodology had to be developed, tested and implemented in a case study of
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approximately 400 HSARB decisions over a five year period. The empirical research
methodology developed for this thesis is a preliminary but significant contribution to the
understanding of tribunal resource allocation decision making. The analysis of the
research results identified the following key trends with respect to patient profiles and the
effect of the Board‘s procedures and the substantive arguments of the parties on Board
decisions.
Patient Profile
In terms of a Patient Profile, the analysis revealed patients know what diagnosis they
have and are requesting specific facilities for specific treatment. Overall, Ontario‘s
OCCNEIHS issue is largely based on patients requesting surgery in northeastern USA.
The specificity of the patients‘ requests also implies that the patients had contact with an
out of country medical system and/or had likely conducted some of their own research
into their conditions and treatment options and facilities. Unlike the statutory requirement
for physicians to determine medical resource allocations, patients appear to be playing a
major role in determining and advocating for their own OCCNEIHS. Of interest was the
large number of ‗pain‘ cases and a possible connection between a patient‘s subjective
experience of pain and their attempt to seek treatment which often at odds with the
approval of that treatment by their own Ontario physician.

Research Question #1:
Do procedures statistically affect the resource allocation decisions of the Board? If so,
what elements of the procedures create this statistical affect?
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It is important to note that the majority of procedures did not affect resource allocation
decisions. It is also important to note the analysis of data over time is critical to
identifying trends across all study years versus trends which may have only taken place in
a specific year, For example, using quantitative methods, the author‘s statistical analysis
found that the Board‘s procedures significantly affect resource allocation decisions with
respect to self-representation and, for specific years, oral hearings. These identified trends
were not evident from the A4R theory. If the quantitative analysis correctly identified
elements of the Board‘s procedure which significantly influenced the Board‘s decision,
these elements of the Board‘s procedures were not neutral. If this element of the
procedure was known not to be neutral, it is questionable if the decision outcome would
be acceptable to those affected.

The author analyzed the procedural quantitative research results relative to the A4R
theory‘s four procedural conditions of transparency – appeals, publicity, enforcement and
relevancy of evidence. The author concluded that the four conditions were present, but
that the A4R theory does not represent the complexity of the tribunal resource allocation
decision making in terms of the influence of a tribunal‘s procedures.

Research Question #2:
What substantive arguments affect the resource allocation decisions of the Board?

While all substantial arguments affect resource allocation decisions, the empirical
research highlighted a number of interesting issues including: the number of experimental

234

and unnecessary medical cases that did not fall within the Board‘s jurisdiction; patients
and administrative requirements – rather than solely physicians - played a significant role
in determining OCCNEIHS; counter to public opinion, more patients were arguing that a
OCCNEIHS was generally accepted as appropriate for the patient rather than arguing that
there was a delay to access that treatment; patients appear to be defining one of the
legislative criteria – delay – differently than the medical authorities. As with the
importance of identifying the above trends, the empirical research also identified the lack
of trends including: the absence of discussion of economic factors, of cost-benefit
analysis of treatment and non-treatment, medical expert consensus on approved treatment
and treatment protocols or multi-disciplinary panels of experts to assess
ethical/medical/fiscal issues. There was also no reference to a separate regulation that
specifically dealt with OCCNEIHS or an alternate forum to the Board where patients
could bring their concerns about the health care system in general.

Research Question #3
What It Should Be
What Should Be a Revised Resource Allocation Decision Making Mechanism?

Based on the research results of this study, the thesis asked: What Should the Revised
Resource Allocation Decision Making Model Be? The revised resource allocation
decision making mechanism would eliminate the procedural elements which influence
the resource allocation decision – such as oral forums and legal representation. The
jurisdiction of the Board should be revised such that the Board would review the resource
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allocation decisions of OHIP for compliance with agreed upon guidelines. The guidelines
would be multi factorial and based on expert consensus and include medical,
administrative, economic and political factors as well as patient input and unforeseen
developments. These multi factorial guidelines would be available publicly. Given the
extensive potentially varying factors, the multi factorial guidelines would take the form
of an algorithm. OHIP would apply the algorithmic equation to requests for OCCNEIHS.
Parties could appeal OHIP‘s decision to HSARB if it fell within the jurisdiction of the
Board. HSARB would conduct a review – as opposed to a hearing – to ensure that OHIP
had utilized the factors which comprise the algorithm and the decision of OHIP was
reasonable given the algorithm results. In this respect, the Board would depend on the
expert consensus on the evidence rather than attempting the near impossible task of
determining OCCNEIHS based on the evidence presented at the hearing. In this respect,
the role of the Board would be significantly narrowed.
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CHAPTER 13
Final Thought

The focus of this research is on tribunal resource allocation decision making based on a
five year case study of HSARB OCCNEIHS decisions. This thesis reveals several
challenges with respect to the effect of the Board‘s procedures and the substantive
arguments on the decision to allocate health care resources. These challenges are not
solely those of the Board. The challenges reflect many systemic problems in domestic
health care. The issue of OCCNEIHS can be seen as embedded within the systemic
problems.

However, the issue of OCCNEIHS also presents an opportunity to research, innovate and
evaluate the assessment and delivery of health care services.364 Researchers and policy
analysts could use OCCNEIHS to pilot test a number of innovative algorithms and
service delivery models for the following reason: OCCNEIHS is outside the jurisdiction
of the CHA and the requirements for provincial governments to receive federal health
care financial support. OCCNEIHS is also outside the established contractual
negotiations and fee-schedule of the Ontario government and Ontario Medical
Association. As such, OCCNEIHS is a discretionary provincial program free of the
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For example, a ―heat map‖ could be created and updated continually regarding OCCNEIHS patients
age, sex, geographical residence, diagnosis, requested treatment and requested facility out of country. This
information could be ‗mapped‘ onto utilization of the domestic health care system and health outcomes.
Such information could be analyzed relative to the municipal, provincial and federal political and economic
environment, historical medical practices, cultural norms and population emigration and immigration.
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federal and provincial governments and medical association constraints. As a unique
subcomponent of publicly funded health care system, OCCNEIHS should be used to
guide research and policy developments at the provincial, national and international level.
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CHAPTER 14
EPILOGUE
Recent Changes to Regulation 552 s.28.4(2)

During the course of the research for this thesis, several major changes were made to
Regulation 552 with respect to the OCCNEIHS test criteria under section 28.4(2). These
changes to Regulation 552 took place in April 2009 and in April 2011 – subsequent to the
Ontario courts issuing decisions in the Flora case of 2008 and the CCW case of 2009.365
The changes clarified that in order to receive OCCNEIHS, a specialist practicing
medicine in Ontario must approve the requested medical service as being medically
necessary. The changes also clarified that OCCNEIHS requests must be approved by
OHIP as insured services before the services are rendered.

Changes in 2009:
The author‘s analysis of the 2009 changes to Regulation 552 found physicians practicing
in Ontario (s.28.4(2)(a)) must deem the OCCNEIHS medically necessary (s.28.4(2)(b))
for the specific patient. The services can also be provided by a health facility not just a
hospital.

Section 28.4(2) - as of 2009 - stated:

365

Flora, Supra Note 5.
C.C.W., Supra Note 100.
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(2) Services that are rendered outside Canada at a hospital or health facility are
prescribed as insured services if,
(a) the service366 is generally accepted by the medical profession367 in Ontario as
appropriate for a person in the same medical circumstances as the insured
person;
(b) the service is medically necessary;368
(c) either,
(i) the identical or equivalent service is not performed in Ontario, or
(ii) the identical or equivalent service is performed in Ontario but it is
necessary that the insured person travel out of Canada to avoid a delay
that would result in death or medically significant irreversible tissue
damage;
(d) in the case of a hospital service or a service rendered in a health facility
described in clause (a) of the definition of ―health facility‖ in subsection (1),
the service, if performed in Ontario, is one to which the insured person would
be entitled without charge pursuant to section 7 in the case of an in-patient
service or section 8 in the case of an out-patient service; and

366

Previously ―treatment‖ is now listed as ―service‖
Previous ―generally accepted in Ontario‖ is now listed as ―generally accepted by the medical profession
in Ontario‖
368
This test – ‗the service is medically necessary‘ – is a new criteria for s.28.4(2)
367
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(e) in the case of an in-patient service, in Ontario, the insured person would
ordinarily have been admitted as an in-patient of a public hospital to receive the
service. O. Reg. 135/09, s. 4.

In essence, the OCCNEIHS criteria changed in April 2009. This new criteria – requiring
an Ontario medical professional - may have arisen following section 28.4(2)
interpretation by the Ontario Court of Appeal in the July 2008 cases of Flora369 – which
endorsed an Ontario standard for determining the general acceptability of an
OCCNEIHS.370

Changes in 2011:
In April of 2011, Regulation 552 changed again to clarify that specialists practicing in
Ontario - as defined by the Ministry-Ontario Medical Association jointly negotiated
Schedule of Benefits (or a general practitioner if the services requested are within their
scope of practice) - must approve the OCCNEIHS for the specific patient. Section
28.4(7)2 states:

28.4(7) 2. The application mentioned in paragraph 1 includes written confirmation
that the conditions set out in clauses (2) (a) and (b) and one of the conditions
set out in clause (2) (c) are satisfied, from,

369
370

Flora, Supra Note 5.
Under s.28.4(2)(a)
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i. a physician who is a specialist, as defined in the schedule of benefits, in
the type of service for which approval of payment is sought,
ii. a general practitioner, if the type of service for which approval of
payment is sought is within the general practitioner‘s scope of practice,
or
iii. in emergency circumstances, a physician who practices medicine in
Ontario or an emergency patient referral service.
As such, the regulation now endows the specialist with the responsibility of gatekeeping a
patient‘s access to OCCNEIHS.

Section 28.4(4)1 – as of 2011 – also states:

28.4(4) Despite anything in this section as it read before April 1, 2009, a
service is not, and is deemed never to have been, an insured service under this
section unless the following conditions are satisfied:
1. For services rendered in circumstances that are not emergency
circumstances,
i. written approval of payment of the amount for the services is
granted by the General Manager before the services are rendered,
and
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ii. the services are rendered within the time limit set out in the written
approval.

As such, there is no discretionary power to approve an OCCNEIHS retroactively. This
author speculates that the regulatory changes were based on the court‘s direction in
C.C.W. v. Ontario Health Insurance Plan, 2009 CanLII 712 (ON S.C.D.C.) that prior
approval was required for an OCCNEIHS.

Absence of Attention to Changes:
In final reflection on the changes to Regulation 552, this author notes an absence of
attention and debate by academics, the Legislature, the media and the public at large.
Given the extensive debates about health care, this author would have expected more
public discussion. However, Regulation 552, as with all regulations but unlike statutes,
can be amended by the government without approval by the Legislature and therefore
without public debate. This lack of attention to changes in Regulation 552 is in
opposition to the media attention given to high profile cases seeking OCCNEIHS and the
extensive public discussion regarding public health insurance and the delays accessing
insured care in Ontario.371

371

While not directly related to this thesis, the biggest change to s.28.4(2) is the addition of (d) which deals
with the provision of insured services by a ‗health facility‘. The section refers to s.28.4(1)(a) which states:
―health facility‖ means,
(a) a health facility licensed as a health facility by the government in whose jurisdiction the health
facility is situated in which complex medical and complex surgical procedures are routinely
performed,
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(b) whether or not described in clause (a), a facility licensed by the government in whose
jurisdiction the facility is situated with whose operator the Minister has entered into a
preferred provider arrangement;
It is questionable if the ‗health facility‘ referred to in s.28.4(1)(a) are bound by the CHA and the Ontario
contractual fee schedule agreement for insured services.
So, what are the ‗insured services‘? The new s.28.4(2)(d) also refers to s.7 of Regulation 552 which is the
insured inpatient services in Canada – previously directed at ‗hospital insured services‘. Section 7 states:
7. Subject to section 10, the in-patient services to which an insured person is entitled without
charge are all of the following services:
1. Accommodation and meals at the standard or public ward level.
2. Necessary nursing service, except for the services of a private duty nurse who is not engaged
and paid by the hospital.
3. Laboratory, radiological and other diagnostic procedures, together with the necessary
interpretations for the purpose of maintaining health, preventing disease and assisting in the
diagnosis and treatment of any injury, illness or disability.
4. Drugs, biologicals and related preparations that are prescribed by an attending physician, oral
and maxillofacial surgeon or midwife in accordance with accepted practice and administered
in a hospital, but not including any proprietary medicine as defined from time to time by the
regulations made under the Food and Drugs Act (Canada).
5. Use of operating room, obstetrical delivery room and anaesthetic facilities, including necessary
equipment and supplies. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 552, s. 7; O. Reg. 794/93, s. 2; O. Reg. 345/01,
s. 2.
Basically, section 7 covers diagnostics, prescriptions and operating facilities in addition to nursing services
and ward accommodations. Why is section 28.4(2)(d) so important?
Because of its reference to section 28.4(1)(a) and section 7, section 28.4(2)(d) allows health facilities in
Ontario to provide insured services – diagnostics, prescriptions, operating facilities, nursing services and
ward accommodations - but leaves open the question of ‗top up‘ incurred by the provincial government. If
the provincial government ‗tops up‘ insured health care services for private health facilities, the patient
does not encounter a ‗two tiered‘ extra billing/user fee health care system based on ability to pay and contra
indicated by the CHA. The cost of private health care is directly incurred by the province and not by the
patient. The provincial government is not bound by the Schedule of Benefits for insured services or the
CHA conditions for transfer payment funding if the provincial government pays the ‗tops up‘ out of
discretion. This author speculates while health care is funded through tax dollar allocations or new
additional taxes, the patient is not directly experiencing extra billing counter to the CHA but is indirectly
subsidizing extra billing. This author further speculates that the provincial government may wish to keep
Ontario tax dollars used to fund health care public insurance within Ontario and not lose those tax dollars to
health care services out of country.
In summary, this obscure, difficult to understand amended regulation s.28.4(2) may have introduced a
novel way to address the public-private health care insurance debate, the demand for health care and the
interest in out of country health care options.
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APPENDIX A – HSARB Search Engine Results
Original Search Results
Health Services Appeal and Review Board
March 2010
1. HIA Out of Country Coverage Search Terms
HIA Out of Country Coverage,

No Dates

No Matches

No Dates

No Matches

No Dates

4 Cases

HIA Prior Approval s.28.4(2)

No Dates

No Matches

HIA Prior Approval s.28.4

No Dates

No Matches

HIA Prior Approval

No Dates

704 Cases

HIA Windsor

No Dates

62 Cases

HIA Winsor s.28.4(2)

No Dates

No matches

No Dates

89 Cases

Section 28.4(2)
HIA Out of Country Coverage
Section 28.4(2)
HIA Out of Country Coverage
2. Prior Approval Search Terms

3. Geographic Location Search Terms

4. Out of Country Facility Search Terms
HIA Mayo Clinic

5. Regulation “Test” of s.28.4(2) Search Terms
HIA Medically Significant Tissue Damage

No Dates

509 Cases

HIA Generally Accepted in Ontario

No Dates

555 Cases

HIA Identical / Equivalent

No Dates

595 Cases
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ACTUAL CASES
Five (5) Year Breakdown: April 1, 2003 to March 31, 2008
Year 1

April 1/03-March 31/04

Year 2

April 1/04-March 31/05

83 Cases

Year 3

April 1/05-March31/06

84 Cases

Year 4

April 1/06-March 31/07

104 Cases

Year 5

April 1/07-March 31/08

101 Cases

SUBTOTAL CASES

April 1/03-March 31/08

372 Cases

Duplicate/Not Relevant

- 58 Cases

TOTAL CASES
314 Cases

NOTE: The Database Search string of ―HIA 28.4(2)‖ produced 353 cases while the
previous search strings of ―HIA Out of Country Coverage‖ and ―HIA Out of Country
Coverage s.28.4(2)‖ the same database produced 4 cases and no cases respectively. Thus,
the search engine for the database was variable based on the search string.
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APPENDIX B – Code Book February 28, 2011

EXCEL Code Book
Tribunal (HSARB) Case Decisions (n = approx. 315)372
2003-2008

NOTE: ―3‖ = not accepted cases373

Case Identification374
A)

Case #

Hard copy decision (off by 1)

B)

File Number

Year

C)

File Number

Legislation375

D)

File Number

Office Code Number

E)

HSARB Hearing Date

Day (―9‖ = unknown)376

F)

HSARB Hearing Date

Month

G)

HSARB Hearing Date

Year

372

Note: Word Count for Cases will be done for Phase II selected cases but not for this Phase I study
There are 6 cases in this database that appeared in the online search of s28.4(2) cases but were
subsequently not accepted typically b/c the Applicant misused s28.4(2) ie for out of province but within
Canada claims – as such, all columns will have ―3‖ if the case is not accepted for analysis. The 6 not
accepted cases are line 11/case 25=5-149; line 23/case 38=4-134; line 50/case 69=3-267; line 65/case87=257; line273/case330=6-298; line 295/case 352=6-431 – ‗not accepted cases‘ moved to Excel Sheet 2 and
deleted from Sheet 3 to avoid complication with stats concerning ‗3‘s
374
File Number – focus on primary issue not Joiner files
Date Heard – only initial Hearing Date recorded even if Hearing covered more than one date
375
Legislation category will always be HIA
376
This happens for one case = CCW Part II
373

249

AS)

HSARB Decision Date

Day

AT)

HSARB Decision Date

Month

AU)

HSARB Decision Date

Year

AV)

Explanation

Details

**)

HSARB Repeat Case

―1‖ = yes ―0‖= no/otherwise377

H)

Applicant Represented by Lawyer

―1‖=yes ―0‖=no378

I)

Respondent Represented by Lawyer ―1‖=yes ―0‖=no

J)

Interpreter

Parties

―1‖=yes ―0‖=no379

Type of Hearing
K)

Oral Hearing

―1‖=yes ―0‖=no

L)

Teleconference Hearing

―1‖=yes ―0‖=no

M)

Written Hearing

―1‖=yes ―0‖=no

377

At this stage of analysis, Repeat Cases will refer to both the same patient with the same health condition
as well as the same patient with an additional health condition – this category was not used in coding as it
was unclear which cases were repeat OHIP cases
378
Representation by ‗Agent‘ or Friend/Family Member will be coded as ―0‖=no representation
379
If number of Interpreters is significant, Phase II will investigate the language of Interpreters
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Request
N)

Prior Approval

―1‖=yes ―0‖=no380

O)

Reimbursement

―1‖=yes ―0‖=no381

P)

Review

―1‖=yes ―0‖=no382

Q)

Accept Case

―1‖=yes ―0‖=no ―3‖=not accepted 383

R)

Patient‘s Diagnosis

Text if known384 ―9‖=unknown/na

S)

Patient Age

actual age, ―99‖=unknown,

Patient

―65‖= retired/senior, ―17‖=minor
T)

Patient Sex

1=male ‗5‘=female ―9‖=unknown/na

U)

Patient Residence

Text= known,385 Not

Stated=unknown

Treatment
V)

Requested Treatment

Text if known, ‗9‘=unknown/na

W)

Requested Treatment Location

Text if know, ―9‘=unknown/na

Patient Reason for Out of Country Treatment Request
380

‗Prior Approval‘ cases include cases where an Application Form was submitted requesting or prior to
departure for out of country treatment
381
‗Reimbursement‘ cases include a request for coverage after the out of country treatment was received.
382
Applicants or Respondents may request a ‗review‘ of the HSARB decision by another panel of HSARB
members. This request may/not be granted by HSARB. A Party is not required to have a case reviewed in
order to proceed to the next step of entering the Court system
383
Accepted Cases are further reviewed for this s.28.4(2) study
384
‗C-P‘= cut and paste
385
Actual residence location state by Decision or extrapolated from Office location of Family Physician
and/or Place of Employment
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X)

Experimental

―1‖=yes ―0‖=no ―9‖= not applicable

Y)

Generally Accepted for patient

―1‖=yes ―0‖=no ―9‖= not applicable

Z)

No Identical or Equivalent in Ontario―1‖=yes ―0‖=no ―9‖= not applicable

AA)

Delay resulting in Death

―1‖=yes ―0‖=no ―9‖= not applicable

AB)

Delay resulting in MSITD

―1‖=yes ―0‖=no ―9‖= not applicable

AC)

Delay to see GP

―1‖=yes ―0‖=no ―9‖= not applicable

AD)

Delay to see Ontario Specialist

―1‖=yes ―0‖=no ―9‖= not applicable

AE)

Delay to get Ontario TMT/Surgery

―1‖=yes ―0‖=no ―9‖= not applicable

AF)

Other

―1‖=yes ―0‖=no ―9‖= not applicable
or Text

OHIP Decision
AG)

Experimental

AH)

Generally Accepted for patient

AI)

No Identical or Equivalent in Ontario

AJ)

Delay resulting in Death

AK)

Delay resulting in MSITD

―1‖=yes ―0‖=no ―9‖= not applicable

Health Services Appeal and Review Board Decision
AL)

Experimental

AM)

Generally Accepted for patient

AN)

No Identical or Equivalent in Ontario

―1‖=yes ―0‖=no ―9‖= not applicable
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AO)

Delay resulting in Death

AP)

No Delay resulting in MSITD

AQ)

HSARB – Deny

AR)

HSARB – Grant

―1‖=yes ―0‖=no ―9‖=not applicable

―Categorized Data‖

1. Age Categories - BA, BB columns

a) Column BA = raw age actually cited in case (same as column ―S‖)

b) Column BB = coded / grouped raw ages based on Canada Census 2006, Stats Canada
categories:
0-17

= 1386

18-24 = 2
25-44 = 3
45-64 = 4
65-79 = 5
80+

=6

Unknown = 99387

386

Census and Stats Canada use 0-14 and 15-24 categories – I have adjusted this age category to 0-17 and
18-24 b/c many cases state age as ‗a minor‘ which is defined in legislation to be under age 18 [. If I kept the
category of 0-14 and 15-24, I would not know if ‗17‘ referred to a minor or the age of 17 – thus possibly
falling w/in two categories
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2. Patient‘s Residence - BC, BD columns
Based on LHINS boundaries388 389

a) Column BC = raw Patient Residence cited in cases (same as column ―U‖)

b) Column BD = coded / grouped raw Patient Residence based on LHINS Boundaries of
North, South, East, West:

North = 1
-

North Simcoe, Muscoka LHINS

-

North East LHINS

-

North West LHINS

East

=2

-

Champlain LHINS

-

South East LHINS

-

Central East LHINS

387

Case not accepted – defined originally as ―3‖ were transferred out to Excel Sheet 2 and deleted from
Sheet 3 to avoid numeric confusion
388
http://www.centrallhin.on.ca/map.aspx
389
LHINS Legislation Local Health System Integration Act, 2006
http://www.centrallhin.on.ca/ontariolhinslegislation.aspx
LHINS population, health utilization
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South = 3
-

Central LHINS

-

Toronto Central LHINS

-

Mississauga-Halton LHINS

West = 4
-

Central West

-

Hamilton/Niagara/Haldimand Brant

-

South West

-

Erie St Clair

Not Stated

= 99

3. Patient‘s Requested Treatment Location - BE-BJ columns
Based on global geography

a) Column BE – raw Requested Treatment Location cited in case (same as column ―W‖)

b) Column BF – coded / grouped raw Global geographic Location

c) Column BG – coded / grouped raw Global geographic Location converted into
numeric code
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1 = USA
2 = Europe390 (including UK391)
3 = India
4 = China
6 = Israel
7 = Other392
9 = unknown / not provided by the case

d) Column BH – coded USA geographic location: North, East, South, West

North = Ohio, Wisconsin, Michigan, Minnesota, Philadelphia, Montana, Idaho,
Illinois

East = New York, Maryland, Massachusetts, Connecticut

South = Florida, New Mexico, Utah, Arizona, Alabama, Louisiana, Texas,
Kansas, Kentucky, North Carolina, Virginia

West = California, Oregon

9 = Not in USA
390

About half of the category 2/‘Europe‘ cases appear to be Belgium and Germany
The UK originally had its own category but the sample size was very low – so the UK – which had been
coded as ―5‖ was recategorized as ―2‖ and lumped in with ‗Europe‘ – thus, no ‗5‘ exists in this category
392
―Other‖ includes: Taiwan, Hong Kong, Argentina, South Africa, Chile, Pakistan, Mexico, Iran, and
South Korea
391
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e) Column BI = actual USA State Name cited in case
Or
9 = Not in USA

f) Column BJ = actual Global Health Facility +/ City393 cited in case
Or
9 = Not Given

4. Patient‘s Diagnosis/Condition

a) Column BK = raw Patient‘s diagnosis/condition as listed in the case (same as column
―R‖)

b) Column BL = coded Patient‘s Condition
1 = Cancer (breast, colon, prostate…)
2 = Heart Disease/Circulation
3 = Back Pain
4 = General Pain

393

Excel Dbase Line 147 05-HIA-0180 = says both ‗Feng Clinic + Mayo Clinic‘ – coded as ‗Mayo Clinic‘
Minnesota
Excel Dbase Line 293 06-HIA-0444 = does not indicate campus location of Mayo Clinic – coded as ‗May
Clinic, Minnesota‘
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5 = Obesity
6 = Addictions/Mental Health/Anorexia
7 = Joints (hips, knee, shoulder, joint – surgery, replacement, pain, arthritis)394
8 = Head (eye, ear, headache, cataract, memory loss)395
9 = Unknown
10 = Other (transplant, gastro, renal)396

5. Patient‘s Requested Treatment

a) Column BM = raw Patient‘s requested Treatment as listed in the case (same as column
―V‖)

b) Column BN = Coded Patient‘s Requested Treatment

394

Joint category (7) and General Pain category (4) very similar – I may try to analyze both separately and
together(collapsing 7+4) – eg A patient may have hip or shoulder pain which could be categorized as either
Joint (7) or General Pain (4) – where the patient indicated more than two cites for pain (e.g. hip and groin
pain) I categorized under General Pain (4). Where a specific joint pain was stated (e.g. hip pain) I
categorized under Joint (7). It may be unlikely that a Joint related health problem was not accompanied by
some general pain – thus making it difficult to separate the two categories
395
―8 = head‖ also includes migraines, brain tumor, brain surgery, dyslexia, cranial nerves, ‗no sense of
smell‘, acoustic neuroma
396

―10=Other‖ also includes: pneumonia, CP, MS, Fabre Disease, Leukemia, Falls,
Hernia, vertigo, gynecological, asthma, reconstruction after mastectomy, birthmark
infection, lymph nodes, bowel polyps, stent, multiple (health issues), neuropathy in feet,
gallbladder, gastrointestinal issues, liver, kidney, urine blockage, urine fibroids,
endometriosis, Menier‘s Disease, carpal tunnel syndrome, lesions, abdominal complaints,
hereditary condition, genetic disease, menstrual disorder, lymphoma, MRI of the breast,
nerve function, laryngeal issue, myelodysplasia, scleroderma morphea, pevic organ
prolapse, Wegener's Granulomatosis

258

1= Surgery397
2 = Treatment398
3 = Transplant
4 = Diagnostics (e.g. MRI, XRay, CT, PET)
5 = Assessment (medical opinion)399
6 = Counseling
7 = Drug Treatment only400
8 = Follow up401
9 = Unknown

397

‗1=Surgery‘ includes ‗cyber knife therapy‘ which is actually a surgery and not a ‗therapy‘‘ ‗Gucci
Procedure‘, myomectomy,
398
‗2=Treatment‘ includes chemotheraphy, radiation, angioplasty, angiogram, scleroderma, drug Herceptin,
399
‗5=Assessment‘ includes ‗diagnostics and assessment‘, vertigo, second opinion, surgical consult but not
the surgery
400
‗7=Drug Treatment only‘ was not used for coding purposes
401
‗8=Follow up‘ was not used for coding purposes – follow up or ‗redoing the surgery‘ was factored under
2=treatment or 1=surgery respectively. I believe there were only a few such cases actually stating a return
to an OC health professional but I suspect there was a greater number of patients returning to the original
OC health professional
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APPENDIX C – Three Research Questions and Cross Tabulations

THREE MAIN QUESTIONS and CROSS TABS:

1. Profile of Patients/Applicants coming to the Tribunal (HSARB)

2. Position of the Patient/Applicant, OHIP and ultimately the Tribunal and how these
may differ

3. Administrative questions regarding the Tribunal Hearing

DETAILS:

1. PROFILE of PATIENT
a) Profile of Patients/Applicants coming to the Tribunal (HSARB)
- Age (BB)
- Sex (T)
- Residence (BD)
- Diagnosis (BK)
- Requested Treatment (BN)
- Requested Location of Requested Treatment (BF, BG, BH, BI, BJ)
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Profile of Patient Cross Tabs
Where People are, what they have and where they want to go
Residence (BD) x Diagnosis (BL)
Residence (BD) x Diagnosis (BL) x Age (BB)
Residence (BD) x Diagnosis (BL) x Requested TMT (BN)
Residence (BD) x Diagnosis (BL) x Requested Location (BG, BH)
Residence (BD) x Diagnosis (BL) x Requested TMT (BN) x Requested Location (BG,
BH)

2. POSITION OF PATIENT, OHIP, TRIBUNAL AND TRIBUNAL‘S ULTIMATE
DECISION
a) Patient Position Totals
Experimental (X)
Generally Accepted (Y)
Identical/Equivalent (Z)
Delay causing Death (AA)
Delay causing Medically Significant Tissue Damage/MSITD (AB)
Delay to see Ontario General Practitioner/GP (AC)
Delay to see Ontario Specialist/SP (AD)
Delay to Ontario TMT/Surgery (AE)
Other (AF)
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Patient Cross Tabs

Date x Test in s.28.4(2):
In a given year, why are people asking for Out of Country Coverage from OHIP?
Decision Date [AU] x Test [Experimental (X) x Generally Accepted (Y) x
Identical/Equivalent (Z) x Delay Death (AA) x Delay MSITD (AB)]

Residence x Test:
Based on the patient‘s geographical setting, why are people asking for Out of Country
coverage from OHIP?
Patient‘s Residence [BD] x Test [Experimental (X) x Generally Accepted (Y) x
Identical/Equivalent (Z) x Delay Death (AA) x Delay MSITD (AB)]

Diagnosis x Test:
For a given diagnosis, why are people asking for Out of Country coverage by OHIP?
Patient‘s Diagnosis [BL] x Test [Experimental (X) x Generally Accepted (Y) x
Identical/Equivalent (Z) x Delay Death (AA) x Delay MSITD (AB)]

TMT Location Out of Canada x Test:
Based on a requested procedure location, why are people asking for Out of Country
coverage by OHIP?
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TMT Location [BG, BH] x Test [Experimental (X) x Generally Accepted (Y) x
Identical/Equivalent (Z) x Delay Death (AA) x Delay MSITD (AB)]

Requested TMT and TMT Location Out of Canada x Test:
Based on a requested procedure and procedure location, why are people asking for Out of
Country coverage by OHIP?
TMT Requested [BN] x TMT Location [BG, BH] x Test [Experimental (X) x Generally
Accepted (Y) x Identical/Equivalent (Z) x Delay Death (AA) x Delay MSITD (AB)]

b) OHIP Position Totals
Experimental (AG)
Generally Accepted (AH)
Identical/Equivalent (AI)
Delay causing Death AJ)
Delay causing MSITD (AK)

OHIP Cross Tabs

Date x Test:
In a given year, what is OHIP‘s position on each test factor?
Decision Date [AU] x Test [Experimental (AG) x Generally Accepted (AH) x
Identical/Equivalent (AI) x Delay Death (AJ) x Delay MSITD (AK)]
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Residence x Test:
Based on where the patient lives/geographical setting, what is OHIP‘s position on each
test factor?
Patient‘s Residence [BD] x Test [Experimental (AG) x Generally Accepted (AH) x
Identical/Equivalent (AI) x Delay Death (AJ) x Delay MSITD (AK)]

Diagnosis x Test:
For a given patient diagnosis, what is OHIP‘s position on each test factor?
Patient‘s Diagnosis [BL] x Test [Experimental (AG) x Generally Accepted (AH) x
Identical/Equivalent (AI) x Delay Death (AJ) x Delay MSITD (AK)]

TMT Location Out of Canada x Test:
Based on a requested procedure location, what is OHIP‘s position on each test factor?
TMT Location [BG, BH] x Test [Experimental (AG) x Generally Accepted (AH) x
Identical/Equivalent (AI) x Delay Death (AJ) x Delay MSITD (AK)]
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c)Tribunal Position Totals
Experimental (AL)
Generally Accepted (AM)
Identical/Equivalent (AN)
Delay causing Death (AO)
Delay causing MSITD (AP)

Tribunal Cross Tabs

Date x Test:
In a given year, what is the breakdown for the test factors considered by the Tribunal?
Decision Date [AU] x Test [Experimental (AL) x Generally Accepted (AM) x
Identical/Equivalent (AN) x Delay Death (AO) x Delay MSITD (AP)]

Residence x Test:
Based on the patient‘s location/geographical setting and the test factors considered by the
Tribunal, does the Tribunal ‗grant‘ or ‗deny‘ the patient‘s request?
Patient‘s Residence [U] x Test [Experimental (AL) x Generally Accepted (AM) x
Identical/Equivalent (AN) x Delay Death (AO) x Delay MSITD (AP)] x Grant (AR)
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Patient‘s Residence [U] x Test [Experimental (AL) x Generally Accepted (AM) x
Identical/Equivalent (AN) x Delay Death (AO) x Delay MSITD (AP)] x Deny (AQ)

Diagnosis x Test:
Based on the patient‘s diagnosis, and the test factors considered by the Tribunal, does the
Tribunal ‗grant‘ or ‗deny‘ the patient‘s request?
Patient‘s Diagnosis [BL] x Test [Experimental (AL) x Generally Accepted (AM) x
Identical/Equivalent (AN) x Delay Death (AO) x Delay MSITD (AP)] x Grant (AR)

Patient‘s Diagnosis [BL] x Test [Experimental (AL) x Generally Accepted (AM) x
Identical/Equivalent (AN) x Delay Death (AO) x Delay MSITD (AP)] x Deny (AQ)

TMT Location Out of Canada x Test:
Based on a requested procedure location, and the test factors considered by the Tribunal,
does the Tribunal ‗grant‘ or ‗deny‘ the patient‘s request?
TMT Location [BG, BH] x Test [Experimental (AL) x Generally Accepted (AM) x
Identical/Equivalent (AN) x Delay Death (AO) x Delay MSITD (AP)] x Grant (AR)

TMT Location [BG, BH] x Test [Experimental (AL) x Generally Accepted (AM) x
Identical/Equivalent (AN) x Delay Death (AO) x Delay MSITD (AP)] x Deny (AQ)
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d) Tribunal Decision Totals
Deny (AQ)
Grant (AR)

Tribunal Cross Tabs
Decision Date (AU) x Test [Experimental (AL) x Generally Accepted (AM) x
Identical/Equivalent (AN) x Delay Death (AO) x Delay MSITD (AP)] x Grant (AQ)

Decision Date (AU) x Test [Experimental (AL) x Generally Accepted (AM) x
Identical/Equivalent (AN) x Delay Death (AO) x Delay MSITD (AP)] x Deny (AR)

3. ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS REGARDING TRIBUNAL HEARING

a) Dates: Hearing Requested, Hearing Date, Decision Date
File Submitted to Office (B, C, D)
Hearing Date (E, F, G)
Decision Date (AS, AT, AU)

Total days it takes from when a file is submitted to the office till a Hearing is held and a
Decision is rendered
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Total Days = File Submission Date (B,C,D) – Hearing Date (E,F,G) – Decision Date
(AS,AT,AU)

b) Legal Representation
Representation by Counsel/Lawyer
Applicant (H)
Respondent (I)

Cross Tab
What are characteristics of an Applicant represented by Counsel/Lawyer?
Applicant Represented (H) x Residence (BD) x Diagnosis (BL) x Requested TMT (BN) x
Requested Location (BG, BH)

c) Language
How many times is an Interpreter used at the Hearing?
Interpreter Present (J)

Cross Tab
Based on the patient‘s residence/geographical location, how many times is an Interpreter
used at the Hearing?
Interpreter Present (J) x Residence (BD)
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d) Type of Hearing Totals
Oral (K)
Teleconference (L)
Written (M)

Cross Tab
How many times is a Hearing conducted either orally, in writing or by teleconference?
Oral (K) x Written (M) x Teleconference (L)

Does the fact that a Hearing is conducted orally, in writing or by teleconference effect
whether the Tribunal ‗grants‘ or ‗denies‘ the patient‘s request?
Oral (K) x Deny (AQ)
Oral (K) x Grant (AR)
Teleconference (L) x Deny (AQ)
Teleconference (L) x Grant (AR)
Written (M) x Deny (AQ)
Written (M) x Grant (AR)

e) Payment Requested
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Does the patient request OHIP coverage before (prior) or after (reimbursement) the out of
country procedure?
Prior Approval Payment (N)
Reimbursement (O)

Cross Tab
Based on the year, does the Tribunal ‗grant‘ or ‗deny‘ a patient‘s requests if they are
‗prior requests‘ or ‗reimbursement‘ requests?
Grant (AQ) x Prior Request (N) x Decision Date Year (AU)
Deny (AR) x Prior Request (N) x Decision Date Year (AU)

Grant (AQ) x Reimbursement (O) x Decision Date Year (AU)
Deny (AR) x Reimbursement (O) x Decision Date Year (AU)

f) Accepted Case
Accept case for analysis (Q) from total cases (n=315)

g) Reviewed cases
Reviewed cases (P)
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APPENDIX D: Example of Excel Spreadsheet Coding
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APPENDIX E – Definition of s.28.4(2) Test Elements: Standard of Proof / OnusBurden / Evidence

a) Introduction
This section seeks to examine the legal aspects of the s.28.4(2) Test – specifically, if the
Definition of each element of the s.28.4(2) Test, the Standard of Proof, the Onus/Burden
of the Proof, and the Evidence required by the Board regarding the s.28.4(2) Test affect
the determination of resource allocation.

In analyzing the Decisions, it became clear that the s.28.4(2) Test was greatly affected by
the s.24(1)17 arguments - whether or not a treatment was deemed to be ‗experimental‘
and thus not meeting the criteria for OHIP funding. As a result of this assessment, the
Definition, the Standard of Proof, the Onus/Burden of the Proof, and the Evidence
regarding the ‗experimental‘ nature of a treatment under s.24(1)17 were also analyzed in
addition to the s.28.4(2) Test.

Overall, the Standard of Proof for all aspects of the s.28.4(2) Test, was a civil standard of
a balance of probabilities. In terms of Onus/Burden of Proof, the onus for the screening
‗experimental‘ test (HIA 24(17)) is on OHIP as it has denied the patient‘s out of country
request, the s.28.4(2) Test. The onus flips to the patient to prove the test‘s elements.402 403
The Board‘s jurisdiction allows it to hear new evidence presented at the Hearing:

402
403

06-HIA-0444 BS at 12.
06-HIA-0430 at 6.
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―… the Appeal Board conducts a hearing de novo, which is a fresh determination
of the issues based upon the evidence at the hearing.―404

The evidence required to prove the s.28.4(2) test regarding ‗generally accepted as
appropriate for the patient‘ (GA), ‗identical or equivalent treatment in Ontario‘ (I/E),
and/or ‗delay causing death or medically significant tissue damage (D) appears to initially
be based on the Prior Approval Form signed by an Ontario physician and submitted by
the patient‘s physician or by the patient themselves. OHIP has stated that the Prior
Approval Form must be based on a medical opinion and that medical opinion must come
from an Ontario physician. Medical opinions from physicians outside of Canada are not
accepted. The Prior Approval Form submitted by the patient may be counteracted by
OHIP. OHIP may submit evidence based on their own medical expertise or it may
contract with field experts to provide medical opinions on GA, I/E and/or D. Patients may
clarify their evidence for GA, I/E and/or Delay with the submission of additional
correspondence from their physician. This additional correspondence can also be
contradicted by OHIP. In very rare situations does the patient‘s physician attend the
Board Hearing either in person or by teleconference. The patient may also produce
information on out of country procedure success rates, journal articles, patient
testimonials, etc. OHIP will counter argue each of these submissions.

b) Experimental
i) Definition of ‗Experimental‘
404

06-HIA-0191 MB at 5.
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As stated earlier, if a treatment is found to be experimental, it is not funded by OHIP and
does not qualify for review under s.28.4(2). The case Decisions appear to be using the
following definition for ―experimental‖ originally cited in A. v. General Manager, OHIP
(HSARB File No. 04-HIA-0040):

The term ―experimental‖ is not defined in the Act or in the regulations. While the
Appeal Board is not bound by definitions applied in earlier Appeal Board
Decisions, in assessing the evidence, it is helpful to consider those definitions. In
A. v. General Manager, OHIP (HSARB File No. 04-HIA-0040), the Appeal
Board applied the following definition of experimental, supported by the
Respondent in that case: ―a therapy is experimental when the effects are unknown
and are not understood‖ and that ―conversely a treatment which is not
experimental must be one which is accepted practice within the medical
profession and one that is proven to have beneficial results‖ and that ―these results
must be based on objective standards and not the subjective view of a patient‖.405

Overall, the definition of ―experimental‖ is challenging and determined by a lay Board.
The definition is very broad, not linked to experimental definitions under regulatory
authorities for drugs, medical devices and medical research. It is the author‘s opinion that
the determination of ‗experimental treatment‘ is a very technical area of medicine and
highly regulated by the scientific and governmental sphere. It is unclear how the lay

405

Definition also used in 06-HIA-0287 MS.
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Board‘s assessment of the evidence fits with the scientific and governmental regulation of
experimental treatment. It would be beneficial to the Board and to the parties if a
technical body could review the treatment in question and determine if it was
‗experimental‘ or not at the time of the patient‘s request.

ii) Onus / Burden of Proof
According to the Decisions, the onus/burden of proof to establish that a procedure is
‗experimental‘ under s.24(17) lies with the party advocating that the treatment is
experimental. It is not the Appellant [the patient in that case] who must establish that the
treatment is not experimental.406 On an appeal to the Board of an OHIP denial to fund an
out of country health care service, the onus rests with OHIP to show that a treatment is
experimental.407

iii) Standard of Proof
The civil standard of a ‗balance of probabilities‘ is required for OHIP to prove that a
procedure is experimental and thus not fundable.

iv) Evidence Required
OHIP must use evidence to prove a procedure is experimental. Typically, OHIP will use
the information from the patient‘s GP and/ SP from their Prior Approval Form. If the

406

06-HIA-0383 at 7.
In the case analysis, when OHIP, or the patient, has not argued the out of country health care service is
experimental, the author has assumed that the out of country health care service was not experimental and
thus potentially fundable by OHIP.
407
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Prior Approval from the GP and/or SP states that the out of country health care service is
experimental then OHIP will define the procedure to be experimental.

The evidence for experimental determination is not only technical but it is often subject
to conflicting, changing and unclear statements from medical practitioners. As of April
2011, the Regulation for s.28.4(2) requires SP evidence from on Ontario based physician.
While this stipulation renders debates regarding GP, SP and/or out of country SP moot, it
still raises the question regarding SPs who provide conflicting information on the
‗experimental‘ nature of the treatment. The Board must still weigh the evidence provided
by the SP on the Prior Approval Form and any subsequent submissions from the SP.408
Given the evolving nature of experimental treatments, the possible fluctuations of the
patient‘s medical condition and the time period from an initial request to OHIP through to
the release of a Board Decision, the definition and the related evidence need to be
precise. A precise definition of ‗experimental‘ is not in the regulations. The medical
evidence to meet this definition and the expertise to assess the medical evidence are
variable across the Decisions. It is assumed that this makes the determination of the issue
before the Board very difficult.

c) Generally Accepted as Appropriate for Patient
i)

Definition

Under s.28.4(2), a treatment must be ‗generally accepted as appropriate‘ for the given
patient. For example, a coronary bypass may be treatment/procedure that is generally
408

Such as subsequent letters from the SP and/or oral testimony from the SP
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accepted if a patient has a blocked coronary artery. However, if the patient is not likely to
survive the coronary bypass surgery because of their specific condition – let us say,
hypothetically, that the patient is 120 year old, in extremely poor health and is mortally
allergic to the anesthetic that would be used in the surgery – the medical opinion would
be that the coronary bypass surgery would not be appropriate for the given patient.

The definition of GA in Ontario as appropriate for a person in the same medical
circumstances as the patient raised a number of questions regarding ‗who‘ decides the
GA – the patient, the medical community at large or more specifically the medical
community in Ontario. It was first established in the Decisions that it is the medical
community that determines if an out of country treatment is generally accepted as
appropriate for the patient:
.
―The Appeal Board finds that the words ―generally acceptable‖ in the context of
section 28.4(2) to mean approval of a treatment as a rule, or usually, by the
medical community.‖409

The ‗medical community‘ was further defined by Ontario Courts as the medical
community in Ontario. In the Decision 06-HIA-0343, the following was clarified:

―In a recent decision of the Ontario Divisional Court, Flora v. General Manager,
Ontario Health Insurance Plan, 1 (1 [2007] O.J. No. 91) Justice Epstein

409

06-HIA-0266 EC at 8.
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considered the rationale for this reference to an Ontario standard in some detail. In
particular, she said:

‗Adopting an Ontario standard for determining funding ensures that limited public
monies are only spent on medical treatments that (i) are accepted by doctors of a
recognizable standard; (ii) are accepted as deserving of public funding in
accordance with Ontario‘s values and laws; and (iii) are provided in accordance
with the ethics and values of Ontarians.‘410

―As set out in Flora, this reference to an Ontario standard is important for, among
other reasons, the protection of Ontario citizens seeking medical services in other
jurisdictions.‖411

There has been much discussion in the Decisions as to ‗medical community‘ in Ontario.
The key issue in this discussion is ‗who‘ within the Ontario medical community
determines if the out of country treatment is GA for the patient. Several of the Decisions
accept the opinion of the patient‘s Ontario GP. Several of the Decisions accept the
opinion of the patient‘s Ontario SP.

ii)

410
411

Onus / Burden of Proof

Flora, Supra Note 5 at para 102.
06-HIA-0343 at 6.
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The onus/burden of proof lies with the patient to establish all elements of the s.28.4(2)
Test:412

―The onus is on the Applicant to establish that the treatment in question is
generally accepted in Ontario as appropriate for a person in his medical
circumstances, and is not performed in Ontario by an identical or equivalent
procedure and that there was a delay in receiving medical services. Whether or
not the evidence adduced is sufficient to discharge the onus on the Appellant is a
question of fact.‖413

OHIP can submit that the patient has not met the burden of proof with the evidence:

―To satisfy the criteria for insured out-of-country medical services that are set out
in section 28.4 of Regulation 552, the treatment must be generally accepted in
Ontario as appropriate for a person in the same medical circumstances as the
insured person. The Appellant bears the burden of establishing that this provision
has been satisfied. The Respondent submits that the evidence provided by the
Appellant does not meet this burden.‖ 414

The Decisions seem to be quite clear that the onus for proving GA is on the patient. The
challenge for the patient is to establish this onus based on Ontario medical opinion. This
412

06-HIA-0430 at 6.
06-HIA-0434 at 8.
414
05-HIA-0318 at 5 – see also 06-HIA-0417 at 6 ―It is the Respondent‘s position that the Applicant has
not shown that intensive inpatient residential treatment was generally accepted for a patient in these clinical
circumstances.‖
413
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is a difficult burden given that the majority of patients are self represented and Ontario
medical opinions are only presented in writing – which may be unclear or non-existent.

iii)

Evidence Required

When the onus is not met by the patient based on the evidence provided, the Board will
deem that the out of country treatment is not GA:

―The onus for establishing that a treatment is generally considered appropriate is
on the Applicant. In the absence of any evidence to support such a conclusion, the
Appeal Board finds that the treatment received by the Applicant is not generally
accepted in Ontario as appropriate.‖415

Where the evidence does not support GA, the Board can choose not to continue with the
s.28.4(2) Test:

―There is insufficient evidence to find that the arthroscopic surgery performed on
the Appellant in Florida is generally accepted in Ontario as appropriate for
someone in his medical circumstances. It is therefore not necessary for the Appeal
Board to address the issues of whether the surgery is performed in Ontario and if
so, if there would have been a delay in receiving it.‖416

415
416

06-HIA-0444 at 12.
06-HIA-0231 at 10.

280

Thus, the GA test appears to screen cases which may or may not go on to the next steps
of the s.28.4(2) Test.

The medical opinion evidence typically comes from the patient themselves in the form of
website materials and/or medical journals as well as evidence from GPs, SPs and out of
country SPs. The patients‘ argument appears to be strongest when the patient presents
evidence that an Ontario SP agrees that the out of country treatment is GA. When OHIP
argues against the patient‘s GA request for out of country treatment OHIP‘s opinion is
typically based on medical expertise in the area of the out of country treatment in
question. However, the OHIP medical expert may not have viewed the patient directly.
The OHIP expert may have expertise in the treatment area but may have never had
contact with the patient or review the patient‘s medical file.

One example of conflicting medical opinion evidence from an Ontario SPs and out of
country SPs took place in the case of 06-HIA-0434. That case involved a request for
nerve block treatment out of country. The patient‘s GP provided a medical opinion that
the out of country treatment was GA. The Board stated that the GP was not a SP. The
opinion of Ontario SP #1 declined to comment on OHIP‘s question whether the out of
country treatment was GA. The opinion of Ontario SP #2, in his two letters to OHIP, was
interpreted by the Board to not be GA because of the Board‘s assessment of SP #2‘s
qualifications and treatment of the patient. Letters of support for the patient were
provided by an American SP. Despite the medical opinion of the GP, the Ontario SP#2
and the USA SP, the Board deemed that there was insufficient evidence that the out of

281

country treatment was GA. The Board quoted the Ontario Divisional Court417confirming
the need for an Ontario standard for determining GA.

In another case, 06-HIA-0472 AD, the Board examined medical opinion evidence from
an Ontario GP. In that case, the patient, the patient‘s GP and the patient‘s USA SP
provided evidence that the medical treatment was GA. The Ontario SP, according to the
GP, was ―unwilling to provide this service‖ so the Board accepted the medical opinion of
the GP.418 According to the Decision, OHIP did not ‗seriously‘ contradict the evidence
provided by the patient. The Board deemed the out of country treatment was GA. So, in
this case, the Ontario GP and the USA SP evidence convinced the Board the out of
country treatment was GA for the patient, over the evidence of OHIP. This finding differs
from the previous case where the evidence of Ontario GPs was not considered
knowledgeable enough and the American SP was considered irrelevant for determining
the‗in Ontario‘ criteria.

The Board appears to take a variable stand on the evidence required of the patient. In
some cases, the medical opinion of an Ontario SP was required. In some cases, the
medical opinion of the Ontario GP was sufficient. If OHIP opposes the patient‘s GA
request, the medical experts for OHIP may not have seen the patient or the patient‘s
medical history. The variability of medical opinions accepted as evidence by the Board
may have encouraged cases to come forward to the Board as it was unclear when and on
what evidence the Board grants or denies GA.
417
418

Flora (2007), Supra Note 5 at para 102.
06-HIA-0472 AD at 8.
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The stakes are quite high for the patient at this early stage of the s.28.4(2) Test. If the
patient does not meet the onus through their evidence, the case does not proceed. The
challenge for the patient is to produce evidence which supports their request for GA. The
patient is not only dependent on Ontario medical opinions, the patient is typically self
represented before the Board and no medical opinion provider is present. As such, the
Board must depend on the print medical opinion(s) provided by the patient.

Because the evidence requirement at this point of the Test is so crucial in order to
proceed with the Test, it raises the question of how many medical opinions are accessed
by the patient before the evidence of GA can be established. The criteria encourages
accessing multiple SPs until the evidence requirement of GA is established. There is no
patient follow up to determine if the treatment requested out of country is or is not
appropriate for the patient.

d) Identical or Equivalent Treatment in Ontario
i) Definition
There are possibly two elements to the definition of Identical or Equivalent found in
s.28.4(2)(b)(i) - that the treatment out of country being requested is 'identical' or the
treatment out of country being requested is 'equivalent' to treatment that is offered in
Ontario. From the definition, it appears that the two elements - identical and equivalent can be interchanged i.e. the section uses the term "or" rather than "and". Board decisions
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state that the definitions for 'identical' and 'equivalent' are not outlined in the Statute or
the Regulation. As such, the Board turns to the dictionary definition. The Board states:
"The dictionary definition of "equivalent" is "similar or identical in value,
meaning or effect". In deciding whether the procedures are equivalent, it is
appropriate to look at the relative quality and results of the procedures....".419
In another Decision the Board states:
"There is no dispute that total knee replacement surgery is performed in Ontario.
At issue is whether the total knee replacement surgery performed in Ontario is
equivalent to the total knee replacement surgery performed in Kentucky ... The
dictionary definition of "equivalent" is "similar or identical in value, meaning or
effect." In deciding whether the surgical procedures are equivalent, it is
appropriate to look at the relative quality and results of the procedures. The
evidence comparing relative quality and results of the procedures in this case is
thin. We will now examine that evidence. ...".420
The Board states that it uses the "Canadian Oxford Dictionary" and it was suggested by
an Appellant that the Board take note of the fourth definitions:
1.(often followed by to) equal value, amount importance, etc. 2. corresponding or
having the same relative position or function. 3. (of words) having the same
meaning. 4. having the same result or effect ... (emphasis added) ...

421

419 06-HIA-0266 EC
420 07-HIA-0068 N.A. at 6
421 06-HIA-0351 at 1
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The Board does outline the definition for 'identical' it used - also based on a dictionary
definition:
"In the absence of an elaboration of the terms "identical or equivalent" in the
Statute, the Appeal Board relied on dictionary definitions to determine whether
the Ontario eating disorder programs were identical or equivalent in their
treatment approaches. The term "identical" would require that the treatment
approaches to be similar to that of the South Coast program. In order to be
"equivalent", the treatment would consist of a program being of equal value or
having the same result."422
The Board turns to the common dictionary to derive the definition for 'identical' and
'equivalent' - and as seen from the Decisions above - the Board may quote the definition
slightly differently. The Board may also not review the evidence relative to both
'equivalent' or 'identical' but may conduct the review only relative to 'equivalent'. In
terms of the definition itself, the Board does use a medical dictionary or a legal
dictionary.
The Board indicates, from its use of the dictionary definition, that it is looking at "quality'
and "the results of the procedures". The author is concerned that a lay Board is looking at
"quality" and "the results of the procedures". If a comparison between the Ontario
treatment and the out of country treatment is made on the basis of quality and results, a
number of possible errors may be made. For example, the comparison may be made
based on the different health status patient samples. An out of country treatment facility
422 06-HIA-0204 at 8
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may select very healthy patients while the Ontario treatment facility may be required to
take all patients including very sick patients who may have a different negative treatment
result. The health professional may perform a perfect treatment yet the results of the
treatment may be negative for the patient sample that was initially in poorer health.
Currently, the comparison is between Ontario and the out of country treatment. The
comparison is not between the out of country treatment and the treatment available in
Canada. It may be more cost effective to seek treatment outside Canada before inside
Canada because of geographic distance to the treatment -as in the case of Windsor
residents accessing treatment in Detroit rather than in Quebec or Manitoba. However, in
terms of medical necessity, the CHA allows for the portability of provincial health
insurance when treatment is not available in the patient's home province but available in
another province within Canada. Under the current I/E Test, if a treatment is not available
within Ontario it can be funded by OHIP outside of Canada - there is no requirement to
assess whether there is I/E treatment available first within Canada. This is interesting
because within Canada treatment is still paid for by Canadian tax dollars. If the treatment
is out of country, Canadian tax dollars also go out of country.
ii) Onus / Burden of Proof
The onus is on the patient to prove that there is no 'identical or equivalent' treatment in
Ontario compared to the out of country treatment. The challenge for the patient is how to
know what treatments are available in Ontario, and if available whether the treatment is
identical or equivalent both in delivery and in its results. This appears to be a very
difficult burden for the patient to meet. If the patient is relying on their physician, the
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physician must also submit testimony on these factors.
iii) Evidence Required
In the cases analysed, patients tended to present comparison evidence [comparing the out
of country treatment to the domestic treatment] or the absence of domestic treatment to
support their argument that there was no identical or equivalent treatment in Ontario. Of
the many 'identical or equivalent' evidence arguments presented in the Decisions, three
evidence arguments are of particular note: the 'type of other patients argument', 'the
insufficient effort' argument, the 'private health care' argument.
In the 'Type of Other Patients' Argument the patient argued that the patients attending the
domestic treatment were different from the patients attending the out of country
treatment. The Board did not accept this argument as evidence that the out of country
treatment was not identical or equivalent to the domestic treatment. The Board stated:
"Dr. Hoffer also argues that the mix of patients at Portage [Ontario] is a basis for
distinguishing it from High Frontier [out of country]. Again, without more than a
bald assertion, we are not prepared to accept Dr. Hoffer's opinion on this point.
He does not explain why this mix of patient population would be harmful for this
particular patient; in the absence of an explanation, we are not prepared to find
that Portage is not equivalent for this reason."423
In the ‗Insufficient Effort‘ argument OHIP argued that the patient has made insufficient
effort in attempting to seek treatment in Ontario before requesting out of country
treatment funding from the government. The Board did not accept this argument by
423 06-HIA-0351 at 14
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stating the Regulation did not require effort on the part of the patient to access domestic
treatment before seeking out of country coverage.
In the ‗Public vs. Private Health Care‘ Argument, OHIP argued the legislation
only required be 'identical or equivalent' treatment in Ontario and did not specify
that this Ontario treatment was not required to be insured by OHIP. In other
words, there could be identical or equivalent treatment in Ontario that was offered
through the private sector/insurance. The Board did not accept that the legislation
referred to all pubic and private health care in Ontario.

The author sees a number of challenges with this element of the Test. One on the most
challenging aspects is if the GP and or the SP do not know what actual treatment should
be provided to the patient. If the medical professionals do not know the treatment, they
are not able to provide domestic-out of country comparison evidence or the lack of
available domestic treatment evidence. For example:
"The Respondent [OHIP] questioned how Dr. Hart [for the Appellant] could
know that the treatment was not available in Canada if he did not know what the
treatment was."424
In this respect, if the patient requires treatment but the treatment is unknown and thus not
comparable to a domestic treatment, it is possible that the evidence of I/E would not be
submitted and the onus not met and - as a result - the patient would not meet the
requirement of s.28.4(2)(b)(i) and would not quality for OHIP out of country coverage.
424 06-HIA-0444 B.S. at12
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e) Delay in Ontario
i) Definitions: Death and MSITD
The Board does not consider ‗delay‘ itself to be a reason for out of country coverage by
OHIP. The delay must be anticipated to result in the death of the patient or in medically
significant irreversible tissue damage to the patient.

―Section 28.4(2) requires that there be not only evidence of delay but also
evidence that the delay ‗would‘ result in death or medically significant tissue
damage.‖425

While the definition of patient ‗death‘ is not in question, the definition of what constitutes
‗MSITD‘ to the patient is more difficult. The definition of MSITD is not in the
legislation. It is also important to note two features of the delay causing death or MSITD
definition – first, the definition is prospective. The definition requires the Appellant to
project into the future that the delay would also cause D or MSITD. This may be very
difficult for a medical practitioner to project. It also raises the question ‗who‘ should
project this outcome – the GP, the SP or the patient.

Officially, the Ontario Wait time bases its ‗delay‘ for Ontario treatment from the time a
SP confirms a treatment is needed to the time the treatment is received. The Ontario Wait
time does not include the time period for the patient to see a GP, the time from GP
appointment to appointment with the SP or the time from appointment with the SP to the
425

06-HIA-0191 M.B. at 11
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time a SP confirms a treatment is needed. In this respect, the ‗delay‘ experienced by
patients may be further broken down. Further research is needed to locate the
subcomponent of delay the patients are experiencing. For example, if the majority of
patients are experiencing delay between the time they see their GP and the time they are
first able to secure an appointment with a SP and are therefore going out of country for
diagnostics and/or out of country SP, that is a different Wait time issue than the delay
from SP confirmation of treatment need to the treatment itself. In terms of diagnostics,
patients may be going out of country for diagnostics in order to maintain their Ontario SP
appointment. Patients also may be generating additional Ontario treatment requests if out
of country diagnostics show the need for treatment.

What is not clear from the Decisions is if there is a ‗tiered delay‘.426 In a tiered delay,
patients receiving Ontario based health care may have a different delay experience than
Ontario patients returning from out of country health care. Those returning from out of
country care may experience delay as medical professionals may not want to follow up
on non-domestic treatment. It is also unclear if patients receiving out of country treatment
are in fact increasing medical requests within Ontario in the form of follow up and/or
ongoing care.

One disturbing feature of the Delay-MSITD definition is the criteria of ‗tissue damage‘.
Tissue damage may not result from significant pain. In the case of patients experiencing
pain, there is not always an objective diagnostic tool to assess the level of pain and which
may not show ‗tissue damage‘.
426

‗tiered delay‘ is the author‘s term
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―The Appeal Board notes that the Appellant has been in significant pain and that
his ability to function has been impaired while waiting some time for surgery;
however, the legislation stipulates that in order for the surgery to qualify as an
insured service, it must be established that the delay would result in ―medically
significant irreversible tissue damage‖. The Appeal Board finds there is
insufficient evidence that the delay would result in medically significant tissue
damage and the requirements of section 28.4(2)(b)(ii) have not been satisfied.‖427

Pain may be severely incapacitating and - according to Decision data analyzed in Phase I
- pain is a major reason for seeking out of country treatment. In such a scenario, the
patient/Appellant may seek out of country treatment for pain which may be GA and I/E
in Ontario but it does not meet the criteria of Delay causing MSITD. Thus, the criteria of
‗tissue damage‘ may be putting a limitation on pain treatment as well as certain mental
health conditions where it is difficult if not impossible for the patient/Applicant to
establish ‗tissue damage‘.

ii)

Onus / Burden of Proof

As previously cited, the Onus is on the Appellant/Patient to prove that the delay
accessing identical or equivalent treatment in Ontario would result in death or MSITD.428

iii)

Evidence Required

427 06-HIA-0357 at12
428 06-HIA-0434 at 8 , 06-HIA-0430 at 6
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The Board requires that ‗delay‘ be established in order to further consider the criteria of
s.28.4(2)(b)(ii) – delay causing D or MSITD:

―Finally, it is not possible to posit a causal connection between the suggested
damage and the delay faced by the Applicant where there is no solid evidence of
the actual delay that he faced for an urgent MRI.‖429

It is also important to note that the evidence required by the Board is based on medical
judgment of the patient‘s probable future health condition as a result of the delay:

―The Health Insurance Act is a statutory scheme to provide insurance against the
cost of ―insured services‖ to insured persons. For the most part those services are
medical treatments delivered in Ontario and the insured person is living in
Ontario. There are a few, well-defined exceptions to that general rule, section 28.4
is one of them. The conditions set out in section 28.4 require a medical judgment
about a patient‘s future, in situations where it is very difficult to predict the future.
Against this backdrop, we are [sp] the view that ―would‘ does not mean
―inevitable‖, however, it does require some degree of certainty of the outcome. In
our view, the word ―would‖ in this context is synonymous with ―probably‖; thus,
the question in this case is whether, in view of the Applicant‘s circumstances,
death or medically significant tissue damage would probably result if she had to
wait a year for surgery.‖430
429 06-HIA-0208 A.S. at 10
430 06-HIA-0191 M.B. at 11
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According to several Board Decisions, the patient/Appellant must first show evidence of
attempting to access I/E within Ontario before advancing a Delay causing D and/or
MSITD argument:

― As the Appellant did not attempt to proceed with the equivalent surgery with Dr.
Izukawa or any other Ontario surgeon, it is impossible to determine whether there
was delay.‖431

―Because the Appellant did not return to Ontario with his second opinion to try to
get a surgery date in Ontario, we do not know whether a date for surgery could
have been obtained earlier than the fall of 2006 … we do not know what the
Appellant‘s family physician would have done for the Appellant had he or she
known all of the facts. …‖432

In this latter case, it is interesting to note that approval for out of country diagnostics may
also generate demand for out of country treatment.

The Board did not accept evidence obtained on the patient‘s health after the out of
country treatment. The Board stated:

431 06-HIA-0383 at 13 – this raises the question that if a patient/Appellant is not assesses on the sufficiency of their attempts to access I/E in Ontario, how is
accessing I/E assessed?
432 06-HIA-0395 at 9 – the diagnostics may create an unexpected demand for services
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― … Dr. Langley [OHIP representative] urged the Board not to rely on the
evidence gleaned following surgery. He stated on an earlier decision of the
Board1 [WM 06-HIA-0001] in which the Panel observed:

…the provision … To find that this question is properly answered with
evidence available only after treatment has been obtained would render
the language of the clause absurd, because the criterion could never be
satisfied in advance, as it should be with prior approval433 …. .

We agree that it would not be appropriate to rely exclusively on evidence gleaned
after the surgery …434 435

It is not clear whether a ‗delay‘ experienced in accessing treatment is actually a
physician‘s decision making regarding medical necessity. In other words, are patients
experiencing ‗real‘ delay or are physicians priorizing patient issues based on ‗real‘
medical necessity. For example, a patient requesting bariatric surgery in Ontario for
obesity may be told, based on their medical condition (perhaps the need to lose a portion
of the weight prior to surgery or to stabilize a diabetic or mental health condition) that
there will be a 3-5 year wait for bariatric surgery. The patient/Appellant‘s submission to
the Board is that the surgery is GA, that there is I/E in Ontario but that there is a Delay
433

Italics as reported in actual case 07-HIA-0018 at 5

434 07-HIA-0018 at 5
435 It is interesting to note that the Board preferred the evidence of the patient‘s GP over the evidence of the patient‘s SP

―We prefer the evidence of
Dr. Whishinsky [the patient‘s GP not the SP]‖ 07-HIA-0018 at 5. Earlier in the decision, the Board states
―The views of a specialist are often highly persuasive and perhaps more persuasive than those of a family
physician on matters concerning surgery; however, this is not always the case. It is a question of fact
whether the surgeon‘s opinion has more weight than that of a family doctor.‖ 07-HIA-0018 at 4.
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that will cause MSITD in the form of weight on the joints, increased prospective risk of
heart disease and uncontrolled diabetes. In this scenario, perhaps the patient is
experiencing a delay as they see it but the delay is justified based on medical assessment.
On the other hand, the patient may be experiencing actual delay even if the treatment is
deemed medically necessary.

j) Summary of Analysis
This section sought to examine the legal aspects of the s.28.4(2) Test – specifically, the
Definition of each element of the s.28.4(2) Test, the Standard of Proof, the Onus/Burden
of the Proof, and the Evidence required by the Board regarding the s.28.4(2) Test for GA,
I/E and D causing D and/or MSITD. The author found that how the elements of s.28.4(2)
are defined had a major impact on what evidence was required to establish the given
element. It is of interest that the s.28.4(2) Test definitions were not outlined in the statute
or regulations. The Board had to resort to common dictionary definitions to define the
element of the s.28.4(2) Test. The definition for the first element of the Test – GA
s.28.4(2)(a) – was further judicially defined by the court in 2006 in the case of Flora but
there were still gaps in the definition that led to different weighting of evidence by the
Board.436 It is also of interest that the evidence of physicians is required yet physicians
rarely come before the Board in person with evidence – it is the patient who brings
evidence to the Board and argues the evidence against OHIP. The evidence submitted by
physicians is typically based on a government issued form. The medical opinion
expressed on the form is typically difficult to understand and the evidence supporting the
436

The author notes that in April 2011, the s.28.4(2) was further amended to include - among other aspects
– the requirement for Ontario SP medical opinion as evidence to support a patient‘s request for of out of
country treatment funded by OHIP.
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medical opinion is rarely present. The substantiation of the medical opinion and the
representation of that opinion by the patient and not the physician needs further
exploration.
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APPENDIX F: – Patient Age, Sex Residence

It became clear in the case analysis that a significant number of Board Decisions did not
state the age of the patient. If age was stated, it may have been stated as of the time of a
health incident or at the time of application to OHIP rather than the Board Hearing. In
cases where the age was stated as of the time of the health incident, that age was added to
the date of the Board Hearing to approximate the age of the patient. Given that the date of
Board Hearing was not the same as the date of the Board Decision, the age of the patient
is an approximation of the age at the time of the Board Hearing not the date of the Board
Decision.

The data revealed a wide variation in patient age. Given this wide variation of ages, the
raw data was subsequently grouped into the age categories used by the Canada Census of
2006 and Statistics Canada. As such, the seven age groupings were 0-17 years, 18-24
years, 25-44 years, 45-64 years, 65-79 years, 80 plus years or ‗Unknown‘.

Age
Cumulative
Frequency
Age

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

0-17

23

7.3

7.3

7.3

18-24

8

2.5

2.5

9.8

25-44

32

10.2

10.2

20.0

45-64

37

11.7

11.7

31.7
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65-79

23

7.3

7.3

39.0

7

2.2

2.2

41.3

Unknown

185

58.7

58.7

100.0

Total

315

100.0

100.0

80+

It is assumed that data collected by OHIP, in order to process the patient‘s request
relative to their OHIP number, could provide this information.

There may be several reasons why only 40% of patients indicated their age. First, for
privacy reasons, patients may not give their age as the Decisions become public - even
though the Decisions only display the patient‘s initials and not by name. Second, the lack
of age data may also be a function of Board Decision writing practices. The Board may
have had this information but chose not include it in the Decision as it may not have been
considered relevant information for the determination of the case. Third, the Board may
have been influenced by provincial and federal health privacy legislation regarding the
collection of personal health information. An informal look at the data indicated that
early Decisions did list the age of the patient whereas later Decision typically did not list
the age of the patient. Further analysis would be of interest to determine if there is a
correlation between the year of the Decision not reporting age and the emergence of
provincial and federal privacy legislation.

Where the patient‘s sex was not given but deduced, the deduction was based on
information within the Board Decision. For example, the pronoun ‗her‘ or ‗she‘ was
taken to indicate the patient was female. In rare cases, the sex of the patient was deduced
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from the diagnosis or requested procedure. For example, if the patient was diagnosed
with ovarian cancer or who requested a hysterectomy, it was deduced that the patient was
female. A deduction could not be made if the diagnosis or treatment requested was
applicable to both sexes even if the condition was more probable in one sex than the
other. An example of this would be breast cancer.

Patient Sex
Cumulative
Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

Male

151

47.9

47.9

47.9

Female

164

52.1

52.1

100.0

Total

315

100.0

100.0

The patient‘s geographical residence was often not stated within the Decision. When it
was clearly stated it was documented as such. In many cases, the patient‘s residence was
not stated but the location of the patient‘s work and the location of the General
Practitioner (GP) were stated. In such cases it was assumed that if these two factors
coincided – the workplace and GP location – then they represented the residence location
of the patient. However, if only the Ontario Specialist (SP) geographic location was
given, the patient‘s residence was not assumed to be the same as the SP and the patient‘s
residence was coded as ‗Not Stated‘. The reason of this coding was that a SP may have
been outside the geographic area of the patient. For example, patients residing in Windsor
may have been referred to SP in London, Hamilton or Toronto. Patients residing in
northern Ontario may be referred to Ottawa or London, Hamilton or Toronto. The referral
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location of the SP was assumed not to be specific enough to attribute it to the residence
location of the patient.

There was large variability in the raw data regarding patient residence. The raw data was
re categorized into 15 areas based on the 14 Local Health Integration Networks (LHIN)
boundaries and one category of ‗Not Stated‘. These 14 geographic LHIN based locations
were then further re-categorized into 5 Ontario regions: North Ontario, East Ontario,
South Ontario, West Ontario and ‗Not Stated‘.

Patient Residence
Cumulative
Frequency
LHIN

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

North

35

11.1

11.1

11.1

East

23

7.3

7.3

7.3

South

48

15.2

15.2

15.2

West

46

14.6

14.6

14.6

Unknown

163

51.7

51.7

100.0

Total

315

100.0

100.0
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APPENDIX G: Patient Profile - Diagnosis and Pain

The patient‘s diagnosis and subsequent coding for this study was based on the
information provided in the Decision. There was variability in the diagnosis description
based on whether the patient used medical terms or lay person terms to describe the
diagnosis. In several cases there was more than one diagnosis. In cases with more than
one diagnosis, the predominate diagnosis was coded.

The raw data showed huge variations in diagnosis. As a result, the raw data was
summarized / categorized into 10 codes for diagnosis: cancer, heart disease/circulatory
disease, back pain, general pain, obesity, addictions/mental health/anorexia, joints (hips,
knee, shoulder – surgery, replacement, pain, arthritis), head (eye, ear, headache, cataract,
memory loss), unknown and ‗other‘ (e.g. organ transplant).

Patient Diagnosis
Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

V
Cancer

49

15.6

15.6

15.6

aHeart/Circulatory

17

5.4

5.4

21.0

lBack Pain

36

11.4

11.4

32.4

iGeneral Pain

22

7.0

7.0

39.4
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dObesity

22

7.0

7.0

46.3

Addictions/Mental

29

9.2

9.2

55.6

Joints

34

10.8

10.8

66.3

Head

35

11.1

11.1

77.5

3

1.0

1.0

78.4

Other

68

21.6

21.6

100.0

Total

315

100.0

100.0

Health/Anorexia

Unknown

Pain Diagnosis:
The addition of Back Pain (11.4%) and General Pain (7.0%) equals 18.4% which is a
greater percent than the leading diagnosis of Cancer (15.6%)

The ‗Other‘ category included conditions not easily falling within the categories of
cancer, heart disease/circulatory disease, back pain, general pain, obesity,
addictions/mental health/anorexia, joints, head and ‗other‘ (transplant, gastro, renal). This
collection of ‗Other‘ conditions included: pneumonia, CP, MS, Fabre Disease, leukemia,
falls, hernia, vertigo, gynecological, asthma, reconstruction after mastectomy, birthmark
infection, lymph nodes, bowel polyps, stent, multiple (health issues), neuropathy in feet,
gallbladder, gastrointestinal issues, liver, kidney, urine blockage, urine fibroids,
endometriosis, Menier‘s Disease, carpal tunnel syndrome, lesions, abdominal complaints,
hereditary condition, genetic disease, menstrual disorder, lymphoma, MRI of the breast,
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nerve function, laryngeal issue, myelodysplasia, scleroderma morphea, pelvic organ
prolapse, and Wegener's Granulomatosis.
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APPENDIX H: Requested Patient Procedure Global Locations

The details of the requested treatment locations are further described in the Table below:

Global Location – Detailed Chart

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

VArgentina

1

.3

.3

.3

aBelgium

5

1.6

1.6

1.9

Chile

1

.3

.3

2.2

China
d
France

4

1.3

1.3

3.5

4

1.3

1.3

4.8

Germany

8

2.5

2.5

7.3

Hong Kong

1

.3

.3

7.6

Hungary

1

.3

.3

7.9

India

9

2.9

2.9

10.8

Iran

1

.3

.3

11.1

Israel

2

.6

.6

11.7

Italy

1

.3

.3

12.1

Mexico

1

.3

.3

12.4

Pakistan

2

.6

.6

13.0

Poland

1

.3

.3

13.3

South Africa

1

.3

.3

13.7

South Korea

1

.3

.3

14.0

Sweden

1

.3

.3

14.3

Switzerland

1

.3

.3

14.6

Taiwan

1

.3

.3

14.9

UK

5

1.6

1.6

16.5

USA

263

83.5

83.5

100.0

Total

315

100.0

100.0

l
i
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APPENDIX I: Patient Requested USA Northern State and Requested Treatment

Northern State by Patients‘ Requested Treatment
Cross tabulation
Patient's Requested TMT
1

2

4

6

Surgery Treatment Diagnostics 5 Assessment Other
State

1 Michigan

Code

Count

Total

32

6

5

6

0

49

24.3

6.6

5.4

12.0

.8

49.0

65.3%

12.2%

10.2%

12.2%

.0%

100.0%

15

6

7

23

1

52

25.8

7.0

5.7

12.7

.8

52.0

28.8%

11.5%

13.5%

44.2%

1.9%

100.0%

Count

12

3

2

1

0

18

Expected

8.9

2.4

2.0

4.4

.3

18.0

66.7%

16.7%

11.1%

5.6%

.0%

100.0%

Expected
Count
% within
State Code
2 Minnesota

Count
Expected
Count
% within
State Code

3 Ohio

Count
% within
State Code
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4 Illinois

Count

0

1

0

1

0

2

1.0

.3

.2

.5

.0

2.0

.0%

50.0%

.0%

50.0%

.0%

100.0%

2

1

0

0

0

3

1.5

.4

.3

.7

.0

3.0

66.7%

33.3%

.0%

.0%

.0%

100.0%

Count

0

0

0

0

1

1

Expected

.5

.1

.1

.2

.0

1.0

.0%

.0%

.0%

.0% 1.0E2

100.0%

Expected
Count
% within
State Code
5

Count

Pennsylvania

Expected
Count
% within
State Code

6 Montana

Count
% within
State Code
7 Wisconsin

%

Count

1

0

0

0

0

1

Expected

.5

.1

.1

.2

.0

1.0

100.0%

.0%

.0%

.0%

.0%

100.0%

1

0

0

0

0

1

Count
% within
State Code
9 Not stated

Count
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Expected

.5

.1

.1

.2

.0

1.0

100.0%

.0%

.0%

.0%

.0%

100.0%

63

17

14

31

2

127

63.0

17.0

14.0

31.0

2.0

127.0

49.6%

13.4%

11.0%

24.4%

1.6%

100.0%

Count
% within
State Code
Total

Count
Expected
Count
% within
State Code
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APPENDIX J: File Date, Hearing Date, Decision Date

In the future, it is recommended that the File Number include a day and month code to
allow for analysis of total time a case was within the Tribunal system.

Days from Hearing Date to Decision Date
No.
Days

315

Valid N

315

Minimum

Maximum

3.00

1220.00

Mean
159.9397

Std. Deviation
147.28111

The following table assesses this skewness of the data:

Days from Hearing Date to Decision Date
Statistic
Days

Mean
95% Confidence Interval for

159.9397
Lower Bound

143.6123

Upper Bound

176.2671

Std. Error
8.29835

Mean

5% Trimmed Mean

142.6173

Median

122.0000

Variance

21691.726

Std. Deviation

147.28111
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Minimum

3.00

Maximum

1220.00

Range

1217.00

Interquartile Range
Skewness
Kurtosis

135.00
3.305

.137

17.739

.274

Mean (159.9) and median (143.6, 176.2) should be close in value – but the analysis
indicates they are not. The skewness (3.3) and kurtosis (17.7) statistics should be in the
range of [+1 and -1] to be considered normal. The data analysis indicates that the
skewness is 3.305 and the kurtosis is 17.739 – outside the normal distribution range.

The data was also analyzed according to a box-plot where the line in the box is the
median value and the box is drawn at 25 and 75 percentile points. Anything outside the
box can be regarded as outliers, i.e. those very unusual cases in terms of days from the
number of days from Hearing Date to Decision Date. The data clearly indicates that the
extreme higher values – those cases incurring more days between the Hearing Date and
the Decision Date – affect the distribution - not the shorter day lengths.

The case numbers for these extreme high values were identified - cases 88, 223 and 279.
These are ―unique‖ cases from the point of view of number of days spent in the system.
Further analysis is required to determine why these three cases were ‗unique‘.
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Although data comparisons were based on the case day, month and year, only the year
existed in the File Date. Therefore, comparisons could only be based on the File Date
year. The relationship between File Date year and the Hearing Date year is very strong
but suffers from the ‗year end‘ problem meaning that the File Date only gave the year
date not the month and day date. If, hypothetically, a File Date year was 2005, that could
mean the file came into the office as early as January 1, 2005 or as late as December 31,
2005. If the File came into the office December 31, 2005 and the Hearing Date was
scheduled for January 1, 2006, it will appear as though the File Date of 2005 was heard
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one year later in 2006. Thus the usefulness of the File Date as a start date to estimate time
a case is within the Board‘s system is very limited.

In terms of analyzing the data for File Date year to Hearing Date year, a ―perfect‖ system
would have most cases falling within the diagonal of the table below. This appears to be
the case except for File Date year 2005 (values 53, 47) and 2006 (values 55, 20). This
signals that something is different for File Date years 2005 and 2006.

File Year by Hearing Year Cross tabulation
Count
Hearing Year
2
File Year

Total

3

4

5

6

7

Total

2

8

9

1

0

0

0

18

3

0

17

8

1

0

0

26

4

0

0

29

16

1

0

46

5

0

0

1

44

53

4

102

6

0

0

0

1

47

55

103

7

0

0

0

0

0

20

20

8

26

39

62

101

79

315

This could have been explored more but given the challenges of ‗year end‘ problems with
File Date, the focus of this study continued on the Hearing Date and Decision Date
variables.
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With this focus, an analysis was undertaken to determine if the Hearing Date year and the
Decision Date year matched – in other words, did the date a case was heard coincide with
the date a Decision was released:

Hearing Date Year by Decision Date Year: Cross tabulation
Count
Decision Date Year
3
Hearing Date Year

Total

4

5

6

7

8

Total

2

7

0

0

1

0

0

8

3

10

12

4

0

0

0

26

4

0

15

22

1

0

1

39

5

0

0

27

35

0

0

62

6

0

0

0

63

36

2

101

7

0

0

0

0

65

14

79

17

27

53

100

101

17

315

In a ―perfect‖ system, most cases would fall within the diagonal on the table below. From
the data, it appears that all of these associations are highly significant, perhaps indicating
that on a broad year-by-year basis, Hearing year and Decision Date year were associated.
In other words, the Hearing Date year appears to be within the Decision Date year.

Analysis was then done to determine the number of days a case was within the system –
from Hearing Date to Decision Date - by year. In other words, did the number of days a
case was within the system vary by year of Decision Date?
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Number of Days by Year: Hearing Date to Decision Date
95% Confidence Interval for Mean
N

Mean

Std. Deviation

Std. Error

Lower Bound

Upper Bound

Minimum

Maximum

3

17

183.0588

133.47728

32.37300

114.4311

251.6865

11.00

422.00

4

27

162.0370

127.59566

24.55580

111.5619

212.5122

37.00

473.00

5

53

182.8679

167.58546

23.01963

136.6757

229.0602

8.00

805.00

6

100

136.8700

147.40816

14.74082

107.6210

166.1190

3.00

1218.00

7

101

144.6139

88.35858

8.79201

127.1708

162.0570

17.00

454.00

8

17

288.7647

286.61593

69.51457

141.4004

436.1290

59.00

1220.00

315

159.9397

147.28111

8.29835

143.6123

176.2671

3.00

1220.00

Total

37.
ANOVA
Days – Year: Hearing to Decision Date
Sum of Squares
Between Groups

Df

Mean Square

396141.565

5

79228.313

Within Groups

6415060.289
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20760.713

Total

6811201.854

314

F
3.816

Sig.
.002

According to the table above, the Decision Date Year is significant (.002) in terms of the
amount of time a case was in the system (‗Between Groups‘). As such, which years are
more important with respect to how long a case takes from the Hearing Date to the
Decision Date? If the data was less than or equal to .05, the year was significant. The
following table shows how the differences that 2008 contribute to the strength of this year
effect:
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Multiple Comparisons
Days: Hearing - Decision

95% Confidence Interval

Mean Difference
(I) Decision Year
2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

(J) Decision Year

(I-J)

Std. Error

Significance

Lower Bound

Upper Bou

4

21.02179

44.61091

1.000

-110.9462

152.9

5

.19090

40.16130

1.000

-118.6142

118.9

6

46.18882

37.79981

1.000

-65.6305

158.0

7

38.44496

37.77261

1.000

-73.2939

150.1

8

-105.70588

49.42102

.498

-251.9031

40.4

3

-21.02179

44.61091

1.000

-152.9897

110.9

5

-20.83089

34.06797

1.000

-121.6107

79.9

6

25.16704

31.24936

1.000

-67.2748

117.6

7

17.42318

31.21645

1.000

-74.9213

109.7

8

-126.72767

44.61091

.072

-258.6956

5.2

3

-.19090

40.16130

1.000

-118.9960

118.6

4

20.83089

34.06797

1.000

-79.9489

121.6

6

45.99792

24.48099

.918

-26.4217

118.4

7

38.25406

24.43897

1.000

-34.0413

110.5

8

-105.89678

40.16130

.132

-224.7019

12.9

3

-46.18882

37.79981

1.000

-158.0082

65.6

4

-25.16704

31.24936

1.000

-117.6088

67.2

5

-45.99792

24.48099

.918

-118.4175

26.4

7

-7.74386

20.32631

1.000

-67.8731

52.3

8

-151.89471

*

37.79981

.001

-263.7140

-40.0

3

-38.44496

37.77261

1.000

-150.1838

73.2

4

-17.42318

31.21645

1.000

-109.7676

74.9

5

-38.25406

24.43897

1.000

-110.5494

34.0

6

7.74386

20.32631

1.000

-52.3854

67.8
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2008

8

-144.15084

*

37.77261

.002

-255.8897

-32.4

3

105.70588

49.42102

.498

-40.4913

251.9

4

126.72767

44.61091

.072

-5.2403

258.6

5

105.89678

40.16130

.132

-12.9083

224.7

6

151.89471

*

37.79981

.001

40.0754

263.7

7

144.15084

*

37.77261

.002

32.4120

255.8

*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

In this respect, it may be helpful to have benchmarks for Tribunal procedural fairness in
order to assist with internal tribunal processes. For example, a legislated period of time
between receipt of a file (File Date) and the final Decision (Decision Date) may assist in
designating existing and/or new tribunal staff and panel members to cases.

It is important to note that the Hearing Date code does not indicate how many days the
case was actually argued. While Hearings lasting more than one day are not the norm, it
is possible that a case could be heard over several days. For example, a case may have
been argued 3 hours or three days but would have been coded as of the first day of the
Hearing. For example, case 02-HIA-0040 JD was argued October 13 and 14th, 2004 as
well as August 11, 2005. In the case just referenced, the Hearing Date to Decision Date
would have been estimated from the first Hearing Date of October 13th, 2004 rather than
August 11, 2005. If, hypothetically, the end of the Hearing was August 11, 2005 and the
Decision was released September 1, 2005, it would appear that the case took 10 months
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rather than half a month between hearing and Decision. Thus the time between Hearing
Date and Decision Date is just a rough estimate of the days a case was within the system.

Further analysis should also be done to determine whether case time within the system
was significantly related to the ultimate outcome of Granting or Denying the appeal. A
cross tabulation regarding the substantive legal argument and patient profile may also
render interesting data with respect to the time a case is within the system.
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APPENDIX K: Type of Hearing (oral/written/teleconference/combination) relative
to Disposition

Percent of Oral Hearings
Oral

Frequency Percent

Valid

Cumulative

Percent

Percent

V
No

123

39.0

39.0

39.0

aYes

192

61.0

61.0

100.0

lTotal

315

100.0

100.0

i
d

Percent of Teleconference Hearings
Teleconference

Frequency Percent

Valid

Cumulative

Percent

Percent

V
No

259

82.2

82.2

82.2

aYes

56

17.8

17.8

100.0

lTotal

315

100.0

100.0

i
d
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Percent of Written Hearings
Written

Frequency Percent

Valid

Cumulative

Percent

Percent

V
No

230

73.0

73.0

73.0

aYes

85

27.0

27.0

100.0

lTotal

315

100.0

100.0

i
d

Percent of Combination Hearings
Oral – Teleconference Hearings
Cross tabulation
Teleconference
No
Oral

No

Count
Expected

Yes

Total

78

45

123

101.1

21.9

123.0

181

11

192

157.9

34.1

192.0

259

56

315

Count
Yes

Count
Expected
Count

Total

Count
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Oral – Teleconference Hearings
Cross tabulation
Teleconference
No
Oral

No

Count
Expected

Yes

Total

78

45

123

101.1

21.9

123.0

181

11

192

157.9

34.1

192.0

259

56

315

259.0

56.0

315.0

Count
Yes

Count
Expected
Count

Total

Count
Expected
Count

Oral – Written Hearings
Cross tabulation
Written
No
Oral

No

Count
Expected

Yes

Total

42

81

123

89.8

33.2

123.0

Count

319

Yes

Count
Expected

188

4

192

140.2

51.8

192.0

230

85

315

230.0

85.0

315.0

Count
Total

Count
Expected
Count

Teleconference - Written Hearings
Cross tabulation
Written
No
Teleconferenc No

Count

e

Expected

Yes

Total

177

82

259

189.1

69.9

259.0

53

3

56

40.9

15.1

56.0

230

85

315

230.0

85.0

315.0

Count
Yes

Count
Expected
Count

Total

Count
Expected
Count
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Chi-Square Tests
Asymp. Sig. Exact Sig. (2Value

df

(2-sided)

Pearson Chi-Square

8.925a

1

.003

Continuity Correction

8.078

1

.004

Likelihood Ratio

9.472

1

.002

Exact Sig.

sided)

Fisher's Exact Test

(1-sided)

.003

Linear-by-Linear

8.896

1

.002

.003

Association
N of Valid Cases

314

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 24.29.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Format of Hearing relative to Disposition
Year 2004: NOT significant

Board-Grant of Appeal vs. Oral Hearing
Cross tabulation
Oral
No
Board-Grant

No

Count

Yes
10

Total
13

23

321

Yes

Expected Count

9.4

13.6

23.0

% Board-Grant

43.5%

56.5%

100.0%

1

3

4

1.6

2.4

4.0

25.0%

75.0%

100.0%

11

16

27

11.0

16.0

27.0

40.7%

59.3%

100.0%

Count
Expected Count
% within Board-Grant

Total

Count
Expected Count
% within Board-Grant

Chi-Square Tests
Asymp. Sig. Exact Sig. (2Value

df

(2-sided)

Pearson Chi-Square

.482a

1

.488

Continuity Correction

.020

1

.886

Likelihood Ratio

.508

1

.476

Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear

sided)

.624
.464

1

Exact Sig.
(1-sided)

.455

.496

Association
N of Valid Cases

27

322

Chi-Square Tests
Asymp. Sig. Exact Sig. (2Value

df

(2-sided)

Pearson Chi-Square

.482a

1

.488

Continuity Correction

.020

1

.886

Likelihood Ratio

.508

1

.476

Exact Sig.

sided)

Fisher's Exact Test

(1-sided)

.624

Linear-by-Linear

.464

1

.455

.496

Association
N of Valid Cases

27

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.63.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Format of Hearing relative to Disposition
BUT for 2006 the association was significant:

Board-Grant of Appeal vs. Oral Hearing
Cross tabulation
Oral
No
Board-Grant

No

Count

Yes
36

Total
45

81

323

Expected Count
% within Board-Grant
Yes

Count
Expected Count
% within Board-Grant

Total

Count
Expected Count
% within Board-Grant

31.3

49.7

81.0

44.4%

55.6%

100.0%

3

17

20

7.7

12.3

20.0

15.0%

85.0%

100.0%

39

62

101

39.0

62.0

101.0

38.6%

61.4%

100.0%

Chi-Square Tests
Asymp. Sig. Exact Sig. (2Value

df

(2-sided)

Pearson Chi-Square

5.867a

1

.015

Continuity Correction

4.690

1

.030

Likelihood Ratio

6.536

1

.011

Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear

sided)

.020
5.809

1

Exact Sig.
(1-sided)

.012

.016

Association
N of Valid Cases

101
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Chi-Square Tests
Asymp. Sig. Exact Sig. (2Value

df

(2-sided)

Pearson Chi-Square

5.867a

1

.015

Continuity Correction

4.690

1

.030

Likelihood Ratio

6.536

1

.011

Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear

sided)

Exact Sig.
(1-sided)

.020
5.809

1

.012

.016

Association
N of Valid Cases

101

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.72.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
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APPENDIX L – Procedures – Self Represented / Lawyer Represented Results

Introduction
Patients were often accompanied by friends or relatives who may or may not have had
legal training. The level of legal training was not identified in the Decision. Patients who
were represented by ‗agents‘ were coded as not being represented by a ‗lawyer‘ because
determinations could not be made as to the level of legal training of the ―agent‖. Only
licensed lawyers were coded as ‗represented‘. To be coded as a ‗lawyer‘ the party had to
be identified as ‗Counsel‘ in the Decision section of ‗Appearances‘. In the case of minors,
deceased parties, or other factors such as ill health, patients were typically represented by
a guardian, the estate or a ‗friend‘. While it is possible that any party could have been a
‗lawyer‘, they were only coded as being a lawyer if identified as such. It is also possible
that patients received legal advice or had their written submissions to the Board vetted
through a lawyer. This was information not available in the Decision.

Representation
Patient Represented by a Lawyer:

Patient Representation

Frequency Percent
V
Not

282

89.5

Valid

Cumulative

Percent

Percent

89.5

89.5

aRepresented

326

lRepresented
iUnknown
dTotal

32

10.2

10.2

99.7

1

.3

.3

100.0

315

100.0

100.0

OHIP Represented by a Lawyer:

OHIP Represented

Frequency Percent
V
Not

Valid

Cumulative

Percent

Percent

273

86.7

86.7

86.7

42

13.3

13.3

100.0

315

100.0

100.0

aRepresented
lRepresented
iTotal
d

Cases where both the Patient and OHIP were Both Represented by Lawyers:

Patient+OHIP Represented: Cross Tabulation
Count

327

OHIP
Represented
No
Patient

No

Yes

Total

268

14

282

Represente Yes

4

28

32

d

1

0

1

273

42

315

Unknow
n

Total

Details regarding Patient Representation Cases
While beyond the scope of this study, the 28 cases having a grant rate of 32% were
identified for further future analysis in order to determine the substantive arguments
made by the parties and the Board‘s resulting position.

The table below lists the 28 cases and whether they resulted in a grant of denial of the
patient‘s appeal:

Case Summaries

1

Unique

V1 Case

Patient

OHIP

HSARB-

_ID

number

Rep.

Rep.

Grant

4.00

6

1

1

0

328

2

9.00

20

1

1

1

3

15.00

32

1

1

0

4

21.00

39

1

1

0

5

23.00

44

1

1

1

6

47.00

70

1

1

0

7

55.00

78

1

1

0

8

67.00

94

1

1

0

9

104.00

134

1

1

0

10

128.00

169

1

1

0

11

129.00

173

1

1

0

12

132.00

178

1

1

0

13

144.00

198

1

1

0

14

153.00

207

1

1

0

15

154.00

208

1

1

1

16

174.00

228

1

1

0

17

188.00

242

1

1

1

18

207.00

263

1

1

0

19

218.00

274

1

1

1

20

219.00

275

1

1

0

21

223.00

279

1

1

0

22

224.00

280

1

1

0

23

228.00

285

1

1

1

329

24

236.00

293

1

1

1

25

238.00

297

1

1

0

26

265.00

328

1

1

9

27

278.00

342

1

1

1

28

315.00

382

1

1

1

28

28

28

28

28

Total N

a. Limited to first 100 cases.
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APPENDIX M: Cross Tabulation Generally Acceptable Procedure for the Patient
(GA) with Identical/Equivalent (I/E) and Delay-Death (D) or Medically Significant
Irreversible Tissue Damage (MSITD)

Section 28.4(2) Elements
To examine s.28.4(2) further, patients requesting GA were cross tabulated with patients
requesting I/E across the 50 cases. There was Team Patient agreement for both GA and
I/E in 21 cases and Team Patient discrepancies for both GA and I/E 4 cases. There was
Team Patient agreement on GA but discrepancies on I/E in11 cases. Interestingly, there
was discrepancies on GA and agreement on I/E 14 cases.

GA versus I/E
Cross tabulation
Patient Request- I/E in
Ontario
No
Discrepancie Discrepancie
s
Patient

No

Count

Request-GA

Discrepancies Expected Count
% within Patient GA
Discrepancies Count

s

Total

21

11

32

22.4

9.6

32.0

65.6%

34.4%

100.0%

14

4

18
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Expected Count

12.6

5.4

18.0

77.8%

22.2%

100.0%

35

15

50

Expected Count

35.0

15.0

50.0

% within Patient GA

70%

30%

100%

% within Patient GA
Total

Count

From this data of 50 Team Patient discrepancies, in less than half the cases (n=21) there
was agreement within Team Patient. However, there was some level of non-agreement in
Team Patient regarding GA and I/E in 29 cases.

The Patients‘ argument for GA was then cross tabulated with the Patient‘s argument for
Delay causing Death and Delay causing MSITD. In Delay causing Death, 13 cases had
agreement within Team Patient regarding both GA and Delay causing Death while 6
cases discrepancies within both GA and Delay causing Death. Nineteen cases agreed on
GA but disagreed on Delay causing Death. Six cases disagreed on GA but agreed on
Delay causing Death.

A similar pattern was seen regarding GA and Delay causing MSITD: 13 cases had no
disagreement within Team Patient regarding both GA and Delay causing MSITD while 8
cases discrepancies within both GA and Delay causing MSITD. Nineteen cases agreed on
GA but disagreed on Delay causing MSITD. Ten cases disagreed on GA but agreed on
Delay causing MSITD.
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Patient Request-GA versus Patient Request b/c Delay causing Death
Cross tabulation
Patient RequestDelay=Death
No
Discrepancy

Discrepancy

13

19

32

Discrepancy Expected Count

16.0

16.0

32.0

% within Patient

40.6%

59.4%

100.0%

12

6

18

Expected Count

9.0

9.0

18.0

% within Patient

66.7%

33.3%

100.0%

25

25

50

Expected Count

25.0

25.0

50.0

% within Patient

50.0%

50.0%

100.0%

Patient Request- No
GA

Count

Total

Request GA
Discrepancy Count

Request GA
Total

Count

Request-GA

Patient Request-GA versus Patient Request b/c Delay causing MSITD
Cross tabulation
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Patient RequestDelay=MSITD
No

Patient

Discrepancy

Discrepancy

13

19

32

Expected Count

14.7

17.3

32.0

% within Patient

40.6%

59.4%

100.0%

Count

10

8

18

Expected Count

8.3

9.7

18.0

% within Patient

55.6%

44.4%

100.0%

23

27

50

Expected Count

23.0

27.0

50.0

% within Patient

46.0%

54.0%

100.0%

No Discrepancy Count

Request-GA

Total

Request GA
Discrepancy

Request GA
Total

Count

Request GA
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APPENDIX N: Substantive Argument – Team Patient Discrepancies

Introduction
Discrepancies in the patients‘ argument were not expected at the start of the study. Once
identified as a trend, the discrepancies in the patients‘ s.28.4(2) argument were analysed
relative to the determination of the Board whether or not to grant OHIP coverage for
OCCNEIHS

Discrepancies
In Year 5 (2007/08), one hundred and six s.28.4(2) cases came before the Board. The
patient and OHIP each presented their argument for and against the out of country
treatment request. However, the patients‘ argument for s.28.4(2) out of country treatment
in these Year 5 cases was not always cohesive in terms of medical necessity.
Approximately 50 of the 106 cases showed discrepancy within the patient‘s s.28.4(2)
argument – even before the counter argument of OHIP was presented and the subsequent
determination of the Board. The author refers to these discrepancies as argument
‗discrepancies within Team Patient‘ These discrepancies within Team Patient were found
in every area of the s.28.4(2) test437 - s.28.4(2)(a) generally accepted as appropriate for
the patient (GA), s.28.4(2)(b)(i) identical or equivalent treatment available in Ontario
(I/E) and s.28.4(b)(ii) delay causing death (DD) or delay causing irreversible significant
tissue damage (DM).

437

Discrepancies within the ‗Experimental‘ screening element were not analyzed for the purpose of this
paper but are available for future analysis
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It is important to note that discrepancies within Team Patient may not have been
referenced in the Decision in all cases across the five years of study. In other words, the
Board may have not recorded the medical opinion differences in Team Patient‘s
argument and/or the Board may have weighted the evidence to that evidence presented by
the patient and not the medical opinions. If this was the case, there may have been more
discrepancies within Team Patient than recorded in the Board‘s Decisions. The patient
may also have appeared to have had no discrepancies within their argument as they may
only have been presenting medical support evidence and not evidence were there was not
medical support for the patient‘s position. These issues are not known based on the cases
reviewed for the study.

Discrepancies within Team Patient
While Team Patient discrepancies may have occurred in Years 1 through 4, they were
not coded as such for one main reason - the author had made the assumption in
designing this research study and Code Book that if the patient appeared before the
Board there was medical endorsement for the patient‘s request for out of country
treatment – given that the Board‘s jurisdiction was not to assess medical costs or
human compassion arguments but rather to assess medical necessity for the patient‘s
treatment. In this respect, it was assumed that there were no discrepancies within
Team Patient – in other words, that the patients and the physicians were in agreement
regarding s.28.4(2) - that the (a) the treatment was generally accepted in Ontario as
appropriate for a person in the same medical circumstances as the insured person; and
(b) either,(i) that kind of treatment that was not performed in Ontario by an identical
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or equivalent procedure, or (ii) that kind of treatment was performed in Ontario but it
is necessary that the insured person travel out of Canada to avoid a delay that would
result in death or medically significant irreversible tissue damage.

It became clear, while analyzing the cases, that this was not the case. By Year 5 cases,
the author was attuned to these discrepancies and the discrepancies were well
documented in the Board‘s written Decisions. The voided assumption of ‗no Team
Patient discrepancies‘ plus the clear documentation in Year 5 Decisions lead to the
development of a more detailed coding system for Year 5 patient arguments.

While there may also have been discrepancies within OHIP argument and dissent in
the Board‘s determination, these were not recorded in the written Decision – only
Team Patient discrepancies were reported and thus coded. In hindsight, this more
detailed coding system should have been applied to Years 1 to 4 – but in the interest of
time and exploratory nature of this study, only Year 5 was analyzed using the more
detailed coding system.

All s.28.4(2) Test Elements of Patients‘ Argument Assessed
While initially an analysis of the first element of the s.28.4(2) test – GA - was
assessed,438 this only represented 17 of the 50 cases. GA cases were analyzed for the type
of discrepancy. Given the small sample size of 17 cases and the number of possible
discrepancies, it was not possible to have significant findings. As a result, all 50 GA, I/E,

438

the element s.28.4(2)(a) requiring the treatment is generally accepted in Ontario as appropriate for a
person in the same medical circumstances as the insured person
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and Delay cases were analyzed in order to increase the sample size and determine if any
patterns could be seen. The results for each of the four elements of s.28.4(2) are listed
below. Of the 50 cases, there were only 4 Grants of out of country coverage.439 The
remaining 46 cases that had discrepancies within Team Patient were Denied by the
Board. In hindsight, Year 1 to 5 cases should have been included in the analysis or – at a
minimum – all 106 cases – not just the 50 cases for Year 5.

Of the cases in Year 5, 41 (82%) were in 2007 Decisions and 9 (18%) were 2008
Decisions. The 4 Granted Decisions were issued in 2007.

HSARB Decision-Year

Frequency Percent

Valid

Cumulative

Percent

Percent

V
2007

41

82.0

82.0

82.0

a2008

9

18.0

18.0

100.0

lTotal

50

100.0

100.0

i
d

But if one looks at the file date of each of these 4 cases, 3 of the cases entered the Board
system in 2006 and 1 in 2007. Why is this important? It is important because the patient‘s
medical condition, the state of the comparable identical or equivalent treatment in
439

Cases #292 (06-HIA-0047 L.S.), Case #322 (06-HIA-0265 D.A.M.), Case #329 (06-HIA-0293 D.K.),
Case #362 (07-HIA-0018 S.F.)
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Ontario and the delay experienced in the eyes of the patient must be, in the majority of
Granted cases, seen as of 2006 and not 2007. At the end of 2005, the Ontario government
began operationalizing its Wait Time Strategy (WTS) for five treatments/operations 440 in
an effort to decrease the delay patients were experiencing. For surgical wait times, the
time is tracked between when a surgery is ordered and when the surgery is performed.441
Standards were put in place as to how long a patient should have to wait, based on their
medical condition, from the time surgery was ordered until the time surgery took place.

The file date 2006 cases before the Board may not have had a chance to experience the
decreased Wait Times as the policy came into effect in late 2005. On the other hand, even
if it effectively reduced a delay between the order for surgery and the surgery itself, the
Wait Time Strategy may not have been addressing the type of ―Delay‖ patients were
experiencing. The concept of ―Delay‖ needs to be further broken down to determine
where the delay is happening and why it is happening. It is unknown at this time if the
implementation of Ontario‘s WTS lead to an increase in the number of patient
experiencing delays in non-WTS procedures. This is a area for potential research.

Out-of-Country ―Grants‖ by the Board
In cross tabulation analysis table below of GA versus the Board‘s Grant of the out of
country request by the patient, it can be seen that when there was a discrepancy in the
argument of Team Patient, the Board did not Grant the patient‘s out of country request (in
all 4 cases or 0%). If there was no discrepancy in the argument of Team Patient, the

440
441

cancer, cataract, hip, knee surgery and angiography, angioplasty and CT Scans.
http://news.ontario.ca/mohltc/en/2010/06/ontarios-wait-time-strategy.html
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Board did Grant the patient‘s out of country request (in all 4 cases or100%). Thus, even
though the presence of Team Patient discrepancies resulted in denials, the only time the
Board granted out of country coverage was if there was no Team Patient discrepancies.

HSARB-Grant versus Patient-GA
Cross tabulation
Patient Request GA as
appropriate
No

HSARB-Grant Deny

Count
Expected Count
% within HSARB

Discrepancy

Discrepancy

Total

27

18

45

28.5

16.5

45.0

60.0%

40.0%

100.0%

4

0

4

2.5

1.5

4.0

100.0%

.0%

100.0%

31

18

49

31.0

18.0

49.0

63.3%

36.7%

100.0%

Grant
Grant

Count
Expected Count
% within HSARB
Grant

Total

Count
Expected Count
% within HSARB
Grant
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In cross tabulation analysis table below of I/E versus the Board‘s Grant of the out of
country request by the patient, it can be seen that when there was a discrepancy in the
argument of Team Patient, the Board did not Grant the patient‘s out of country request (in
all 4 cases or 0%). If there was no discrepancy in the argument of Team Patient, the
Board did Grant the patient‘s out of country request (in all 4 cases or 100%). Thus, as
with GA, even though the presence of Team Patient discrepancies resulted in denials, the
only time the Board granted out of country coverage was if there was no Team Patient
discrepancies.

HSARB-Grant versus Patient Request- I/E in Ontario
Cross tabulation
Patient Request- I/E in
Ontario
No

HSARB-

Deny

Grant

Count
Expected Count
% within HSARB

Discrepancy

Discrepancy

Total

30

15

45

31.2

13.8

45.0

66.7%

33.3%

100.0%

4

0

4

2.8

1.2

4.0

Grant
Grant

Count
Expected Count
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% within HSARB

100.0%

.0%

100.0%

34

15

49

34.0

15.0

49.0

69.4%

30.6%

100.0%

Grant
Total

Count
Expected Count
% within HSARB
Grant

This is the same pattern for GA (s.28.4(2)(a)) and I/E (s.28.4(2)(b)(i)) in terms of the
Board Granting if there is no discrepancies in Team Patient‘s argument and not Granting
if there is a discrepancy. The pattern is not significant given the sample size of 4 Grants.
A larger sample size should be included to assess if this pattern is significant. Given that
the focus at this point is on ‗patterns‘ as opposed to significance given the sample size, it
is interesting to note that the pattern changes when analyzing Delay (s.28.4(2)(b)(ii)).

Delay causing Death and Delay causing MSITD (s.28.4(2)(b)(ii)) both show the same
pattern to each other which is different from the pattern shown in GA (s.28.4(2)(a)) and
I/E (s.28.4(2)(b)(i)). With Delay causing Death, the Board Grants or Denies the patient‘s
request for out of country coverage approximately equally if there is agreement in within
Team Patient or if there is discrepancies within Team Patient. In the Table below, 50%
(n=2) the Board Granted if there was no discrepancy in Team Patient argument and 50%
(n=2) the Board Granted if there was a discrepancy in Team Patient‘s argument.
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HSARB-Grant versus Patient Request b/c Delay causing Death
Cross tabulation
Patient RequestDelay=Death
No

HSARB-

Deny

Grant

Count
Expected Count
% within HSARB

Discrepancy

Discrepancy

Total

22

23

45

22.0

23.0

45.0

48.9%

51.1%

100.0%

2

2

4

2.0

2.0

4.0

50.0%

50.0%

100.0%

24

25

49

24.0

25.0

49.0

49.0%

51.0%

100.0%

Grant
Grant

Count
Expected Count
% within HSARB
Grant

Total

Count
Expected Count
% within HSARB
Grant

The same pattern can be seen with Delay causing MSITD. The Table below shows that
the Board Grants or Denies the patient‘s request for out of country coverage
approximately equally if there is agreement in within Team Patient or if there is
discrepancies within Team Patient. In the Table below, 50% (n=2) the Board Granted if
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there was no discrepancy in Team Patient argument and 50% (n=2) the Board Granted if
there was a discrepancy in Team Patient‘s argument.

HSARB-Grant versus Patient Request b/c Delay causing MSITD
Cross tabulation
Patient RequestDelay=MSITD
No

HSARB-

Deny

Grant

Count
Expected Count
% within HSARB

Discrepancy

Discrepancy

Total

20

25

45

20.2

24.8

45.0

44.4%

55.6%

100.0%

2

2

4

1.8

2.2

4.0

50.0%

50.0%

100.0%

22

27

49

22.0

27.0

49.0

44.9%

55.1%

100.0%

Grant
Grant

Count
Expected Count
% within HSARB
Grant

Total

Count
Expected Count
% within HSARB
Grant
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Granted Cases Year 5
The following 4 cases were Granted by the Board. Each case is reviewed in more detail
to determine where the discrepancy within Team Patient lied and over what element of
s.28.4(2):

1. Case 292 (06-HI-0047 L.S.) involved a second opinion regarding an eye
condition. The discrepancy within Team Patient arose between the patient and the SP
regarding the Delay causing MSITD element of s.28.4(2).

The patient requested reimbursement for a consultation at the Cleveland Clinic in Ohio,
USA. The patient had undergone various treatments and surgeries in Toronto and was
under the care of a SP at Toronto Western Hospital. The patient‘s condition worsened
and she, at her own expense, visited the Cleveland Clinic for a consult where immediate
surgery was recommended. The patient returned to Ontario where SP then attempted
surgery but it was unsuccessful. The SP ‗recommended‘ the patient return to the
Cleveland Clinic – which she did – but the Cleveland Clinic would not operate ‗because
it was too late‘ because ‗he [the Cleveland Clinic SP] found irreversible tissue damage
due to months of low intraocular pressure.‘

The patient wanted to be reimbursed for her consult at the Cleveland Clinic. The patient
and OHIP agreed on GA and I/E but disagreed on Delay causing MSITD. The patient‘s
SP initially stated a delay would cause MSITD but then reversed his agreement with the

345

patient – not telling the patient - and stated to OHIP that a delay would not cause MSITD.
The SP then became a proposed witness for OHIP but was not called at the Hearing.

The Board stated it

―… had the benefit of observing and hearing the Applicant [the patient] as she
testified. She was forthright and entirely credible…. OHIP pointed out that the
form was completed in two different handwritings, and questioned whether the
Applicant had written some of the statements on the form. The Applicant testified
that the information on the form was completed when she received it from Dr.
Lam [patient‘s Ontario SP].

Since Dr. Lam did not testify, the inconsistent and contradictory information
remains unexplained. ...‖442

The Board concluded that it was too late for surgery – delay causing MSITD – but it was
not too late for a consult out of country regarding the patient‘s condition. The Board also
stated that the Prior Approval Form must be completed before the health care service out
of country is received. However, in this case, the patient submitted the form to her SP but
the SP did not complete the form before the consult despite the SP‘s endorsement that the
patient should seek the consult. Thus, according to the Board, the patient had to wait for
the SP to complete the form in order to quality for s.28.4(5) Prior Approval by OHIP.
The Board granted the out of country coverage on the basis of Delay causing MSITD.
442

06-HIA-0047 L.S. at10.
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2. Case 322 (06-HIA-0265 D.A.M.) dealt with consultation and biopsies for foot
pain at John Hopkins Hospital (JHH) in Baltimore, Maryland. The discrepancy within
Team Patient arose between the P and the SP regarding the ‗experimental‘ element of the
pretest to s.28.4(2).

The patient‘s SP referred her to JHH. The Board admitted evidence that was submitted by
the patient following the close of the Hearing. Recognizing that it was not the ordinary
practice to file evidence after the conclusion of a Hearing, the Board found the evidence –
a letter from a Professor of Neurology supporting the patient – to be relevant to the issue
on appeal. Under the authority of the SPPS to control its own process, the Board stated it
had the jurisdiction to admit the evidence. OHIP responded to the letter in submissions to
the Board.443

Initially, the patient‘s SP on the Prior Approval Form stated that the treatment was
‗experimental‘. In a subsequent letter after OHIP had made its decision not to fund the
request, the patient‘s SP stated:

―In your application, I indeed indicated that the procedure is considered
experimental in Ontario. At the time, I meant to indicate that this procedure is not
offered as a regular diagnostic service. I indicated that the investigation is
generally appropriate for a person in these medical circumstances.‖444

443
444

06-HIA-0265 D.A.M. at 2
06-HIA-0265 D.A.M. at 8
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In a second subsequent letter, the SP confirms he sent the patient on a referral to JHH but
the diagnostic ―…is recognized worldwide as a reliable diagnostic procedure if done in a
centre with expertise. …‖445 OHIP agreed with the SP‘s initial position that the procedure
was experimental and stated:

―It is the General Manager‘s position that the continued evidence from an Ontario
expert shows that the procedure being requested out-of-country is considered
experimental by Ontario standards and, in accordance with the previously notes
sections of the Health Insurance Act, of Ontario, funding cannot be considered by
the Ontario Health Insurance Plan for this form of investigation and testing.‖446

Based on the evidence, the Board determined that the treatment was not experimental and
thus within the jurisdiction of OHIP to fund. The patient and OHIP agreed on GA and no
I/E in Ontario existed. It is interesting to note that the evidence for no I/E from the patient
was a simple indication on the Prior Approval Form and a letter from the SP, uncontested
by OHIP, which stated:

―The technique of cutaneous nerve biopsy is not offered in Canada.‖447

The Board stated that if the procedure is GA and not performed in Ontario, OHIP was to
insure the out of country service. The Board stated that delay need not be considered:
445

06-HIA-0265 D.A.M. at 8
06-HIA-0265 D.A.M. at 8
447
06-HIA-0265 D.A.M. at10
446
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―Having found that the requested treatment, cutaneous nerve biopsy, is not
performed in Ontario by an identical or equivalent procedure, the Appeal Board need not
consider this issue [whether Delay would cause death or MSITD]‖.

3. Case 329 (06-HIA-0293 D.K.) dealt with reimbursement for back surgery at the
Cleveland Clinic in the USA. The discrepancy within Team Patient arose between the P
and the SP regarding the Delay causing M element of s.28.4(2).

The patient and OHIP agreed on GA and I/E but not Delay causing MSITD. In addition
to his GP, the patient contacted a number of SP in Ontario. One SP – Dr. D - gave a wait
time for surgery consultation and another wait time for the actual surgery. The patient,
patient‘s family and physicians explored surgery in Toronto, Hamilton, Windsor and
Timmins but found a wait list of at least 6 months. The patient proceeded to have surgery
at the Cleveland Clinic. The patient argued Delay causing MSITD. OHIP argued the
Delay did not cause MSITD based on OHIP‘s conversation with Dr. D. - one of the
patient‘s SP – who did not examine the patient. OHIP had contacted Dr. D‘s office and
Dr. D‘s secretary reported that Dr. D had reviewed the patient‘s chart and the patient
could wait for his appointment. The Board was not persuaded by this evidence and called
it Hearsay.

The Board took into account the evidence of Delay causing MSITD by one of the
patient‘s Ontario treating SP, and its consistency of the Cleveland neurosurgeon, the
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patient‘s attempts to contact surgeons for surgery and subsequently Granted out of
country coverage.

4. Case 362 (07-HIA-0018 S.F.) dealt with a diagnosis of pancreatic cancer. The
patient, a physician himself, was referred to 4 surgeons for a consult with one surgeon
proposing surgery 6 weeks later. The discrepancy within Team Patient arose between the
P and the SP regarding the Delay causing MSITD element of s.28.4(2).

The patient investigated and pursued surgery in the USA and submitted a reimbursement
request for surgery that had taken place at John Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore, USA in
Dec of 2006. The patient and OHIP agreed on GA and I/E but disagreed on Delay. The
patient argued that a 6 week delay for Ontario surgery would be a Delay causing MSITD.
The patient‘s Ontario GP agreed but the patient‘s Ontario surgeon did not agree and felt
that the 6 week delay would not have affected the tumor. Thus, there was conflicting
views from Ontario physicians who had examined the patient. The Board stated:

―The views of a specialist are often persuasive and perhaps more persuasive than
those of a family physician on matters concerning surgery; however, this is not
always the case. It is a question of fact whether the surgeon‘s opinion has more
weight than that of the family doctor.‖448

448

07-HIA-0018 at 4
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The patient argued that little weight should be given to his specialist‘s opinion but instead
the Board should weigh the observations of the USA surgeon conducting the operation
and the recurrence of the cancer following the USA surgery.

OHIP did not argue against the patient‘s statement that the cancer was ‗aggressive‘ but
argued that the Board should not rely on evidence gleaned following the surgery.449 OHIP
cited a previous Board case450 regarding evidence gleaned after a surgery:

―… the provision is one of the criteria for funding of services obtained with prior
approval. This also indicates that the question raised by the provision is whether
at the time of the application for prior approval, there is evidence that it is
necessary for a insured person to travel outside Canada to avoid a delay that
would result in medically significant irreversible tissue damage. To find that this
question is properly answered with evidence available only after treatment has
been obtained would render the language of the clause absurd, because the
criterion could never be satisfied in advance, as it should be with prior approval.
Similarly, to find that one can satisfy a forward-looking criterion with hindsight
presents an untenable proposition in terms of the medical assessment that must be
performed to answer the question. A medical assessment of the necessity of
obtaining early treatment to avoid tissue damage or death is not properly an

449
450

07-HIA-0018 at 5
06-HIA-0001
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assessment, but rather a self-fulfilling prophecy if based solely on knowledge of,
and pronounced following, the outcome of the treatment. (emphasis added).‖451

The Board agreed that it would not rely exclusively on evidence gleaned after surgery to
determine Delay.

It is important to note the role of the SP in these 4 cases granted in Year 5. In each case,
the SP was acting as a ‗gatekeeper‘ and in 3 or the 4 cases where there was a discrepancy
between the P and the SP regarding Delay causing MSITD – s.28.4(2)(b)(ii). It is also
interesting to note that the SP was not present at the Hearing to answer questions from the
parties or the Board.

Summary
The discrepancies in the patients‘ s.28.4(2) argument were analysed relative to the
determination of the Board whether or not to grant OHIP coverage for OCCNEIHS. In
summary, of the 106 Year 5 cases, 50 cases showed discrepancies within Team Patient of
which 4 cases were granted OHIP coverage. The rate of discrepancies within Team
Patient is remarkable because of grounds for granting out of country coverage are based
on medical opinion for medically necessary services. If there is a disagreement, it is
between the patient and their medical professional(s) whether or not the criteria of
s.28.4(2) are met. The Team Patient discrepancies could be GA, I/E or Delay causing D
and/or M elements of s.28.4(2). The question becomes whether the discrepancies had an
451

07-HIA-0018 at 5
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effect on the Board‘s Granting or Denying of out of country coverage. The study is very
limited in that only 4 cases out of 50 Team Patient discrepancy cases were granted. The
remaining 46 Team Patient discrepancy cases were Denied by the Board. Of those 4
Team Patient discrepancy cases granted, if the discrepancy was within the GA element or
the I/E element of s.28.4(2) test, the Board appears to not grant the out of country
coverage. If, however, there is a Team Patient discrepancy in Delay causing death and or
MSITD, a different pattern emerges such that the Board still Granted the out of country
coverage 50% of the time. Although this is preliminary, exploratory data, the difference
of patterns warrants more investigation beyond this study.

It is important to note that the s.28.4(2) elements of GA and Delay both apply directly to
the patient‘s medical condition. In s.28.4(2), the element of I/E applies is a non-patient
specific element as it assesses the availability of treatment in Ontario rather than any
medical condition of the patient.
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